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ABSTRACT
Usable Security and Privacy for Secure Messaging Applications
Elham Vaziripour
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
The threat of government and corporate surveillance around the world, as well as the
publicity surrounding major cybersecurity attacks, have increased interest in secure and private
end-to-end communications. In response to this demand, numerous secure messaging applications
have been developed in recent years. These applications have been welcomed and publically used
not just by political activists and journalists but by everyday users as well. Most of these popular
secure messaging applications are usable because they hide many of the details of how encryption
is provided. The strength of the security properties of these applications relies on the authentication
ceremony, wherein users validate the keys being used for encryption that is exchanged through the
service providers. The validation process typically involves verifying the fingerprints of encryption
keys to protect the communication from being intercepted.
In this dissertation, we explore how to help users enhance the privacy of their communications, with a particular focus on secure messaging applications. First, we explore whether secure
messaging applications are meeting the security and privacy needs of their users, especially in
countries that practice censorship and restrict civil liberties, including blocking access to social
media and communication applications. Second, we studied existing popular secure messaging
applications to explore how users interact with these applications and how well they are using the
authentication ceremony during lab studies. Third, we applied design principles to improve the
interfaces for the authentication ceremony, and also to help users find and perform the authentication ceremony faster. Forth, we applied the lessons from our interviews with participants in
our user studies to help users comprehend the importance of authentication. As part of the effort,
we developed an authentication ceremony using social media accounts to map key fingerprints to
social features, pushing the ceremony to a more natural domain for users. We modified the Signal
secure messaging application to include this social authentication ceremony and used a user study
to compare this method to other common methods. We found that social authentication has some
promising features, but that social media companies are too distrusted by users. Based on our
results, we make several recommendations to improve the use of security and privacy features in
secure messaging applications and outline areas for future work.

Keywords: security, HCI, authentication ceremony, usable security, user study, secure messaging
applications, end-to-end encryption
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Over the past several years, disclosures of widespread surveillance of Internet traffic and
security breaches have shed light on the necessity of end-to-end encryption to protect communication.
With end-to-end encryption, every piece of information is encrypted by the sender, so that only
the recipient may decrypt it. Using end-to-end encryption prevents messages, videos, photos, and
documents from being read by anyone but the intended recipient. For instance, this is useful for
communication between patients and their doctors, financial planners, and their customers, or among
friends who discuss sensitive political topics in countries where freedom of speech is curtailed.
End-to-end encryption is most commonly used today in secure messaging applications, such
as WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, and Viber. These applications use significant automation to greatly
simplify key management for users. For example, some of the secure messaging applications, such
as WhatsApp and Signal, provide a trusted key server to distribute public keys that are associated
with each phone number. Other secure messaging applications, such as Safeslinger and Zendo,
require the user to exchange keys out-of-band before the conversation can begin, such as by scanning
a QR code. Many secure messaging applications use the Signal protocol to establish a shared secret
between the users [49].
In this dissertation, we study the usability of the security and privacy features of popular
secure messaging applications. While some of these applications are widely used, there is evidence
that many people do not understand or use the features available to them. This may be because
application developers have prioritized usability over security. We first provide an overview of some
of these issues, then describe our work and contributions.
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1.1

Meeting the Security and Privacy Needs of Users

It is important to understand the security and privacy needs of users who use secure messaging applications, and whether these applications are meeting their needs. Information disclosure behaviors
are multidimensional, meaning people with different demographics have different tendencies to
disclose different types of information [23, 31]. It has been shown that privacy preferences vary
widely among people within a country and between countries. For instance, people who live in
Northern European and Eastern European countries reported to be less concerned than people were
living in Central and Southern European nations about the misuse of their information [14].
An important question is whether secure messaging applications are meeting the security
and privacy needs of their users, particularly those that do not have strong civil rights protections.
One of the few studies in this area, by Rashidi et al., examined the privacy practices of WhatsApp
users in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [50]. This study found that many users had changed their
privacy settings and had blocked unwanted contacts, but also wanted more control over their privacy.
They did not examine the use of security features in WhatsApp. Other work has studied users of
Telegram, but only in interviews within a lab setting [2], [1].
Telegram is one of the popular secure messaging applications, with widespread usage in
China, Iran, and Japan. Similar to other secure messaging applications, Telegram provides users
with a wide variety of privacy and security features that they must opt into using. The privacy
features include the ability to control who can see the last time they were active, who can call
them or add them to a group, and who can send them messages. The security features include
adding a passcode lock to the app, enabling two-step verification, and using end-to-end encryption
chat. Given the sensitivity of the information that can be discussed online, especially in vulnerable
situations, it is important to understand whether these features are being used. There is a little
knowledge about how these features are used in practice.
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1.2

Key Management for End Users

Encrypted messaging, known as secure messaging, provides end-to-end encrypted conversation
for users such that no one else, including the service providers, can decrypt and access their
conversations. Some secure messaging applications also provide end-to-end encryption for phone
calls.
Most secure messaging systems use symmetric encryption to encrypt the actual message
data. In some systems, the sender randomly chooses the key, and securely delivers it to the receiver
using the receiver’s public key. In other systems, they securely agree on the symmetric key using a
key agreement protocol, such as Diffie-Hellman. The key agreement protocol will often use the
participants public keys to complete securely in order to avoid a MitM attack. The public keys of
both participants is a key property on which the security of this process depends.
Key management refers to the set of techniques and procedures that support initialization,
generation, distribution, update, auditing, revocation, storage, recovery and validating of the public
key materials. Key management is generally considered the main obstacle to the usability of publickey cryptography systems because this involves many interactions with cryptographic concepts that
users are unfamiliar with [26].
Signal is a secure messaging application that is available for the Android, iOS, Windows,
MacOS and Linux platforms. Users can use the app to send secure messages, as well as voice
and files. The app is free and open source, allowing any party to audit and verify the app’s code.
Some other secure messaging applications, such as WhatsApp, have adopted the Signal protocol to
automatically encrypt conversations.
The Signal protocol is an evolution of the OTR protocol that allows for secure asynchronous
messaging (i.e., both participants need not be online at the same time). OTR provides forward
secrecy by using ephemeral key exchanges for each session [13]. Therefore, compromise of one
key session would not cause a compromise of the whole conversation. OTR continuously ratchets
the key material forward during a session. The OTR ratchet is called a “three step ratchet” [65]. In
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each message exchange step, one party is advertising their new key, and acknowledging the key that
their conversation partner has offered.
The automatic key management in secure messaging applications such as Signal enables
them to be adopted widely since hiding these details makes them usable by many people without
ever having to know about encryption. The server providers automatically exchange public keys for
their users. However, this also opens the door to new vulnerabilities. It is possible that a service
provider can be coerced or attacked so that it replaces the public key of a user with its own, in order
to conduct a man-in-the-middle attack that allows the service provider to view the encrypted traffic.
Therefore, to be safe, users should verify the public keys they receive before sending sensitive
information.
Significant work has been spent designing key distribution mechanisms, with an emphasis
on helping one user get the correct public key for another user. One of the earliest techniques
is the web of trust in PGP [81]. Web of trust is a trust model that leaves the trust decision to
individual users, who must meet in person and exchange signed keys for each other and for other
contacts. The “web” refers to trusting the “friends of your friend”, who has given you their keys.
The main challenge with the web of trust model is that it requires users to have a high level of
understanding about keys and also requires in-person meetings, which can be especially difficult for
those living in remote areas. To tackle these challenges some secure email schemes rely on a trusted
key server to distribute public keys. For example, most secure messaging applications use a key
server to bootstrap secure communication. Alternatively, both S/MIME and HTTPS use a certificate
authority (CA) to act as a trusted third party. The CA signs client certificates and maintains a public
database of the certificates. Although key servers make it easy to find a user’s public key, it is
important for users to verify they have their right keys registered with the certificate authority. For
example, CONIKS provides a system that provides efficient monitoring of key servers as well as a
privacy-preserving directory for publishing keys [46].
Keybase is a special key server that allows people to link their social media accounts to a
public key. Users first create a unique username and associate it with their public keys in Keybase.
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Next, users prove that they own their social media accounts. When someone wants to find the public
key of a user, they ask Keybase, and it provides the proofs of ownership that link the social media
accounts to a public key. Keybase partially protects communications against man-in-the-middle
attacks. A man-in-the-middle attack needs a compromise of multiple social media accounts, which
is less likely to happen.

1.3

Authentication Ceremony

The effective security being provided by secure messaging applications depends heavily on users
completing an authentication ceremony, the process of manually verifying the fingerprint of the
initial encryption key being used. This key, which is called the safety number in Signal, is derived
from the public keys of the conversation partners and their phone numbers. Any user who does
not execute the authentication ceremony for a particular conversation is essentially trusting the
application’s servers to distribute the public keys correctly. This makes the conversation vulnerable
to a man-in-the-middle attack.
Third parties, a hacker or the service provider, could intercept the traffic by positioning
in between the two endpoints of a conversation and replacing the public keys with fake ones. To
make this attack work, the attacker would need to change the keys used to encrypt data for the
conversation. The attacker can do this if they replace the public key for a user with their own public
key. If this is successful, as Figure 1.1a shows, the attacker can intercept the messages. To make sure
the conversations are secure and private, users need to verify the integrity of the exchanged public
keys, which are used to transfer the encryption keys securely, like what is shown in Figure 1.1b.
Each application provides a different user interface to facilitate the authentication ceremony.
Users may verify the public key of their partner such as by manually comparing a fingerprint of
the derived key that has been mapped into English sentences, by comparing a hexadecimal version
of the fingerprint, or by scanning a QR code that encodes the fingerprint. Recent research shows
that sentence-based encoding of a key fingerprint is more resistant to attacks and rated high on
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(a) Conversations on secure messaging applications are vulnerable to MitM attacks.

(b) Authentication ceremony detects possible MitM attacks in the communication.

Figure 1.1: Threat to secure messaging applications
usability, but low on trustworthiness among users as compared to hexadecimal, alphanumeric,
or pure numeric representations [18]. Other work shows that graphical representations are more
susceptible; however, they are easy and quick to use [66].
Unfortunately, the evidence to date suggests users are unable to perform the authentication
ceremony successfully in current messaging applications [8, 33, 58]. Assal et. al. found that only
30% of participants successfully completed the QR code verification with no error, mainly due
to the ambiguity of the connection between the key and QR code to them [8]. Schröder et. al.
associate this huge failure rate to usability problems and incomplete mental models [58]. Herzberg
and Leibowitz proposed that with some instruction about the ceremony itself, users can successfully
find and conduct the authentication [33].
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1.4

Usable Security

Only by simultaneously addressing both usability and security concerns will we be able to build
systems that are truly secure. The usable security field is interdisciplinary, mixing the methods
of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) with methods and results from information security and
privacy [27]. The Department of Homeland Security has listed 11 hard problems in information
security, with the 11th problem being usable security:
Security must be usable by persons ranging from nontechnical users to experts and
system administrators. Furthermore, systems must be usable while maintaining security.
In the absence of usable security, there is ultimately no effective security [27].
A key component of this dissertation is the use of lab user studies and surveys to evaluate various
authentication ceremony techniques, both those we created and existing systems within secure
messaging applications. We collected both quantitative data and qualitative data to assess usability,
identify flaws, and get ideas for how to improve a secure application. We used usability studies to
compare different versions of a secure messaging application with different built-in authentication
methods, to study which performs best or which users like more.
In our lab user studies, participants are recruited in pairs across the campus and are brought
into the lab and asked to complete several tasks using secure messaging applications. These tasks
are part of a scenario, wherein participants played the role of another person and required to send
sensitive information to their conversation partners. After completing the assigned tasks with an
authentication ceremony within a secure messaging application, users complete a survey regarding
their experience. Additionally, study coordinators monitor participant actions, record participant
discussion while thinking aloud about the task or answering questions, or record the screen of a
phone during the study. These recordings and monitoring are used to calculate task completion
times and note mistakes made while using systems. We define a mistake as a user accidentally or
intentionally sending sensitive information before completing the authentication ceremony. Finally,
we interview participants regarding their experience to gather additional qualitative data.
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One of the primary areas where usable security has been studied is email. Whitten and
Tygar, in the very first usability study of PGP 5.0, showed that users were confused about how PGP
is supposed to protect their messages and they were unable to use the software [? ]. Fifteen years
later, Ruoti et al. showed that Mailvelope, a modern PGP tool, was still difficult for users to operate
correctly [52]. More success has been seen with S/MIME-based systems. Garfinkel and Miller
showed that automatic key management improved the usability of S/MIME, although too much
transparency caused users to fail to notice the visual security indicators [28]. Recent work has made
significant progress in improving the usability of PGP. Bai et al. conducted a study that asked users
to compare a key exchange model (similar to PGP’s web of trust) to a key directory model (similar
to PGP with a key server) [11]. They found that the key directory model was more usable and that
users felt its security was “good enough” for most purposes.
Another area of study for usable security is secure messaging [71]. Most popular secure
messaging applications are usable because they hide many of the details of how encryption is
provided. Abu-Salma et al. studied the adoption of secure messaging and found that fragmentation
of users among a variety of applications and lack of interoperability are the primary obstacles
to adoption. In addition, users feel that secure messaging applications cannot provide protection
against strong adversaries [2]. Schröder et al. studied the usability and security of Signal, showing
that users were susceptible to active attacks due to usability problems and incomplete mental models
of public key cryptography [58]. Herzberg and Leibowitz examined the usability of WhatsApp,
Viber, Telegram, and Signal, finding that most users were unable to properly authenticate, both
in an initial authentication ceremony and after a key reset [33]. In a user study by Assal et al.,
participants were asked to perform the authentication ceremony in ChatSecure using different key
representations, which include a fingerprint, shared secret, and QR code [8]. Participants performed
well with a shared secret, but poorly with the fingerprint and QR code.
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1.5

Dissertation Overview

Chapter 2. Elham Vaziripour, Reza Farahbakhsh, Mark O’Neill, Justin Wu, Kent Seamons, and
Daniel Zappala, Private But Not Secure: A Survey Of the Privacy Preferences and Practices of
Iranian Users of Telegram, Workshop on Usable Security (USEC), February 2018.

We first study whether secure messaging applications are meeting the security and privacy needs
of their users, who mainly live in countries that practice censorship and restrict civil rights. To
answer these questions, we performed the first large-scale survey on Iranian Telegram users, living
both inside and outside the country employing snowball sampling technique. Specifically, we were
interested in understanding (1) how users perceive the importance of secure messaging; (2) why
they use secure messaging applications, especially in countries with higher risk of government
censorship or surveillance; (3) how users use privacy and security features of these applications;
(4) what type of information they choose to share over secure messaging applications and whether
users employ these applications to share sensitive information.
We found that the majority of respondents, particularly those who live inside Iran, feel that
it is necessary that secure messaging applications protect the privacy of their conversations, yet their
adoption of available security and privacy features is mixed. Many participants report blocking
particular users and editing or deleting messages, but few report using security features such as a
pass code, two-step verification, and using secret chat. We speculated that the differences between
privacy and security feature usages are due to design of these features within the application and
higher familiarity of users to privacy features, in addition to uers’ threat models. We also find a
contradiction between a stronger desire for privacy by those living in Iran, yet those same users
are more likely to share sensitive information while using Telegram. Thus current users trust is
misplaced and there is a strong need to improve usage of privacy and security features in Telegram.

Chapter 3. Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Mark O’Neill, Ray Clinton, Jordan Whitehead, Scott
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Heidbrink, Kent Seamons, and Daniel Zappala, Is that you, Alice? A Usability Study of the
Authentication Ceremony of Secure Messaging Applications, Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Security (SOUPS), July 2017.

It is well known that if a user cannot verify the authenticity of the keys used to secure the
conversation, then there is no guarantee that someone else is not listening in to the conversation.
The next step in this dissertation was to determine how well users could locate and complete the
authentication ceremony when they are aware of the need for authentication while working with
popular secure messaging applications. We also were interested to explore their threat models,
and their awareness about the importance of the authentication ceremony. We conducted a twophase within-subject user study involving 36 pairs of participants using three popular messaging
applications with support for secure functionality: WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook Messenger. The
first phase included instructions about potential threats, while the second phase included instructions
about the importance of the authentication ceremony. This series of studies helped us to identify the
pros and cons of different authentication methods and gave us insight into how users think about
encryption.
We found that the overall success rate for the first phase was 14%, while in the second phase,
when we provided participants with instruction, the success rate improved to 78% overall. However,
the time required to find and complete the authentication ceremony was long. The success rate for
Viber was significantly higher, 96%, and this is likely due to its use of an in-app phone call for the
authentication ceremony. Participants rated the usability of all applications in the “C” range, and
many complained about the length of the fingerprint they needed to read to complete the ceremony.
We also found that while participants were concerned about impersonation attacks and surveillance
by the government, they were unaware of the possibility of an active man-in-the-middle attack.

Chapter 4. Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Mark O’Neill, Dan Metro, Josh Cockrell, Timothy
Moffett, Jordan Whitehead, Nick Bonner, Kent Seamons, and Daniel Zappala, Action Needed!
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Helping Users Find and Complete the Authentication Ceremony in Signal, Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security (SOUPS), August 2018.

The lab studies that we performed on existing popular secure messaging applications showed
that even with the instruction, the time it takes users to find and complete the ceremony is excessively
long from the usability stand point. Thus the question we asked in the next part of the dissertation was
whether we could help users find and complete the authentication ceremony more quickly, without
any instruction about the ceremony or its importance. To approach this problem, we applied several
design principles to modify Signal secure messaging application to include prompts for the ceremony
and also simplify the ceremony itself. We employed opinionated design, a design philosophy that
advocates making more secure decisions for users and leaves fewer options to them. Furthermore,
we provide nudges and monetary incentives in order to encourage participants to be security minded
now that they wouldn’t get any instruction on the importance of the authentication. We modified the
Signal source code and developed two modifications. The first modification provided verification
status indicators and helped users notice and locate the authentication ceremony. The second
modification included these changes and also provided an improved authentication ceremony with
simpler instructions. To evaluate the impact of modifications, we conducted a between-subject user
study, recruiting 30 pairs of participants.
We found that users were able to find the authentication ceremony faster using our new
design, and with no further instruction they succeeded to complete the authentication faster in the
second modification. Many participants indicated they would be willing to use the authentication
ceremony if they had a specific need for it, such as a for a sensitive conversation. However,
participant understanding of the purpose of the ceremony was mixed. We learned that there is more
space to help users comprehend the importance of authentication.

Chapter 5. Elham Vaziropour, Devon Howard, Jake Tyler, Justin Wu, Kent Seamons, Daniel
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Zappala, I Don’t Even Have to Bother Them! Using Social Media to Automate the Authentication
Ceremony in Secure Messaging, CHI 2019.

Our modified version of Signal is fast and easy to use for authentication, but it still requires
people to make a phone call or meet in person. There may be many times when it is not convenient
to have to meet or call your contact each time you want to verify the safety numbers. Thus, our
ultimate goal was to partially automate the ceremony and enable people to do it on their own.
The method we investigated is called social authentication, which means authenticating
users by associating their public key with their social media accounts. To verify the identity of
a contact, a user fetches all of the public keys that have been published and compares them to
ensure they are identical. Using social networks in this way lets us map the fingerprint comparison
commonly used today into social network identities. This could help people to better comprehend
the purpose of the ceremony, while also automating the fingerprint comparison. This method also
enables a user to perform the ceremony on their own, without having to coordinate with each contact.
To evaluate this approach, we conducted a within-subject lab user study with 21 pairs of students,
who compared social authentication to the traditional methods of a phone call and scanning a QR
code.
Our results are mixed. Participants found social authentication to be fast and usable, but
they did not trust this method as much as the other methods of authentication due to their general
mistrust of social media. Overall, we learned that automating the authentication ceremony with
additional service providers is promising, but this infrastructure needs to be more trusted than social
media companies. Deciding who these entities should be requires additional study.
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Chapter 2
A Survey of the Privacy Preferences and Practices of Iranian Users of Telegram1

Abstract
Telegram is a secure messaging application that offers a wide variety of privacy and security
features, but these features must be activated or chosen by users, rather than being turned on by
default. At the same time, Telegram has a large number of users in Iran, who may potentially have a
high need for privacy and security. In this paper, we present a survey of about 400 Iranian users of
Telegram, living both inside and outside of Iran, exploring their privacy preferences and their use
of Telegram’s available privacy and security features. We find that the overwhelming majority of
respondents feel it is important that messaging applications protect the privacy of their messages,
yet their adoption of the available privacy and security features is mixed. We discuss in detail these
varying practices and how the design of Telegram influences adoption of various features. We finish
by discussing recommendations for improving the design of Telegram and similar secure messaging
applications so that they place a greater priority on protecting privacy.

1

Elham Vaziripour, Reza Farahbakhsh, Mark O’Neill, Justin Wu, Kent Seamons, and Daniel Zappala, Private But
Not Secure: A Survey Of the Privacy Preferences and Practices of Iranian Users of Telegram, Workshop on Usable
Security (USEC), February 2018.
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2.1

Introduction

Recent disclosures of government surveillance in the United States and other countries, as well as
fears over cybersecurity attacks, have increased interest in secure and private communication. In
response to this demand, numerous secure messaging apps have been developed in recent years.
Applications such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Viber encrypt all messages by default, using end-to-end
encryption between the devices of communicating partners, so that the service provider is unable to
view the content of messages and passive monitoring by a government or hacker is not possible.
Other applications use plaintext messaging, with encrypted chat as an optional feature, including
Facebook Messenger and Telegram.
An important question is whether secure messaging applications are meeting the security and
privacy needs of their users. Of particular concern are those countries that practice censorship and
restrict civil liberties, including blocking access to social media and communications applications,
blocking access to content, and arresting journalists and bloggers [34]. Are citizens of these
countries, in those cases where secure messaging apps are not blocked, able to effectively use the
privacy and security features at their disposal?
One of the few studies in this area, by Rashidi et al., examined the privacy practices of
WhatsApp users in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [50]. This study found that many users had
changed their privacy settings and had blocked unwanted contact, but also wanted more control
over their privacy. They did not examine the use of security features in WhatsApp. Other work has
studied users of Telegram, but only in interviews within a lab setting [1, 2].
Telegram is a particularly interesting subject for study because of its widespread usage
among the Iranian populace. One study estimates that Telegram is used by approximately 40
million users in Iran [30], with many residents using it daily, primarily to chat with friends and
family [10]. From a technical perspective, Telegram is interesting because, in contrast to WhatsApp,
Telegram’s encrypted chat functionality is optional, a decision that has been criticized by privacy
advocates [70]. Similarly, Telegram provides users a wide array of privacy and security features
that they must opt into using. Privacy features include the ability to control who can see the last
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time they were active, who can call them or add them to a group, and who can send them messages.
Security features include adding a passcode lock to the app, enabling two-step verification, and
using end-to-end encrypted chat. Understanding how these features are used can help improve
messaging application design. Given the sensitivity of information that can be discussed online, it is
important to understand whether these features are being used. For example, Telegram has been
used for sharing political views, resulting in the closure of some channels and the arrest of the users
who managed them [21, 30].
Accordingly, we have conducted the first large-scale survey of Iranian users of the Telegram
secure messaging application to seek insight into how they use the privacy and security features it
offers. Specifically, we are interested in understanding (1) how participants perceive the importance
of secure messaging; (2) why participants use Telegram; (3) whether they use Telegram to send
sensitive information, why or why not, and the general strategies they use to protect their privacy;
(4) how participants use the privacy features of Telegram; and (5) how participants use the security
features of Telegram, including whether they use the authentication ceremonies in encrypted chat
and phone calls. We used snowball sampling and some advertising on Twitter to distribute our
survey, and, after filtering for unfinished responses, our final data set totals 392 responses.
An important aspect of our work is in analyzing the differences between participants living
in Iran versus those living outside Iran. Do the differences in environment translate into differences
in perceived threat models, and do these, in turn, translate into differences in adopted attitudes and
behaviors? Because our sample population is largely homogeneous while including members both
inside and outside Iran, it has the potential to offer great insight into these questions, and this is one
focal point of our analysis.
Our results indicate that privacy is important to the vast majority of participants, yet half
have shared sensitive information on Telegram, and a primary factor is trust in the security of
Telegram. Use of privacy and security features is mixed, with high usage for blocking and editing or
deleting messages, but low usage of security features. There is a significant lack of understanding of
what encrypted chat does and the security guarantees it provides for users. Participants living in Iran
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were more likely to rate privacy as extremely important to them, more likely to use Telegram daily,
and yet are also more likely to share sensitive information while using Telegram. Based on these
findings we make several recommendations for improving the privacy and security of Telegram and
similar secure messaging applications.
Artifacts: We have created a companion website at https://telegram.internet.byu.edu that
provides the survey questions, anonymous participant responses, coded data for open response
questions, and a script that calculates relevant summary tables and statistics. For convenience we
also include the survey questions and summary tables of the responses in the Appendix.

2.2

Related Work

Two papers have examined questions relating to use of security and privacy features in secure
messaging applications in particular countries. Rashidi et al. conducted a study of the privacy
practices of 626 WhatsApp users in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [50]. They found that majority
(59%) had changed at least one privacy setting, with about 45% changing who could see their last
seen status, while about 25% changed who could see their profile photo or status. They also found
that 2/3 had been contacted by strangers and 75% had used the blocking feature. Church et al.
previously studied a very early version of WhatsApp and used a survey of 131 residents of Spain to
show that users were concerned about showing their last seen status and the delivery status of their
messages [15].
Other work that studies Telegram includes a paper by Abu-Salma et al. that conducted a
user study of Telegram’s security features [1] with 22 participants. They found at most partial
adoption of Telegram for its security features, and those who had used the tool previously often
abandoned it for a more popular app. Participants tended to use other methods, such as phone calls
or meeting in person, to exchange sensitive information, rather than using Telegram. They also
found some confusion about the functionality of secret chat and the self destruct timer. Another
paper by Abu-Salma et al., while focused primarily on adoption of secure messaging, touches on
use of Telegram [2]. They found that all of the participants who used Telegram did not use secret
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chat, due to the overhead of switching between the default and secure mode, or because they forget
to use it. Only one participant was able to explain the key fingerprints used in the authentication
ceremony, most participants did not setup a passcode, and most felt calls and SMS were more secure
than secure messaging apps.
Part of our work concerns how users adopt the security features available to them. Renaud
et al. [51] found that lack of usability was not the primary reason for users not adopting end-to-end
encrypted emails; rather, incomplete threat models, misaligned incentives and general absence of
understanding of email security are the main obstacles. Abu-Salma et al. studied the adoption
of secure messaging and found that fragmentation of users among a variety of applications and
lack of interoperability are the primary obstacles to adoption; users feel that secure messaging
applications cannot provide protection against strong adversaries [2]. Work by De Luca et al. also
showed that people use secure messaging applications because of peer influence, not due to security
concerns [17].
We are also interested in users’ privacy preferences. The Android permission system is
intended to inform users about the sensitive data an application will access and give them the
ability to cancel installation if they do not approve. One study examined the effectiveness of this
system and found low attention rates and extremely low comprehension [24]. Subsequent work
has proposed a personalized privacy assistant application that could motivate users to review and
modify their privacy settings with the aid of privacy nudges [43]. MacNamara et al. [45] showed
that those who have a more independent decision-making style tend to be more conservative in
sharing personal information. Dupree et al. [20] have clustered users based on their attitudes and
practices toward security practices. Acquisti and Grossklags [3] suggested that users are likely to
trade off their long-term privacy for short-term benefits in making privacy-sensitive decisions.
We note that Telegram uses a custom protocol, known as MTProto, to provide end-to-end
encryption. This is considered poor practice by cryptographers [70], since it is difficult to create a
secure protocol on your own, and there is an alternative protocol, Signal, that is well accepted by
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cryptographers and has been audited extensively [16]. A variety of flaws in MTProto have been
found [36, 37, 40, 54].

2.3

Telegram

Telegram is a free instant messaging application, launched in 2013, that enables users to send
messages of any type to each other, including photos, videos, audio messages, or other files.
Messages can be sent to individuals, with optional end-to-end encryption, or to groups (200
members maximum), supergroups (20,000 members maximum), and channels (unlimited, public).
Messages can be synchronized across mobile, desktop, and web platforms. Telegram has a wide
range of privacy and security features that it promotes, particularly encrypted and self-destructing
messages. Telegram announced in February, 2016 that it had 100 million monthly users2 ; it has an
estimated 40 million users in Iran [68]. Telegram recently added a new voice calling feature, but
this has been blocked in Iran [6].
Telegram offers several different privacy and security settings, shown in Figure 2.1a. Under
the category of privacy settings, users can control who is able to see their last seen status (time last
active in the application), who can call them, and who can add them to groups. These settings all
allow three options: everybody, my contacts, and nobody. Telegram also lets users block each other;
blocking someone means they can’t message you and can’t see your last seen status.
Under the category of security settings, Telegram provides two additional options. Users
can set a passcode lock that can lock access to all chats in the app, which also allows the option of
using fingerprint unlock on compatible phones. Users can also enable two-step verification, which
sets an additional password that is required when logging in from a new device, in addition to the
code received over SMS. This provides additional security against SMS attacks. There have been
recent SMS attacks against Telegram reported in both Iran and Russia [35, 47].
Telegram offers two distinct types of individual (person-to-person) messaging. The default
messaging in Telegram, which they call cloud chat, encrypts messages between users and the
2

https://telegram.org/blog/100-million
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(a) Privacy and security settings

(b) Initiating a secret chat

Figure 2.1: Privacy and security in Telegram

Telegram server, but does not use end-to-end encryption. Telegram also offers end-to-end encrypted
chats, which they call secret chat, which uses a form of end-to-end encryption. When a user deletes
a message in a secret chat, it is deleted for both participants. Secret chat also includes a self-destruct
feature, controlled by a user-settable timer. Telegram justifies the use of two different types of
chat as providing two different use cases, and claims that cloud chat enables Telegram to be used
more broadly, so that activists and dissidents are not singled out as being the only ones using their
platform.3
To initiate a secret chat, a user can click on New Secret Chat in the main menu, shown in
Figure 2.1b, or click on a friend’s name in a cloud chat and then click on Start Secret Chat. An
important part of using secret chat securely is to perform the authentication ceremony, which is
a process for verifying the integrity of the exchanged encryption keys. Users have the option of
checking whether a graphical representation of the key is identical (which would typically be done
in person) or whether a decimal representation of the key is identical (which could be done with
a phone call). Interestingly, Telegram provides a different authentication method for voice calls,
which use end-to-end encryption by default. In this case, users can compare a representation of the
key that uses emojis.
3

https://telegram.org/faq#q-why-not-just-make-all-chats-secret
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2.4

Methodology

We conducted an IRB-approved, web-based survey to ask Iranian Telegram-users about their
perceptions, preferences, and use of this secure messaging application.

2.4.1

Survey Development and Distribution

In designing our questionnaire, we began by first exploring the features available in Telegram
and drafting questions about user preference and use of the application. We then reviewed these
questions in several rounds of discussion with co-authors and other collaborators. We refined the
survey in English, and then one of the authors, a native speaker of Farsi, translated it into Farsi.
Before running the survey, a pilot study with 20 participants was conducted in both English and
Farsi. Feedback from the pilot study was used to revise the final wording and translations of the
questionnaire.
We distributed the survey using the Qualtrics platform and recruited participants via snowball
sampling. Two of the authors, native Iranians, asked Iranian friends (living both inside and outside
of Iran) who used Telegram to take the survey and share it with their friends. The survey was also
publicized on Twitter by tweeting it at approximately 2,000 Farsi speakers over a period of several
weeks, in an attempt to mitigate the negative effects of snowball sampling. Overall, we collected
572 responses, most from snowball sampling, removing 172 unfinished responses. We then filtered
the remaining results to include only those who had completed at least 60% of the survey and spent
at least 2 minutes answering the questions, leaving a total of 392 responses.

2.4.2

Potential Risks to Participants

We took a number of precautions to minimize the risk to participants of our survey. First, we avoided
asking questions on controversial topics, such as feelings on government censorship or surveillance.
Second, we did not ask for any personally identifiable information. Third, the survey was accessed
via a TLS connection, to prevent third-parties from observing answers to questions. Fourth, we did
not offer any compensation for taking the survey, to avoid inducing respondents to put themselves at
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risk in return for payment. Finally, we followed guidance from our IRB by placing a clear message
for participants at the beginning of the survey. This explained who we were and what the purpose of
our survey was. More importantly, it also informed participants that they could skip any questions
they were uncomfortable answering as well as end their participation in the survey at any time. The
survey questionnaire and all procedures were approved by our IRB.

2.4.3

Survey Design

The questionnaire contains 42 questions, the majority of which are multiple-choice and Likerttype questions, with a few open-response questions. At the start of the survey we provided an
introduction about the purpose of the study and an implied consent form that follows guidance from
our IRB. The survey was divided roughly into the following groups of questions: (a) demographics,
(b) privacy preferences, (c) usage of Telegram, (d) usage of privacy features, and (d) usage of
security features. At the conclusion of the survey, in lieu of payment, we provided some brief
education on the importance of the authentication ceremony when using secure chat, along with a
recommendation that for greater security they could use Signal. We then provided some instructions
on how to use the authentication ceremony in Telegram. Respondents were given the option to leave
an email address for further contact.

2.4.4

Data Analysis

In order to analyze the data for open-response questions, three of the authors coded the data together,
ensuring agreement on all codes. The coding methodology employed was that of conventional
content analysis, which is nearly identical to grounded theory except that it does not attempt to output
a theory. In the first phase, we reviewed each response to open-response questions phrase-by-phrase
and word-by-word to assign codes that classified users’ responses. We translated the Farsi responses
so that each of the three coders could work together, and then reviewed the original Farsi and the
context of each statement while coding. In the second phase, we used the constant comparative
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method to group codes into concepts. In the third phase, we organized related categories by merging
related codes.
We perform statistical analysis on responses to questions that allow us to do so. We provide
basic summary statistics for responses to each question as well as perform statistical tests to identify
whether participants living inside Iran answer in a manner distinguishable from those outside. We
include a deeper discussion of the statistical analysis performed in the Appendix.

2.4.5

Limitations

Snowball sampling is a useful methodology for sampling when it is not possible to use more
traditional survey techniques, and it has been employed successfully in previous work [50]. However,
this technique does come with a fairly notable downside. Because people tend to associate with
those that are similar to themselves, snowball sampling is prone to creating population samples that
are highly heterogeneous. Indeed, our sample consists largely of respondents aged 25-34 who are,
on average, more educated the general populace as a whole. Because our sample cannot be seen
as representative of a larger population, it would be inappropriate to attempt to directly generalize
results to the larger population as a whole.
Another limitation of our work is that surveys based on self-reported security practices
may be inaccurate due to participants misremembering or misunderstanding how they use security
features. Some work has shown that there is not always a correlation between what people say
and what they practice [77] in the domain of security behaviors. This work showed that behaviors
involving choices and a visible effect, such as installing a popup blocker or using strong passwords,
are self-reported with moderate accuracy. There is low accuracy for security behaviors that are
more passive, such as the installation of security updates. We believe that the privacy and security
practices we survey in this study fall more under the former category and are likely to involve active
choices and visible effects, such as blocking users, setting a username, using a passcode, or the
use of secret chat. We have further attempted to alleviate misunderstandings about terminology by
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providing screenshots of the features and settings in question alongside the questions asking about
them.

2.5

Results

A total of 572 participants started the survey online between July 12, 2017 and September 1,
2017. Due to the length of the survey, not all participants completed the entire survey. We include
responses only for those participants who completed at least 60% of the survey and spent at least
2 minutes answering the questions. Out of the total, 392 participants meet these criteria and are
included in our results.
The full survey is given in the Appendix. Where space permits we include tables in this
section showing results from the survey, with additional columns showing results split among those
living inside Iran or outside the country. For convenience, we include all summary tables of results
in the Appendix.

2.5.1

Demographics

Out of the 392 participants, 391 reported their gender. Our sample population skewed toward
female (N=234, 59.8%) and younger participants between ages 25–34 (N=239, 60.9%). Most of our
participants were educated, with either a four-year degree (N=118, 30%), Master’s degree (N=152,
38.7%), or a doctorate (N=88, 22.4%). Most were currently living inside Iran (N=256, 65.3%) with
the rest primarily living in the United States of America (N=76, 19.3%). Most participants were
born in Iran (N=350, 89.2%). Those who were living outside Iran reported they had lived outside
the country for an average of 5 years and 8 months.

2.5.2

Privacy preferences

We asked several general questions about privacy preferences. We first asked participants: How
important is it to you that messaging applications protect the privacy of your messages from viewing
by other parties? As shown in Table 2.1, 92.9% of the participants reported that privacy of their
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Table 2.1: How important is it to you that messaging applications protect the privacy of your
messages from viewing by other parties?
Answer
Extremely Important
Important
Neither
Unimportant
Extremely Unimportant

Total

Inside

Outside

64.8%
28.1%
5.4%
1.3%
0.5%

70.3%
22.3%
5.9%
1.6%
0%

54.4%
39%
4.4%
0.7%
1.5%

Table 2.2: I am more likely to trust a secure messaging application to protect my privacy if I pay for
it.
Answer
Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Total

Inside

Outside

14%
35.2%
30.6%
10.7%
9.2%

11.7%
37.1%
30.9%
11.7%
8.6%

18.4%
31.6%
30.1%
8.8%
10.3%

conversations is either important or extremely important. More participants living inside Iran
reported that the privacy of their conversations is extremely important as compared to those living
outside the country (70.3% vs. 54.4%). This difference is statistically significant (P < 0.0001, Φc =
0.479, Fisher’s exact test).
We next asked participants to rank their agreement with the statement: I am more likely
to trust a secure messaging application to protect my privacy if I pay for it. Table 2.2 shows
that nearly half of participants reported either they strongly agreed or somewhat agreed with the
statement (N=193, 49.3%). We did not observe a statistically significant difference based on where
participants are living (P = 0.341, Fisher’s exact test).

2.5.3

Using Telegram

The next section of the survey asked about how participants use Telegram. Because Telegram
includes both insecure and secure messaging, we are interested in understanding whether participants
use Telegram to send sensitive data, and how they conceive of threats against their privacy.
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Table 2.3: Why do you use Telegram? Check all that apply.
Options
Stay in touch with friends/family
Group conversations
Follow channels
Free international communications
Voice messages
Security/privacy features
Stickers
Other

Total

Inside

Outside

80.9%
54.3%
52.6%
21.9%
17.9%
11.7%
13.5%
7.7%

81.2%
58.8%
64.3%
19.6%
16.5%
12.2%
12.9%
7.5%

82.7%
47.4%
31.6%
27.1%
21.1%
11.3%
15%
8.3%

We first asked: How often do you use Telegram? The vast majority (90%, N=352) reported
that they use Telegram on a daily basis. Those living inside Iran more frequently reported using
Telegram daily (93.4% vs 83.7%), and this is statistically significant (P = 0.011, Φc = 0.162,
Fisher’s exact test).
This survey continues by asking: Why do you use Telegram?. We gave participants a choice
of selecting one or more reasons from a list. As shown in Table 2.3, the most popular responses
were using Telegram to stay in touch with friends, being involved within group conversations, and
following channels. Only a very small minority reported using Telegram due to its security and
privacy features. The differences between those who live inside and outside of Iran are statistically
significant (P = 0.002, Φc = 0.145, Fisher’s exact test). This confirms prior work [19, 29] showing
that security and privacy are not the primary reason for users to use secure messaging applications.

Sharing sensitive information
We next asked: Have you ever used Telegram to send private/sensitive information, such as a credit
card number? Just over half (53%, N=207) of participants answered Yes to this question. Those
living inside Iran are more likely to use Telegram for sharing sensitive information than those living
outside the country, 59.8% to 40.3%, and the differences between those who live inside and outside
of Iran are statistically significant (X 2 (1, N = 392) = 12.614, P = 0.0004, Φc = 0.185).
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We asked the participants who reported that they used Telegram for sharing sensitive
information: How often do you have conversations on Telegram that include private information?
These responses were split among often (22.2%, N=46), sometimes (36.2%, N=75), and rarely
(41.1%, N=85), with one person reporting having never using Telegram for this purpose. The
differences between those who live inside and outside of Iran are not statistically significant
(P = 0.752, Fisher’s exact test).
We asked these same participants: What type of private/sensitive information do you discuss
on Telegram? 151 participants responded to this free-response question. Unfortunately 86 of them
mentioned all the types of information they share on Telegram, likely due to a poor Farsi translation
of sensitive/private information in the questionnaire. For those 65 responses where the question
was properly conveyed in English, participants primarily mentioned personal photos, financial
information, and personally identifying information.
We also asked these same participants: Why do you feel comfortable sending private/sensitive
information using Telegram? This was an open response question. We received 154 responses and
coded this data. By far the most popular answer was trust in the application, with other responses
including convenience, having nothing to hide, or willing to take the risk. Very few responses
(6) mentioned the security and privacy features of Telegram, with 2 referring to secret chat and
4 referring to authentication features. Because trust was such a prominent answer, we further
separated responses based on the source of user trust. More than half of the responses mentioned
explicitly that the participants believe Telegram is secure enough for them to share their sensitive
information, while rest use factors such as the popularity of the application, experiences of others,
and so forth.
Recall that 47% (N=183) participants reported that they have not used Telegram for sharing
sensitive information. We asked this group: Why don’t you send private/sensitive information using
Telegram?. This was an open response question. We received 124 responses, which we coded.
Lack of trust in Telegram was the primary reason, with others indicating they feel no need, identify
a perceived threat, or prefer alternatives. Our participants mentioned a wide range of potential
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threats, including hackers, developers, their government, mobile phone eavesdropping, logs, data
leakage, and information theft, plus a general unease about the Internet itself. For those cases where
participants preferred alternative approaches, many were vague about the alternative, but others
mentioned a preference for voice calls, text messaging, and exchanging messages in person.
The Appendix shows the coding results and sample quotes for each of the codes in this
section.

Strategies and Threats
We asked participants: What strategies do you use to protect your privacy on Telegram?. This was
an open response question. For the 233 responses we received for this question, 47% (N=110) of
them explicitly mentioned that they have no strategy to protect their conversations within Telegram.
We coded the rest of their responses and divided them into technical and non-technical strategies. By
technical, we mean using the security features that the application or the phone itself provides. As
shown in Table 2.4, using secret chat was the most popular technical strategy and self-filtering was
the most popular non-technical strategy. In a few cases, participants mentioned a combination of
technical and non-technical strategies. Of the 18 participants who mentioned end-to-end encryption
in their strategy, more than three-fourths (77%, N=14) earlier in the survey reported that they used
Telegram for sharing sensitive information.
We asked participants: Who do you think can read the messages you send on Telegram to
your friend, except you and your friend? Check all that apply. The responses indicate that hackers,
Telegram employees, their government are all considered threats by more than half the participants,
with other governments and their Internet provider being threats for more than one third of the
participants. Those living inside Iran are more concerned about their government than those living
outside, 57.4% to 47.8%. The differences between responses of those who live inside and outside of
Iran are statistically significant (X 2 (1, N = 392) = 9.802, P = 0.02, Φc = 0.139).
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Table 2.4: What strategies do you use to protect your privacy on Telegram?
Technical strategies
End-to-end encryption
Password authentication
Enable security features
Message impermanence
Two-factor authentication
Session management
Selective contacts
Limit the application permissions
Non-technical strategies
Self filtering
Preferred alternatives
Out-of-band communication
Have nothing to hide
Use secret phrases (coding)
Reliance on platform
Manual content encryption
Credential impermanence
Anonymity

2.5.4

Percent

Count

13.1%
7.8%
7.2%
6.5%
5.9%
4.6%
4.6%
0.6%

20
12
11
10
9
7
7
1

Percent

Count

32.2%
5.2%
2.6%
2.6%
2.6%
1.9%
0.6
0.6
0.6

49
8
4
4
4
3
1
1
1

Privacy Features

The next set of survey questions investigates whether people use the privacy features available in
Telegram. Users can configure how others can find them and their last seen status. They can block
others users and control who can invite them into groups. They can also edit or delete messages.
We show overall use of these features in Figure 2.2. Use of the feature is based on those changing
the default setting or reporting using the feature.
We first showed a screenshot of the privacy and security settings screen in Telegram and
asked participants: How often do you change your privacy and security settings in Telegram? Most
users report changing these settings sometimes (64.7%, N=251), while 28.6% (N=111) say they
have never changed these settings and 6.7% (N=26) say they frequently change these settings.
Those living inside Iran are more likely to change these settings than those living outside Iran,
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Figure 2.2: Participant use of privacy features
and the overall differences between these groups is statistically significant (X 2 (2, N = 392) =
14.629, P = 0.0007, Φc = 0.194).
Last Seen Status
Regarding the last seen status, we asked participants: How do you currently control this information?
The default settings is for everyone to be able to see this. 55.5% (N=210) of participants changed
this setting by limiting it to either My contacts can see this (37%, N=140) or Nobody can see this
(18.5%, N=70). The remainder either chose Everyone can see this (27.2%, N=103), the default, or I
don’t use this feature (17.2%, N=65). Those living inside Iran are more likely to let contacts see
their status, while those living outside Iran are more likely to allow nobody to see their status or to
not use the feature. The differences between those living inside and outside Iran are statistically
significant (X 2 (3, N = 392) = 18.51, P = 0.0004, Φc = 0.219).
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Blocking
We next asked participants: Have you ever blocked a person? You may choose multiple answers.
By default, anyone can contact any other user; users are given the option to report another person
as spam or block the person. We allowed participants to select from a variety of reasons for
blocking, including not knowing the person, not wanting contact with the person, etc. Overall,
62% (N=243) participants use the blocking feature for various reasons. Participants who live inside
Iran (67.6%, N=173) use the blocking feature more than those outside the country (51.5%, N=70),
and the differences between responses of those who live inside and outside of Iran are statistically
significant. (X 2 (1, N = 392) = 10.27, P = 0.001, Φc = 0.162).
Group Permissions
We asked participants: Do you let other people add you to groups? Over half of participants (57%,
N=220) reported that they leave this option open and let others add them to groups and decide
later if they want to leave the group. About a quarter of participants (25.1%, N=97) reported that
they blocked anyone outside their contact list from being able to invite them to groups. The rest of
the participants (17.9%, N=69) reported never changing their settings in this regard. The default
value for this setting is that anyone can invite the user to a group. Thus, only about a quarter of
participants have changed this setting. The differences between those living inside and outside Iran
are statistically significant (X 2 (2, N = 392) = 36.219, P < 0.0001, Φc = 0.306).
Message Editing or Deleting
We asked participants: Have you ever used the feature that lets you delete or edit messages you
have already sent? You may choose multiple answers. The majority of participants (66.1%, N=254)
reported that they use this functionality in order to delete or edit messages they sent by mistake.
About 1 in 5 participants (22.4%, N=86) use this functionality as a strategy to protect their privacy
by deleting their messages after they are done with the conversation. About 1 in 5 participants
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Figure 2.3: Participant use of security features

(22.7%, N=87) reported that they never used this feature. The differences between those who live
inside and outside Iran are not statistically significant.

2.5.5

Security Features

The next set of survey questions investigates whether people use the security features available in
Telegram. Telegram includes a variety of security features, including setting a pass code on the
application, activating two factor authentication, using secret (end-to-end encrypted) chat, and using
the authentication ceremony for secret chat. We show overall use of these features in Figure 2.3.
Use of the pass-code lock and two-step authentication is based on a simple yes/no question. Use
of secret chat is based on those who answered rarely, sometimes, or often when asked how often
they use it. Use of the authentication ceremony is based on those who answered sometimes or often
when asked if they used the ceremony for secret chat.
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User authentication
We asked participants: You can set a pass code lock in Telegram so that you need to enter this
code to access your conversations. This could prevent someone from reading your conversations if
they find your phone. Have you set up a pass code lock for your conversations? Most participants
(70.8%, N=271) reported that they are not using a pass code in order to protect their conversations
in Telegram. Participants inside Iran report using this feature more than those living outside the
country, 38.2% compared to 13.6%, and the differences between responses of those who live inside
and outside of Iran are statistically significant (X 2 (1, N = 392) = 23.9, P < 0.0001, Φc = 0.256).
For those who did not setup a pass code, we asked: Why have you never set up a pass code
for your conversations? You may choose multiple answers. The top answers include not needing
it, preferring alternatives, lack of knowledge, or finding the feature inconvenient. The differences
between responses of those who live inside and outside of Iran are not statistically significant.
We also asked participants: Have you set up two-step verification for your Telegram account?
Most participants (72.7%, N=269) reported that they have not used this feature. The differences
between responses of those who live inside and outside of Iran are not statistically significant.
For those who did not setup two-step verification, we asked: Why have you never set up
two-step verification for your conversations? You may choose multiple answers. The top reasons
are not needing it, preferring alternatives, lack of knowledge, or finding the feature inconvenient.

Secret chat
We asked participants: How often do you use the Secret Chat feature in Telegram? This is a picture
of what it looks like. The majority (59.1%, N=220) had never used this feature, with some having
used it rarely (30.9%, N=115), a few reporting sometimes (9.1%, N=34) and a very small number
chose often (0.81%, N=3). There are no significant differences between those living inside Iran and
those living outside of Iran using this feature.
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Table 2.5: What do you think the Secret Chat feature does? How is it different from a regular
conversation?
Functionality
Don’t know
Message impermanence
Encryption
Protection
Government filtered
Restricted sharing
End-to-end encryption
Cost saving
Safe from third parties

Percent

Count

40.8%
20.4%
9.6%
9.1%
6.9%
5.9%
5.3%
1%
0.5%

76
38
18
17
13
11
10
2
1

We asked participants who responded that they rarely or never use secret chat: Why have
you not used Secret Chat more often? You may choose multiple answers. The primary reasons
indicate no need and lack of knowledge.
We asked all participants: What do you think the Secret Chat feature does? How is it different
from a regular conversation?, an open response question. Table 2.5 shows the categories we coded
for the 172 responses we received. Many (40.8%, N=76) indicated they did not know what this
feature does. A surprising number mentioned something related to encryption or protection (26.2%,
N=45). Only a small number (5.3%, N=10), included in this total, mentioned end-to-end encryption.
Some participants (20.4%, N=38) believe that secret chat is similar to self-destructing messages,
like Snapchat, since it does include this functionality. Interestingly, 12 participants reported that the
secret chat feature has been filtered inside Iran. With further investigation, we realized that this is
not the case and they are confused by the fact that two parties need to be on-line to be able to start
exchanging messages in secret chat.
We also asked participants: Who do you think can read your Secret Chat messages with
your friend, except you and your friend? Check all that apply. A large number of participants
are concerned about most of the threats listed—hackers, my government, Telegram employees,
other governments, my Internet provider—with Telegram employees having the largest concern.
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The differences between those who live inside and outside of Iran are not statistically significant.
Interestingly, concerns are only a little lower than those for normal chat; since most participants
have not used it and only know its name, this indicates the name alone does not convey any trust.
We also asked participants: How much do you trust Telegram to keep your Secret Chat
messages private so that only you and your friend can read them?. Note this came after the previous
question asking what they thought secret chat does, to avoid biasing their responses. From the 357
responses, just 5.3% (N=19) trust Telegram a great deal, with 16% (N=57) choosing a lot, 41.7%
(N=149) choosing a moderate amount, 26.3% (N=94) a little, and 10.6% (N=38) not at all. The
differences between those who live inside and outside of Iran are not statistically significant.

Authentication Ceremonies
We asked all those participants who said they had used secret chat: Telegram has a feature that
lets you verify the encryption key for your Secret Chat. How often do you use this feature? This
is a picture of what this feature looks like. The majority (70.4%, N=100) reported that they never
used this feature. Some (19.7%, N=28) reported they had rarely used the ceremony, a small number
(4.9%, N=7) said sometimes, and another small number (4.9%, N=7) claimed they often used the
ceremony. The differences between those who live inside and outside of Iran are not statistically
significant.
Telegram also provides end-to-end encrypted voice calls. We asked participants: Have you
ever made a phone call through Telegram?. A little less than half of participants (47.9%, N=174)
reported using this feature before. The rest indicated they had not used this feature (33.3%, N=121)
or did not have this feature (18.7%, N=68). Since this feature is blocked inside the country, there
is a good chance that some who answered negatively don’t have access to calls in Telegram. The
differences in usage between those living inside and outside Iran (with those living outside more
likely to use phone calls) are statistically significant (X 2 (2, N = 392) = 25.456, P < 0.0001, Φc =
0.265).
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For those who said they had made a phone call, we asked: How often do you compare
emojis when you make a phone call using Telegram? This is a picture of what this feature looks like.
Over half of participants (53.8%, N= 92) claimed they had used the authentication ceremony for
voice calls. This may be due to the use of emojis for comparison, rather than a long, numeric key
fingerprint. The differences between those who live inside and outside of Iran are not statistically
significant.

2.6
2.6.1

Discussion
Differences Based on Living in Iran

One of the primary research questions this work attempts to answer is whether there are differences
in security/privacy behaviors and attitudes between those living in Iran and those living outside.
Questions of this nature are often very difficult to answer owing to the numerous confounding
socioeconomic factors that are at play. However, because our sample population is so demographically homogeneous—largely sharing culture, language, religion, birthplace, educational attainment,
etc.—then resulting differences are much more likely to be a consequence of those factors that
are not shared, like the current country of residence. We are thus able to say with much greater
confidence that behavioral differences between those participants living inside and outside Iran are
likely to be a consequence of differences in their current environment.
Our results indicate that those living inside Iran are more concerned about their privacy,
more likely to report daily usage of Telegram, more likely to send sensitive information using
Telegram, more likely to change their privacy settings, more likely to change the visibility of their
last seen status to only their contacts, more likely to block people, more likely to use a passcode
lock, and more likely to suspect that Telegram employees can view secret chat messages.
We can speculate about some reasons for why these differences may be influenced by current
living environment. The majority of our participants from outside the country are far from the hotly
debated issues inside the country and are likely not activists. Their concern about threats to their
civil liberties are likely to be lower. On the other hand, people inside the country, in addition to using
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Telegram for communication with friends and family, are using Telegram for news and discussion
by following channels and using groups. The discussed topics inside channels and groups are more
likely sensitive and up to date with what is happening in the society. They may feel more worried
about inspection of their phone by authorities or shoulder surfing. People inside the country are
in contact with others who know their language and it is natural for them to be more cautious to
protect their accounts from such attacks.
Overall, these factors could explain some of the differences observed. Participants inside
Iran are more likely to send what they consider to be sensitive, but these include items that are
personal in nature—photos, financial information, and personally identifiable information—as
opposed to information that could lead to arrest. This could simply be due to their more everyday
use. Yet people inside Iran are also more likely to use some privacy features, which could be due to
differences in perceived threats. They may change their privacy settings more often due to concerns
about snooping, and they may be more likely to use a passcode lock if they feel unsafe leave their
phone around. People inside the country are more likely to be contacted by others whom they don’t
like or be added to groups they may not be interested. Thus, it is also normal to see the majority of
this population use features for blocking other even if they are friends, because they are more aware
of privacy threats and take them more seriously in comparison to people who live outside.

2.6.2

Importance of Privacy and Misplaced Trust

The overwhelming majority of participants (93%) indicated it was either important or extremely
important that applications protect the privacy of their messages from viewing by other parties.
Yet, despite this strong concern, over half of participants said they used Telegram to send sensitive
information. A primary factor in choosing to share sensitive information is trust in the security of
Telegram, and nearly half (47%) have no strategy to protect their privacy when using Telegram.
This points to a significant problem for applications like Telegram that do not use end-to-end
encryption by default. There is clearly a strong desire for privacy, and significant trust in the
application, yet this trust is misplaced when their sensitive information is not being protected. As a
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result of this misplaced trust, many users make choices that do not align with their stated privacy
preferences.
In questions that explore reasons for people not using various privacy and security features,
several common themes that participants report include a lack of perceived need, lack of knowledge
of the feature, or finding the feature inconvenient. These match closely to work by Renaud et al.
in identifying reasons why people do not use secure email [51]. Unlike secure email, there are
alternative messaging applications available that do offer strong security and are easy to use (e.g.
Signal, WhatsApp), but a primary factor in adoption of secure messaging applications is using a
platform that your friends are also using [2, 17].

2.6.3

Varying Use of Privacy and Security Features

There is widely varying usage of privacy and security features (12% to 62%). A natural question
to ask is why some of these features are used more than others. To explore this question, we
compiled the usage of each feature from the survey and then correlated this with how this feature
may be prompted in the user interface. None of the features are explicitly prompted in the interface,
meaning the user is never prompted directly to change their privacy settings or adopt a security
feature. Rather, the user experiences implicit prompts to protect their privacy when the application
does something contrary to their preferences.
The privacy features are all implicitly prompted in the user interface. When chatting with a
contact, the last time that contact was seen (active in the application) is shown directly below the
contact’s name. This could prompt the user to review their own privacy settings once they see how
they are able to easily track their contact’s activity. Likewise, when chatting with a contact, if a user
sends a mistaken or otherwise undesired message to a contact, they could be prompted to tap on
it, bringing up the edit and delete options in the contextual menu. The other two privacy features
are prompted by experiences in the main screen of the application, when receiving an unwanted
message from an individual or a group. These experiences could cause the user to examine their
settings to learn how to block a user or prevent others from adding them to a group. For group chats,
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there is also a menu option in the chat window that allows the user to delete the chat and leave the
group. Furthermore, in all of these cases, users may also be prompted to search the Internet for help
if they feel their interaction with the application is violating their privacy in any way.
By contrast, users are not prompted, even implicitly, to use the security features of the
application. The pass code lock protects and against theft (or other unwanted use) of the device.
Two-step verification protects against account hijacking. Secret chat protects against surveillance
by Telegram (e.g. for advertising) or the government, or from infiltration of the Telegram server
by a hacker. None of these occurrences happen regularly, and violations of privacy are likely to
happen silently. The prompts for adopting security practices usually stem from major security
breaches reported in the press. For example, in July 2016, more than a dozen accounts of Iranian
Telegram users were compromised and the phone numbers of more than 15 million Iranian users
were identified by the Roket Kitten Iranian hackers group [47]. It is difficult for users to connect
news like this to some action they could take to prevent it in the future. Rather, they are likely to
connect this to a security failure by Telegram (similar to a breach of information held by Experion
in 2017) and thus expect Telegram to “fix” this problem.

2.6.4

Secret Chat and Authentication Ceremonies

Our results indicate a general lack of awareness about secret chat and confusion over the purpose
of this feature. The majority (59%) had never used secret chat. Of those who had used it, only
10% of participants reported they use it sometimes or often. Regarding the purpose of secret chat,
95% of participants do not know that secret chat provides end-to-end encryption. At best, 24%
know the feature has something to do with protection or encryption, and another 20% recognize
that it provides message impermanence. Note that the self-destruct timer, which provides message
impermanence, is visible to users, whereas encryption is done automatically and has no visible
effect other than a lock icon shown during secret chats.
Of particular concern is a lack of awareness of the security that secret chat offers. The
purpose of end-to-end encryption is to ensure that only the sender and recipient can read a message,
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and no other third party has this ability. However, more than half of participants thought that secret
chat messages could be read by Telegram employees, more than 40% thought they could be read by
hackers or their government, and over 30% thought they could be read by other governments or their
Internet provider. These numbers are only somewhat lower than those for regular chat messages,
and more people think Telegram can read secret chat messages. It is also possible that participants
have a strong sense of distrust in the security of electronic communications.
The infrequent usage of secret chat in Telegram is likely due to Telegram’s design choices.
Telegram encourages people to use plaintext chatting by integrating more features into this mode,
including stickers and group chat. Secret chats must be started with a separate menu option, and by
default messages are not encrypted with this functionality. In addition, Telegram’s implementation
sends an invitation to the other party and requires that they respond before any messages are sent.
This adds additional inconvenience that is not present in other secure messaging applications (e.g.
Signal, WhatsApp). Finally, Telegram does not provide support for secret chats to be visible on
multiple devices, whereas regular chat messages are viewable on all devices. This lack of equivalent
functionality could discourage use of secret chats. Note, there is no technical reason why secret
chat can’t be made portable; there are a variety of ways to safely transfer encryption keys from one
device to another.
We also examined the usage of authentication ceremonies. Of the people who had used
secret chat, a strong majority (69%) reported they had never used the authentication ceremony.
However, over half of participants reported they had used the authentication ceremony for an
encrypted phone call, which consists of comparing emojis. We note that users of Telegram are
explicitly prompted to use the authentication ceremony for a phone call—the emojis and brief
instructions are shown on the screen when a call is made. In contrast, the authentication ceremony
for secret chat is not prompted at all and finding it requires tapping through several menus.
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2.7

Recommendations

Based on our survey results, we make the following recommendations for improving Telegram.
Most of these recommendations generalize to other secure messaging applications, and we use
Signal as an illustrative example. Our ideas follow the principles elucidated by Adams and Sasse [5]
in Users are Not the Enemy: users are security conscious, and they will use security features if
they perceive a need for them. Our survey indicates this holds true for privacy-preserving features
as well, though adoption could be higher. A related concept is the idea of nudging users toward
beneficial behaviors [67], which has been used in several mobile settings [7, 69].

2.7.1

Use end-to-end encryption for all chat messages

Secure messaging applications should use end-to-end encryption for all chat messages. Examples
of applications that do this include Signal and WhatsApp. The evidence continues to accumulate
that when users are given two types of chat, with the default unencrypted, they will use the default
chat and send sensitive information over unencrypted exchanges.
Telegram justifies its use of unencrypted chat by claiming that end-to-end encryption of
chats do not allow users to easily restore access to their chat history on a new device, for example
when replacing a lost phone. It’s not clear this is a desired use case, since many users may consider
chat messages to be temporary in nature.

2.7.2

Use profiles to simplify privacy settings

Although nearly all participants expressed a strong interest in privacy, only some users change their
privacy settings. This is similar to a previous study on Facebook, which showed that privacy settings
matched user preferences only 37% of the time [44]. Currently, Telegram has defaults that allow
anyone to see your last seen status, call you, or add you to a group. Changing these defaults requires
becoming aware of these settings and finding them in the extensive menu system. Likewise, Signal
has privacy settings with defaults that are permissive: contacts can see when you’ve read a message,
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you can take screenshots of encrypted messages, and the keyboard can view everything you type to
improve its personalized learning algorithm.
When secure messaging applications have numerous privacy settings with multiple options,
they can use profiles to help users choose settings that match their privacy preferences. Lin et
al. have shown that mobile app users cluster into a small number of privacy profiles [42]. For
example, the application could allow users to indicate how concerned they are about privacy, and
the application could sort them into one of the groups identified by Lin et al.—conservative, fencesitters, and unconcerned. These could correspond to default settings that are very conservative
(nobody can see your last seen status), in the middle (contacts can see your status), and permissive
(everybody can see your status). More advanced users could customize each setting individually.

2.7.3

Use explicit prompts for privacy and security features

In some cases, user action may be needed to enable a particular feature. For example, even with
strong defaults (or if a user relaxes them), a user may still receive an unwanted message from a
contact. In Telegram and Signal, this is an implicit prompt for the user to investigate whether they
can block someone–they may search Google or look through the application menus. We recommend
that applications instead identify cases when a user is contacted for the first time and then explicitly
prompt the user, asking if they would like to accept messages from this contact or block them, with a
single click required to block the user. To avoid warning fatigue, the application could add a simple
“block” button to the chat interface. Likewise, secure messaging applications could prompt users to
use the authentication ceremony in an encrypted chat (Telegram’s integration of the ceremony into
phone calls is a good example), and could explicitly ask users at installation if they want to setup a
passcode lock or two-step verification.

2.8

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this study was to determine how well Telegram is meeting the security and
privacy needs of their users. The evidence is decidedly mixed. The vast majority of participants
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say that privacy is important to them, yet only about 10% use end-to-end encrypted chat at least
sometimes. Since about half report sending sensitive information while using the application, this
indicates that Telegram is not meeting their expressed privacy preferences. Many of those who
send sensitive information report trusting Telegram, but that trust is clearly misplaced, especially in
light of recent arrests of some who manage Telegram channels. The picture is somewhat better for
privacy features, since many report using features that allow them to edit or delete messages, block
other users, and change their last seen status. However, usage is lower for all security features.
An important point to consider is how our results vary based on whether the participants
were living inside or outside of Iran. Participants living in Iran were more likely to rate privacy as
extremely important to them, more likely to use Telegram daily, and yet are also more likely to
share sensitive information while using Telegram. Given this, there is a strong need to improve the
privacy and security of Telegram. Our recommendations include making end-to-end encryption of
chat messages the default, using profiles to simplify privacy settings, and explicitly prompting users
when they need to take action to adopt certain security and privacy features. Additional work should
be done to study how well these changes would lead to greater use of privacy and security features.
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Chapter 3
Is that you, Alice? A Usability Study of the Authentication Ceremony of Secure Messaging
Applications1

Abstract
The effective security provided by secure messaging applications depends heavily on users completing an authentication ceremony—a sequence of manual operations enabling users to verify
they are indeed communicating with one another. Unfortunately, evidence to date suggests users
are unable to do this. Accordingly, we study in detail how well users can locate and complete
the authentication ceremony when they are aware of the need for authentication. We execute a
two-phase study involving 36 pairs of participants, using three popular messaging applications with
support for secure messaging functionality: WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook Messenger. The first
phase included instruction about potential threats, while the second phase also included instructions
about the importance of the authentication ceremony. We find that, across the three apps, the average
success rates of finding and completing the authentication ceremony increases from 14% to 79%
from the first to second phase, with second-phase success rates as high as 96% for Viber. However,
the time required to find and complete the ceremony is undesirably long from a usability standpoint,
and our data is inconclusive on whether users make the connection between this ceremony and the
security guarantees it brings. We discuss in detail the success rates, task timings, and user feedback
for each application, as well as common mistakes and user grievances. We conclude by exploring
user threat models, finding significant gaps in user awareness and understanding.
1

Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Mark O’Neill, Ray Clinton, Jordan Whitehead, Scott Heidbrink, Kent Seamons,
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3.1

Introduction

Recent disclosures of government surveillance and fears over cybersecurity attacks have increased
public interest in secure and private communication. As a result, numerous secure messaging
applications have been developed, including Signal, WhatsApp, and Viber, which provide end-toend encryption of personal messages [71].
Most popular secure messaging applications are usable because they hide many of the details
of how encryption is provided. Indeed, people are primarily using these applications due to peer
influence, not due to concern over privacy or security [17].
The strength of the security properties of these applications rests on the authentication
ceremony, in which users validate the encryption keys being used. Unfortunately, there is evidence
that most users do not know how to successfully complete this ceremony and are thus vulnerable to
potential attacks [58]. Any user who does not execute the authentication ceremony for a particular
conversation is essentially trusting the application’s servers to correctly distribute the encryption
keys. This leaves users vulnerable to threats that can intercept communications.
Several recent papers have shown that the authentication ceremony in secure messaging
applications is difficult to use and prone to failure. A study of Signal showed that users, all of
whom were computer science students, were highly vulnerable to active attacks [58]. A comparison of WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, and Signal, found that most users were unable to properly
authenticate [33], though after being instructed on what to do most users were subsequently able to
authenticate after a key reset.
This state of affairs motivates our study, which examines to what extent users can successfully
locate and complete the authentication ceremony in secure messaging applications if they are aware
of the need for authentication. To answer this question, we conduct a two-phase user study of
WhatsApp [78], Facebook Messenger [22], and Viber [76]. We chose these applications because
of their popularity and their different designs. The authentication ceremony in WhatsApp uses
either a QR code or a numeric key representation that users can compare. Viber presents a numeric
key representation and provides functionality for users to call each other within the ceremony to
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compare the key. Facebook Messenger provides a numeric representation of the keys for both users.
In addition to these differences, WhatsApp and Viber offer only secure messaging, while Facebook
Messenger offers both insecure and secure messaging. We are curious as to whether the inclusion
of an insecure messaging interface hinders the ability of users to find and successfully use secure
messaging and the authentication ceremony.
In the first phase of our study, we asked 12 pairs of participants to complete a scenario
where one participant needed to send a credit card number to the other participant. They were both
instructed to verify that they were truly communicating with their partner (authenticity) as well as
to ensure that no other party could read their messages (confidentiality). Participants were told the
application would help them accomplish these goals.
In the second phase of the study, we presented 24 pairs of participants with the same task and
scenario provided in the first phase. However, unlike the first phase, participants first read through
an additional set of instructional slides before beginning the task. These slides informed them about
traffic interception, that secure messaging applications use a “key” to secure conversations, and that
to be secure they needed to confirm that they saw the same “key” as their partner. Participants were
not instructed on how to use the applications to compare keys, nor shown any screenshots of the
authentication ceremony; they were only told that each application had some way of providing this
functionality. For both study phases, the method used for authentication was left to their discretion.
Each phase was a within-subjects study, and all participants engaged with all three applications in each phase. Participants differed between the two phases, allowing us to capture
between-subjects differences in instruction between the two phases. We measured success rates
in completing the authentication ceremony, time to both find and complete the ceremony, and
user feedback on the applications, which includes System Usability Scale (SUS) scores, ratings of
favorite application, ratings of trustworthiness for each application, and qualitative feedback.
Our findings include:
• In the first phase, despite the instruction about potential threats, the overall success rate over
all participants and all applications was 14%, and only two of the twelve pairs of participants
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successfully located and completed the authentication ceremony. All other pairs attempted to
authenticate one another through video calls, asking questions that required special knowledge
to answer, or other ad hoc methods.
• In the second phase, the overall success rate increased to 79% for location and completion of
the authentication ceremony. The success rates for the three applications were: 96% for Viber,
79% for WhatsApp, and 63% for Facebook Messenger.
• Viber’s higher success rate was statistically significant when compared to the other two
applications. This is interesting because Viber’s authentication ceremony uses an in-app phone
call and provides a UI that helps users view and read the encryption key during the phone call.
Both WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger also provide manual verification of the encryption
key, but do not provide this assistance. For both of these applications, numerous participants
sent the key through in-app text, voice, and video, with a minority comparing the keys in
person. Nearly half of participants chose to use the option WhatsApp provided for scanning a
QR code.
• Averaged across the three applications, discovery of ceremony functionality took 3.2 minutes
with ceremony completion necessitating another 7.8 minutes.
• All applications were rated in the “C” range on the System Usability Scale, indicating a need
for significant usability enhancements.
• Most participants had not heard of Viber prior to their participation in our study. Trust ratings
were very low in the first phase, but increased significantly in the second phase, when some
instruction about security was received. This provides some evidence that learning about
security features can enhance trust in a secure messaging application.
• Numerous participants complained about the length of the encryption key when having to
compare it manually, taking shortcuts and often feeling fatigued by the process.
• Our qualitative data indicates that our participants have a healthy wariness for, and high-level
understanding of: impersonation attacks, government and developer backdoors, and physical
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theft. They are, however, generally unaware of the existence of man-in-the-middle attacks,
both passive and active. Our data is inconclusive on whether users make the connection
between this ceremony and its security guarantees.
Our main takeaway is that even with an awareness of potential threats, users are not aware
of and do not easily find the authentication ceremony in the secure messaging applications we
tested. If given some instruction on the importance of comparing keys, they can find and use the
authentication ceremony, and Viber’s second-phase success rate indicates that a high success rate is
a realizable goal. However, for all applications, the time to find and use the authentication ceremony
is unsatisfactory from a usability standpoint. The natural tendency of our participants to use personal
characteristics for authentication, such as a person’s voice, face, or shared knowledge, indicates that
future work could leverage this for a more user-understandable method of authentication.

3.2

Related Work

Several papers have studied the usability of the authentication ceremony in secure messaging
applications.
Two papers study the usability of the ceremony in a particular application. Schröder et
al. studied Signal, showing that users were vulnerable to active attacks due to usability problems
and incomplete mental models of public key cryptography [58]. This study included 28 computer
scientists; of the participants, four clicked through the warning message, eight could not find the
ceremony, and ultimately only seven were able to successfully authenticate their peer. Assal et
al. asked participants to perform the authentication ceremony in ChatSecure using different key
representations, which include a fingerprint, shared secret, and QR code [8]. Of the 20 participants
in this study, 20% were successful for the fingerprint, 85% for the shared secret, and 30% for the
QR code.
Two papers have compared the usability of various fingerprint representations. Tan et
al. compared eight representations, including textual and graphical representations with varying
degrees of structure, in a simulated attack scenario [66]. Graphical representations were relatively
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more susceptible to attack, but were easy to use and comparison was fast. Participants used different
strategies for comparison, often comparing only a portion of the fingerprint or comparing multiple
blocks at a time. Dechand et al. studied textual key verification methods, finding that users are more
resistant to attacks when using sentence-based encoding as compared to hexadecimal, alphanumeric,
or numeric representations [18]. Sentence-based encoding rated high on usability but low on
trustworthiness.
Herzberg and Leibowitz examined the usability of WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, and Signal,
finding that most users were unable to properly authenticate, both in an initial authentication ceremony and after a key reset [33]. The study included 39 participants from a variety of backgrounds
and all were given instruction on end-to-end encryption. Most users failed to authenticate on the
first attempt; they were then given additional instruction about authentication. About three-quarters
authenticated properly after the additional instruction was given.
Our work differs from these studies in several important ways. First, we study in detail the
ability of users to discover and use the authentication ceremony in a variety of secure messaging
applications, giving us insight into the differences among these applications. Schröder et al. only
study Signal, and Dechand et al. do not study any particular applications. Second, we use a paired
participant methodology, so that users are asked to identify a friend they already know, rather than
an unknown study coordinator. This method is more realistic than most prior studies and yields
important insights into user behavior. For example, our study participants called each other, verified
through voice and vision, and asked questions based on shared knowledge. Third, we conduct
a between-subjects study on the effects of instruction, so that those receiving instruction are not
biased by their previous experiences. The first set of participants were asked to authenticate given
only general awareness of threats, while the second set of participants received instruction about the
importance of comparing encryption keys.
Another important aspect of our work is that it provides replicability that is not possible
with prior work. Herzberg and Leibowitz report a similar result, that participants authenticated
properly after additional instruction about authentication was given. However, their paper provides
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(a) WhatsApp

(b) Viber

(c) Facebook Messenger

Figure 3.1: Authentication ceremonies in each of the applications.

few details about the instruction given and does not report detailed statistics, so it is difficult to
draw any quantitative conclusions about the effect of the instruction or the relative merits of the
different applications they tested. We report detailed statistics about what methods users tried with
each application, the time taken to authenticate, SUS scores, trust ratings, and favorite systems. We
include our full study materials in the appendix and provide our dataset on a companion web site.
Significant work in the area of secure email has also examined issues related to usable
authentication. Obtaining and verifying the key for a recipient is an important use case for email,
and lessons learned may apply to secure messaging as well. Numerous papers attest to the difficulties
users have with this and other key management steps [52, 59, 79].
The most success in this area has been in the use of automatic authentication using a trusted
key server. Bai et al. [11] has shown that individuals recognize the security benefits of manual key
exchange, but prefer a centralized key server that authenticates users and distributes keys associated
with their email address, due to greater usability and “good enough” security. This model has been
simulated by Atwater et al. [9] and implemented using IBE by Ruoti et al. [53]. Likewise, the use
of secure messaging applications is generally considered a success for automatic key management.
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3.3

Application descriptions

The three secure messaging applications used in our study are WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook
Messenger. These three applications were chosen because they present users with distinct key
verification experiences and because of their popularity and large installation base.

3.3.1

WhatsApp

WhatsApp is perhaps the most well-known and widely-used messaging application, boasting a user
base of over one billion users. While it did not originally offer secure messaging functionality at its
inception, in November of 2014, WhatsApp partnered with Open Whisper Systems to incorporate
end-to-end encryption using the Signal encryption protocol.
When a conversation is initiated, WhatsApp inserts a message informing users that messages
they send are encrypted with end-to-end encryption. Users are given two options for key verification:
QR code scanning and key fingerprint verification (both parties see the same fingerprint). In
accessing this dialog, a short caption accompanies the “Encryption” option in the previous menu,
informing users that they can “Tap to verify.” Doing so brings up the verification dialog shown in
Figure 3.1a.

3.3.2

Viber

Viber is another widely-used messaging application with an install base of over 800 million users.
As with WhatsApp, it did not originally offer end-to-end encryption, adding this functionality in
April of 2016. Its encryption protocol is a proprietary design allegedly based on the principles of
the Signal protocol.
While—as with the other two applications—Viber does not immediately make apparent
the need to verify keys, once begun, it does—unlike the other two applications—carefully guide
the user through the process with a set of instructional dialogs. In displaying this functionality,
Viber does not opt to use the terms “encryption” or “key” at the outset, instead characterizing the
verification process as “trust[ing]” one’s conversation partner. Only after the user selects this option,
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are they prompted with a dialog that explains the need to confirm that “secret keys are identical.”
This process is facilitated via a free Viber call. After making the call, both sides may see their keys
by tapping a lock icon that appears during the call, allowing for verification. This dialog is shown
in Figure 3.1b. It should be noted, however, that Viber does not allow the user to view their keys
without initiating this call, nor does it allow the user to view these keys once a contact has been
marked as trusted.

3.3.3

Facebook Messenger

Facebook Messenger is the messaging utility designed by Facebook to integrate into their chat
system, and, like WhatsApp, has a user base of over 1 billion users. Again, as with the other two
applications, it did not originally offer end-to-end encryption, adding this functionality in October
of 2016. It also uses the Signal protocol.
The user experience of Facebook Messenger’s encryption functionality differs substantially
from WhatsApp and Viber. While the first two applications encrypt all communication automatically,
Facebook Messenger defaults to an unencrypted chat session, with users required to initiate a
standard chat session before accessing a “Secret Conversation” function via the conversation menu.
Once within the secret conversation menu, users can access their device keys via the context menu.
At this point, the experience again diverges from the two other applications, as the key verification
dialog presents users with two keys instead of one. Furthermore, the Facebook Messenger key
verification interface does not easily facilitate a way for users to communicate these key values to
the other party. This dialog is shown in Figure 3.1c.

3.4

Methodology

We conducted an IRB-approved, two-phase user study examining how participant pairs locate and
complete the authentication ceremony in three secure messaging applications: WhatsApp, Viber,
and Facebook Messenger. Our study materials are shown in Appendix D.1.1 and our full data set is
available at https://alice.internet.byu.edu.
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In both phases, we asked participants to complete a scenario where one participant needed to
send a credit card number to the other participant. We instructed participants to verify that they were
truly communicating with their partner and to ensure that no other party could read their messages.
Our instructions informed participants that the application would help them accomplish these goals,
but they were left in control of the methods used to ensure these conditions were met. In the second
phase, participants viewed and read aloud an instructional set of slides that informed them about the
importance of comparing encryption keys.
Each phase was a within-subjects study, and all participants used all three applications in
each phase. The participants differed between the two phases, allowing us to see between-subjects
differences in instruction between the two phases.
To choose the three applications we compared the authentication ceremony in 10 secure
messaging applications—WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Zendo, Facebook Messenger, Viber, ChatSecure, Allo, Line, SafeSlinger. We binned the applications into groups, based on the authentication
methods used. We then narrowed our choices to the following: Signal/WhatsApp (use both QR
codes and manual verification), Telegram/Facebook Messenger (use manual verification, include
non-secure chatting), and Zendo (uses NFC or QR code, requires verification before chatting). We
chose WhatsApp over Signal and Facebook Messenger over Telegram because of their greater
popularity in the United States. As explained below, we were unable to proceed with Zendo in
the study. We chose Viber as an alternative because it provides a method for manually comparing
encryption keys using a phone call built into the application. This provided us with three different
applications that use a variety of authentication methods.

3.4.1

Pilot study

We conducted a pilot study of the first phase with three pairs of participants, using WhatsApp,
Facebook Messenger, and Zendo. The Zendo secure messenger employs key verification as a
forcing function: users must first scan each other’s QR codes, or use NFC communication, before
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What Is Secure Messaging?
When you use regular text messaging, your
phone company can read your text messages.

But you still need to be careful. A hacker could
intercept your traffic.

When you use secure messaging apps, you are
having a private conversation with your friend.
Not even the company running the service can
see your messages.

To make sure your conversation is secure, these
applications assign a “key” to each person.

Secure messaging apps provide a way for you to
compare these keys.

You need to make sure the key you see is the
same key your friend sees.

We want to see how well the application helps
you do this.

The bad guy
???
???

Figure 3.2: Instructional slides used in the second phase.

the conversation can begin. Unfortunately, we experienced multiple, severe technical difficulties
with the application during the pilot study, leading us to abandon it in favor of Viber.

3.4.2

Study recruitment and design

We placed flyers advertising the study around the campus of a local university. These flyers
contained a link that participants could use to schedule online, and they included a requirement
that all participants bring a friend and smartphones in order to take part in the study. Recruitment
proceeded from February 3, 2017 to February 28, 2017, with 39 unique participant pairs being
recruited in total: 12 for the first phase of the study, and 24 for the second.2
To ensure different pairs of participants tried applications in different orders, we calculated
a complete set of permutations listing the order in which each of the three applications would be
used by a given pair. We then randomized the permutation that was assigned to each participant.
This ensured a collectively uniform distribution of sequences while keeping the assignment of a
2

One second-phase participant pair experienced difficulty because one participant had limited English proficiency
and our study was executed entirely in English (this participant thought that they were being tasked with locating a
physical key). Technical errors occurred during the data collection of two other pairs and they were presented with
incorrect post-task questionnaires. Accordingly, the data for these three pairs were excluded from the study and we
recruited replacements in their place.
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given sequence to a particular pair random. Each ordering of the three systems occurred exactly
twice in the first phase and four times in the second.
The study was conducted in two phases, spanning a period of one month. The first phase
ran from February 3, 2017 to February 16, 2017. It took roughly 40 to 45 minutes for each pair of
participants to complete, for which they were compensated $10 USD each. The second phase ran
from February 17, 2017 to March 2, 2017. The second phase studies were more involved and took
longer to complete, roughly 60 minutes each, and so all participants were compensated at a higher
rate of $15 USD.
When participants arrived for their scheduled appointment, we presented them with the
requisite forms for consent and compensation. We instructed them to download and install any of
the three applications—WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook Messenger—that they did not already have
on their phones, to minimize the likelihood of technical difficulties during the study.3 We then read
them a brief introduction describing the study conditions and their rights as study participants. We
informed them that they would be placed in separate rooms, but could freely communicate or meet
with one another if they deemed it necessary to complete their task. We also informed participants
that a study coordinator would be with them at all times and would answer any questions they might
have.
We randomly assigned one member of each pair as Participant A, with his or her counterpart
becoming Participant B, delineating their roles in the subsequent tasks. We then led them to their
respective rooms, seating them at a computer, and initiating audio recording. We preloaded each
computer with a Qualtrics survey that guided participants through the study, and it included a
demographic questionnaire, instructions regarding the three tasks they were to perform, and posttask questionnaires. Each of the three tasks was identical in nature, differing only by which of
the three secure messaging applications participants were to use to complete the task. Throughout
the study, study coordinators were available to answer general questions about the study, but
3

In our pilot study, several participants lacked sufficient space on their phones to install the applications or had
phones that were too old to run the applications properly. We subsequently adopted this measure in an attempt to
forestall re-occurrence.
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were careful not to provide any specific instructions that would aid in the use of the applications
themselves.

3.4.3

Task design

In both phases, the tasks participants completed were the same: Participant A was to securely
retrieve a credit card number in Participant B’s possession by using the application that was being
tested. This scenario was intended solely as a narrative backdrop for the tasks we were truly
concerned with: finding and completing the authentication ceremony. When asked to complete the
task, participants were instructed as follows:
Your task is to make sure that you are really talking to your friend and that nobody else
(such as the service provider) can read your text messages. The application should have
ways to help you do this.
Accordingly, despite a difference in roles, there were no practical differences between the tasks
Participant A and Participant B needed to complete. Participants were instructed and encouraged to
“talk aloud” as they completed the task, explaining the choices they made and the actions they took.
Additional instruction was given in the second phase. Before participants were introduced
to the task, they were asked to read aloud a short set of slides, shown in Figure 3.2. These
slides informed them that traffic interception was a possibility, that secure messaging applications
accordingly provide a “key” that could be compared to ensure that conversations were indeed secure,
and that they needed to make sure that they saw the same key as their counterpart. Furthermore, on
the first task, if second phase participants had failed to verify one another’s identity either prior to
sensitive data exchange or after ten minutes had passed, they were marked as having failed the task
and prompted by study coordinators to look for a way to authenticate properly.
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3.4.4

Study questionnaire

Participants were led through the study by a web-based Qualtrics survey. We first discuss those
aspects that were held constant for both phases, followed by an explanation of how the questionnaire
differed in the second phase.
Upon beginning the survey, participants first answered a set of demographic questions. They
then answered questions about their past experience, if any, with secure messaging applications.
This included questions about which applications they might have used, their reasons for doing so,
and their general experiences with sending sensitive information. Participants were next shown
a description of their first task (all three tasks were identical, diverging only on the system being
used). Each task was followed with a post-task questionnaire assessing their level of trust in the
application, whether or not they believed they had successfully verified their partner’s identity and
why, and who they believed was capable of reading their conversation. After all three tasks had been
completed, participants were then asked which of the three applications was their favorite and why.
In the second phase, participants were given supplementary instructions and asked additional
questions. First, after the demographic questions, participants were asked a series of six questions
intended to gauge their relative familiarity with end-to-end encryption. Next, prior to beginning
the first task, they were presented with, and asked to read aloud, a set of six slides that very briefly
introduced the role of keys and informed them that the applications they were about to use would
provide a way for them to compare these keys. These instructional slides are shown in the appendix.
Finally, at the end of each task, the post-task questionnaire from the first phase was augmented by
the ten questions from the System Usability Scale (SUS).

3.4.5

Post-study debrief

At the conclusion of each study, participant pairs were gathered in the same room and asked a
series of questions. This served as a complement to the questionnaires that they had answered
individually, and gave them an opportunity to react to one another. Participants were prompted
regarding incidents specific to their experience—e.g., if they had evidenced visible frustration with
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a particular app—as well as general questions. Examples of the latter include having participants
contrast the authentication ceremony used by each application, as well as asking them to explain
what role they thought keys played in verifying one another’s identity.

3.4.6

Demographics

Our sample population skewed slightly female (n=40, 56%) and young, with 74% (n=53) between
the ages of 18 and 24, and 26% (n=19) between 25 and 34. Because we distributed recruitment
flyers on a university campus, most of our participants were college students (n=48, 61%), with 17%
(n=12) having less educational experience than that, and 22% (n=16) having at least finished college.
Participants had a variety of backgrounds, with roughly even representation between technical
(i.e., STEM; n=34, 48%) and non-technical backgrounds (n=37, 52%), and 10 (14%) in explicitly
IT-related fields. (One participant failed to identify their field of study or occupation.)
In the second phase, the questionnaire included a series of six multiple-choice questions
intended to assess participants’ knowledge of end-to-end encryption. We assigned equal weights
of one point to each question, and scored each participant from 0-6, corresponding to the number
of correct answers given by the participant. Participants were further placed into categories of
“beginner,” “intermediate,” and “advanced” for scores in the range of 0-2 for beginners, 3-4 for
intermediate, and 5-6 for advanced. There were an equal number of participants with beginner and
intermediate ratings—21—with 6 participants netting an advanced rating. Beginners were mostly
female (3:18), intermediate participants were mostly male (15:6), while the advanced category had
an even gender split (3:3).

3.4.7

Limitations

The instructions given to the first three participant pairs of the first phase were slightly different
from those given to the remaining nine. They were directed to ensure that no one was “listening
in” on their conversation, a directive participants took literally as they would visibly scan the room
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WhatsApp
Viber
Facebook
Messenger

Send
Picture

Recognize Recognize Shared
Contact
Video
Voice
KnowledgeInfo

Second
Authentication
Language Ceremony

0
0
2

0
10
12

2
2
0

13
4
2

10
7
7

3
2
0

2
4
2

Table 3.1: Methods of authentication used in the first phase by pairs of participants.

for potentially intrusive parties. This wording was subsequently altered, with participants instead
instructed to ensure that “nobody else (such as the service provider) can read your text messages.”
The slides we provided participants to teach about cryptographic keys were necessarily
simplified so that they could be understood by novices. In this material we mentioned that participants should ensure the key they see is the same as their partner’s. While this was sufficient in
describing tasks for Viber and WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger actually utilizes two keys, one for
each partner. This subtlety was not mentioned by any participant nor did it seem to adversely affect
their performance.
Finally, due to our method of recruitment, our participants were largely students and their
acquaintances, and subsequently exhibited some degree of homogeneity, e.g., all participants were
between 18 and 34 years of age. They are thus not representative of a larger population. Furthermore,
while an effort was made to place participants in a more organic setting—e.g., by having them
communicate with real members of their social circle as opposed to study coordinators—this was
still ultimately a lab study and has limitations common to all studies run in a trusted environment
[48, 63].

3.5

First Phase Results

In the first phase of the study, only 2 of the 12 pairs experienced some success in locating and
completing the authentication ceremony, with an overall success rate of 14% across all pairs and
applications.
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Participants used a variety of ad hoc methods for authentication. Listed in the order they
appear in Table 3.1, these methods were: utilization of a picture for visual identification, utilization
of a live video feed for visual identification, utilization of shared secrets for identification, utilization
of contact information (e.g., phone number, profile picture) for identification, utilization of a shared
second language for identification, and performing the actual authentication ceremony. These
categories were compiled by asking users how they authenticated the other party, and are not
mutually exclusive (some used more than one method).
We examined the two pairs that were successful to better understand their experiences. One
pair was successful because of their curiosity, which led to them exploring the application settings.
This pair started with Viber and began to verify each other simply through a phone call, when they
suddenly noticed the option in Viber to authenticate a contact, making that contact “trusted.” They
subsequently verified the encryption key through the phone feature embedded in the authentication
ceremony. After this experience, this pair noticed they should be looking for similar functionality in
the other applications. The followed the on-screen instructions in WhatsApp to scan the QR code,
and they exchanged a screenshot of the authentication code in Facebook Messenger.
A second pair started the study with Facebook Messenger. This pair called each other using
an insecure phone call, spoke in Korean, and transferred the credit card number used in the scenario
without completing the authentication ceremony. They next used WhatsApp, and because it was
their first time using the application, they were prompted with a notice about end-to-end encryption
after sending their first message. After clicking to learn more, this pair was able to locate and
complete the authentication ceremony by using a phone call to read and verify the key. After this
experience, the pair was also able to locate the lock icon in Viber, follow the instructions in the
ceremony, and use a phone call to verify the key. However, they were unsure about the role of
the key and still verified each others’ identity by asking questions that relied on their common
knowledge.
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Application

Success

Fail

Error

WhatsApp
19 (79%) 5 (20%) 0 (0%)
Viber
23 (96%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%)
Facebook Messenger 15 (63%) 6 (25%) 3 (13%)
Table 3.2: Success rates per pair of participants for the authentication ceremony in the second phase.

3.6

Second Phase Results

In this section we discuss results regarding participant use of the authentication ceremony for the
second phase, when additional instruction was given regarding the importance of comparing keys.

3.6.1

Success Rate

The success rate for completing the authentication ceremony in the second phase was drastically
higher than for the first phase. Overall, the success rate was 78% across all participant pairs and the
three applications. Table 3.2 shows the breakdown of the success rate for each application. Failures
occurred when participants transmitted sensitive data before verifying keys, or if they failed to
find and validate the keys within ten minutes of opening the application. Successes indicate that
participants identified and compared keys in some fashion. The Error column indicates three cases
where Facebook Messenger failed to deliver messages or failed to display important UI elements
that allow participants to access key information. We noted various mistakes made by participants,
but these were considered distinct from failures and are discussed later.
The leap from a 14% success rate in the first phase to 78% in the second phase suggests that
users are capable of locating and performing the authentication ceremony when prompted. Some of
these applications indicate that keys need to be validated, yet our results from phase one indicate
that these instructions are largely ignored, thus we suspect that the independent prompts from our
study accounted for much of the difference seen in authentication ceremony success rates.
To test whether there are any differences between the applications, we used Cochran’s Q
test. We found that the success rate was statistically different for the applications (χ2 (2) = 15.429,
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p < .0005). We then ran McNemar’s test to identify the significant differences among the pairs of
applications. We found there is a significant difference between WhatsApp and Viber (p = 0.008)
as well as between Facebook Messenger and Viber (p < 0.0005).
It is interesting that Viber’s success rate is significantly higher than the other two applications.
Viber’s authentication ceremony uses an in-app phone call and provides a UI that helps users view
and read the encryption key during the phone call. Both Facebook Messenger’s authentication also
provides only manual verification of the encryption key, but does not provide this assistance.

3.6.2

Verification Methods

The methods used by participants to perform the authentication ceremony are shown in Table 3.3.
Note that some participants used more than one method. We do not include methods for three pairs
of participants who encountered errors when utilizing Facebook Messenger. These errors prohibited
us from assessing how these participants would have interacted with the authentication ceremony.
The most-selected method for the ceremony through WhatsApp was scanning the QR code
of the key fingerprint in person. Of the applications we studied, this method is unique to WhatsApp.
Some pairs opted to take a screenshot of the key or QR code and send it this way, while others
remembered substrings of the key fingerprint and repeatedly visited the text screen to send pieces
of it to their partner. This behavior occurred when participants discovered the QR code and key
fingerprint but were confused as to what to do next.
Numerous participants using WhatsApp read the key data in person, read the key using a
voice or video call, or sent the key using text. Most participants using Facebook Messenger used
these methods, since they were the only ones available.
Viber provides a much stricter interface once a user has located the option to verify his
partner’s identity. Instead of offering key material immediately, an in-app call must be initiated
before the key material is provided to the user. As a result, all pairs who successfully completed the
ceremony utilized this feature to verify their keys. We note that this policy resulted in no mistakes
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Action

WhatsApp

Viber

Messenger

Secure Methods
Scanned QR code in person

11 (46%)

N/A

N/A

Read key in person

1 (4%)

0 (0%)

7 (29%)

Called out of band or used Viber’s call method to
provide key

1 (4%)

23 (96%)

1 (4%)

Sent key through in-app text

7 (29%)

N/A

10 (42%)

Sent key through in-app video

3 (13%)

N/A

4 (17%)

Sent key through in-app voice

1 (4%)

N/A

1 (4%)

Sent sensitive information before validation

5 (21%)

1 (4%)

5 (21%)

Failed to find key within 10 minutes and after a hint

1 (4%)

0 (0%)

1 (4%)

Less Secure Methods

Failures

Table 3.3: Methods used for the authentication ceremony in the second phase. Numbers indicate
pairs and percentages are out of the total number of pairs.

made for the authentication ceremony. However, the process confused some participants, and three
pairs sent sensitive information through the application without performing this procedure.

3.6.3

Timing

We timed each pair of participants to obtain two metrics: the time taken to locate and identify the
authentication ceremony as it is presented within the application interface and the time taken to
complete the ceremony successfully. In the case of finding the ceremony, the time reported is the
time taken for the first partner to identify the key material or complete the task. We consider timing
data only for cases where the pair succeeded in authenticating successfully because we stopped
participants after 10 minutes if they could not find the ceremony.
Figure 3.3 shows the geometric mean of both time metrics for the three applications tested.4
Applications that are selected to be evaluated first in a given study have a disadvantage with respect
to time because it is users’ first exposure to the task and possibly keys in general. To account for
4

Sauro and Lewis recommend using the geometric mean for task timing [57] because timing data is positively
skewed and the geometric mean reduces error.
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Figure 3.3: Timing for finding and using the authentication ceremony in the second phase. Lighter
shades indicate the time taken to find the ceremony and the full bar indicates time taken for
completing the ceremony.

this, Figure 3.3 also includes comparisons showing timing data from when each application was
studied first and when the application was not studied first.
To test whether there is a significant difference in the time to complete these tasks among
the three different applications, we used the Kruskal-Wallis test. We found that there are statistically
significant differences among the applications for completing the ceremony (p = 0.043). We next
ran pairwise post-hoc Dunn’s tests to determine where the differences occur. We found a significant
difference between Viber and WhatsApp for completing the ceremony (p = 0.045), with Viber being
faster (mean time, Viber=6.9 minutes, WhatsApp=8.5 minutes).
A major takeaway from the timing data shown is that key discovery and key verification both
require substantial time for all three applications. On average, across all applications discovery of
the ceremony required 3.2 minutes and ceremony completion required another 7.8 minutes. Given
that the participants were informed about the existence of the keys beforehand and told explicitly
to verify them, these times are unsatisfactory from a usability standpoint. The usability issues and
concerns voiced by participants responsible for these times are discussed in Section 3.7.
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3.7

Application Feedback

In this section we discuss feedback that participants provided regarding the secure messaging applications, including usability, their favorite application, and the trustworthiness of the applications.

3.7.1

Usability

During the second phase of our study, participants evaluated each application using the System
Usability Scale (SUS). Table 3.4 presents the breakdown of the scores for each system across
various subcategories. The values shown are the mean values for each subcategory, while bolded
values highlight the highest SUS score for each subcategory.
We report SUS scores across five subcategories for each application: overall SUS score, the
mean SUS score when the application was the first of the three presented, the mean SUS score when
the application was not the first shown, the mean SUS score for participants who succeeded at the
task using the given application, and the mean SUS score for participants who failed the task.
Although SUS scores range from 0 to 100, this is not a percentile value and can thus be
difficult to interpret. Accordingly, to help contextualize the values shown, we draw on the findings
of researchers familiar with SUS. Sauro [56], extending work from other researchers such as Bangor
et al. [12], created a guide for interpreting a given SUS score by normalizing it relative to those
achieved by other systems. This framework associates SUS scores with percentile rankings and
with letter grades (from A+ to F).
For reference, the applications’ overall SUS scores fall within the “C” range, landing
somewhere within the 41st to 59th percentile. The single lowest SUS score—Viber’s mean failure
score—nets a “C-” grade, falling within the 35th to 40th percentile. The highest SUS score—
Facebook Messenger’s mean success score—achieves a “C+” grade, somewhere within the 60th to
64th percentile.
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SUS subcategory WhatsApp Viber

Messenger

Overall
First system
Not first system

65.45
65.47
64.45

67.45
67.97
66.02

67.78
69.22
67.97

Success
Failure

64.41
66.25

67.86
63.13

72.71
69.50

Table 3.4: SUS scores for the applications in the second phase.
Study phase
One
Two

WhatsApp

Viber

Messenger

None

39.1% 8.7%
31.3% 22.9%

47.8%
43.8%

4.4%
2.0%

Table 3.5: Participants’ favorite applications. Each cell contains the fraction of participants from
each phase who, when prompted for their favorite system, gave the respective response.

3.7.2

Favorite application

Participants were asked to select which, if any, of the three applications was their favorite and why.
Table 3.5 shows the breakdown of responses for each phase. Facebook Messenger was the most
preferred system, followed by WhatsApp. We ran a Chi-Square test to determine if the differences
in the ratings between phase one and phase two were statistically significant and they were not.
Though numerous reasons were given for why a particular system was a participant’s favorite,
familiarity was by far the most commonly cited reason for preference (except with Viber, which
was not previously used by any of our participants). The next most common reason given, and one
that held true for each of the three systems, was ease-of-use, with what constituted “easy to use”
varying from system to system. Some WhatsApp users, for example, appreciated its ability to scan
QR codes for key verification, obviating the need to read aloud the long string of digits comprising a
key fingerprint. Those who liked Viber found its key verification process the simplest to access and
execute. By contrast, those who mentioned ease-of-use relative to Facebook Messenger typically
associated it with familiarity as opposed to any mechanism in particular.
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(a) Trust ratings in the first phase.

(b) Trust ratings in the second phase.

Figure 3.4: Participant ratings of trust for each application.

3.7.3

Trust

As part of each post-task questionnaire, participants were asked to rate their trust in each application.
They were presented with the statement “I trust this application to be secure” and asked to rate the
statement on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Responses
for the two phases are shown, normalized, in Figure 5.4.
Comparing the trust scores from the two phases, two points stand out. First, a “strongly
disagree” response—indicating a total lack of trust in the application—appeared for all three of the
applications in the first phase, but not at all in the second phase. This is mostly due to one participant
from the first phase who chose “strongly disagree” for all three systems. Secondly, responses of
“strongly agree”—indicating confidence and trust in the application—are much more prevalent in
the second phase.
To compare the trust scores in more detail, we ran a mixed model ANOVA Test, which
allowed us to see the the interaction between the two independent variables (application and phase).
We found that there is a significant interaction between the application and the study phase (F(2,140)
= 5.023, p = 0.008, partial η 2 = 0.067).
To determine whether there was a simple main effect for the application, we ran a repeated
measures ANOVA on each phase. There was a statistically significant effect of the application on
trust for phase one (F(2,46) = 4.173, p = 0.022, partial η 2 = .154). By examining the pairwise
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comparisons, we found that the trust score was significantly lower for Viber as compared to
WhatsApp in the first phase (M = 0.542, SE = 0.180, p = 0.19).
To determine whether there was a simple main effect for the study phase, we ran a one-way
ANOVA on each application to compare the trust between the two phases. There was a statistically
significant difference in trust ratings between the two phases for Viber (F(1,70)=14.994, p < 0.0005,
partial η 2 = .176). The mean trust for Viber in the first phase was 3.58, and in the second phase it
increased to 4.40.
Altogether, this analysis indicates that Viber was trusted less than WhatsApp in the first
phase, but then was trusted significantly more in the second phase, after some instruction about the
importance of the authentication ceremony. The trust for Viber increased in the second phase to the
point that it was not significantly different from WhatsApp.
Participant commentary raised two other points of interest. First, participants strongly
associated reputation with the trustworthiness of applications. Viber, for example, despite possessing
a large user base outside of the United States, was essentially unknown to our participants, leading
them to express wariness of this application. Facebook’s status as a household name both inspired
confidence and distrust. While its reputation as a large and established company reassured some,
others were discomfited by the many negative stories they had heard about account hacks and
privacy invasions on Facebook. Second, responding to descriptions of end-to-end encryption and
promises of secure communication by the various applications, multiple participants remarked that
they had no way to truly gauge the validity of those statements. Both these sentiments are captured
by a remark from R10B, “I would say it’s a double-edged sword because Facebook—everyone
knows Facebook—but it has that reputation of getting hacked all the time. But I’ve never heard of
Viber or WhatsApp, so it could easily be some third-party Ukrainian mean people who want to steal
information because that’s just who they are. And whether it states that they’re not gonna read or
listen to the conversations and stuff like that... well, who knows?” However, most opted to believe,
for as one participant concluded, “at some point, you have to trust something.”
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3.8

Observations

During our study, certain participant experiences and commentary stood out, highlighting a handful
of concerns about each of the three applications individually, and in general. We feel that these
observations are worthy of note in that they suggest directions for focus and improvement in the
domain of secure messaging.

3.8.1

Single key fingerprint

WhatsApp and Viber both generate a single key fingerprint to be shared between pairs. While
alternating recitation of segments of the key is likely the intention of developers, in practice,
relationship dynamics complicate the issue. We observed several instances where the dominant
partner in the relationship read the entire key on their own, with their partner simply offering an
affirmation in response. When key verification is done in this manner, one party never actually
demonstrates any knowledge of the shared secret—it is entirely possible that a man-in-the-middle
could simply convey validation of the key when their key is, in actuality, different. This effect is
further emphasized when, as we saw in one instance, the listening party asks the speaking party
to repeat the first part of the key, reinforcing the speaking party’s belief that their partner is in
possession of the correct key. It is, however, worth noting that this “extended” validation once again
did not demonstrate any actual knowledge of the secret.

3.8.2

Key length

It was often observed during the study that participants were surprised at the length of the key data
they were intended to relay to their partners. Though every application used a form of fingerprinting
to greatly reduce the total characters that needed to be read, users often verbally remarked that
strings were too long. During the key exchange process we often witnessed fatigue, as participants
would read only half the key and claim that was “good enough” and some recipients even ignored
the key being read to them by their partners after the first few numbers matched. R27A used a QR
code transmission to handle her first authentication ceremony with WhatsApp. Upon realizing that
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no such option existed for Viber, her second application used, she looked at the key and exclaimed,
“It’s about eight years long!”. R27A successfully checked every digit of the key data with her partner,
but voiced her disapproval of its length repeatedly throughout.

3.8.3

Viber-specific issues

We observed two issues with Viber. The first relates to its mechanism for verifying a new user’s
phone number. While most applications send a confirmation text containing a code, as does Viber,
it nevertheless defaults to calling the new user first as a primary and alternative confirmation
mechanism. This took many of our participants by surprise and left them ill-at-ease to see an
unknown number suddenly calling them. Secondly, and far more concerningly, Viber does not
provide a mechanism to revoke trust. While this is likely a conscious decision on the developers’
part, it can cause issues in practice. More specifically, one participant inadvertently tapped the trust
button while trying to figure out how to verify his partner’s key, thus accidentally conveying to the
application in an apparently irreversible manner that this individual was now trusted.
Many users were also critical of the Viber UI’s phrasing for the option to begin the process
of key verification. The option is labeled “Trust this contact,” which many users hesitated to press,
unsure if it would inform the application to trust the contact or if it would bring up further dialogues
to perform the validation. R36A visibly hesitated during this step during the study and articulated
this concern in the exit interview: “if I click ‘Trust this Contact’ but I haven’t verified [my partner]
yet, it’s kind of weird.”

3.8.4

WhatsApp-specific issues

We observed several issues with WhatsApp. WhatsApp appends a pair of checkmarks next to
each message, representing the delivery and read status of the respective message. However, a
handful of participants mistakenly associated these checkmarks with security, operating under the
misconception that a checkmark beside a given message indicated that it had been secured. The
other two issues concern the key verification mechanism. When a matching QR code is scanned,
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the application briefly flashes a green checkmark logo over the QR code area, indicating that the
fingerprint has been validated and is correct. However, because it disappears quickly, leaving no
lasting indication that verification has occurred, numerous participants wondered if they had verified
the key or not. Additionally, the key verification screen includes a button to share a screenshot
of the verification screen. Some of our participants assumed that they could use this to send a
screenshot to their partner, who could then scan the QR code contained therein. Unfortunately
for them, WhatsApp does not provide functionality to scan a QR code from an image, serving to
confuse those who tried.

3.8.5

Facebook Messenger-specific issues

In addition to the usability concerns already described, such as the difficulty in locating device keys, Facebook Messenger’s Secret Conversation functionality—its mechanism for secure
communication—errored more than a few times during our study. More importantly, however, was
that these errors were not apparent to participants. Participants were thus unaware that the Secret
Conversation was not operating as intended, and instead blamed themselves or their counterparts
for failure. One example we encountered several times was that encrypted messages sent via this
mechanism appeared normally on the user’s phone despite never being received by their partner.
One such participant began shouting in exasperation at her phone, exclaiming, “I feel like I am
having a conversation with myself! What’s wrong with this app?!”

3.8.6

Key changes

One important issue that secure messengers must deal with in practice is a key change occurring
mid-conversation. As this was not tested by our participants during our study, we recreated this
scenario in each of the three applications to observe their respective reactions. Facebook Messenger
inlines a message when one’s conversation partner’s key changes, informing the user that their device
has changed and that their key has changed. While it does not explicitly instruct the user to re-verify
the key, of the three applications, it makes the user aware that key change has occurred. Viber gives
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no proactive notification to the user that key change has occurred, but when the conversation menu
is again accessed post-change, Viber includes an explicit message warning the user that they will
need to re-verify the identity of their conversation partner. WhatsApp presented no notification that
we could observe. It neither inlined a notification as Facebook Messenger did, nor does it indicate
to the user that re-verification must be performed. In fact, WhatsApp presents no lasting UI change
that allows a user to confirm that verification has occurred at all.

3.9

User Threat Model

Two authors jointly coded responses to two survey questions used in both phases regarding participant perception of the authentication ceremony. These questions were:
• Please explain why you think you have (or have not) verified the identity of your friend.
• Who do you think can read your message except you and your friend?
In reviewing the coded data, some details of the threat models perceived by users became evident.
Note that, if correctly followed, completing the authentication ceremony successfully guarantees that a participant has authenticated their partner and no other party can listen in on the
conversation. This of course assumes that the applications have properly implemented cryptographic protocols. None of the applications studied are open source, so their claims cannot be
verified.
Of the 141 times the first of these prompts was presented (excluding Facebook Messenger
errors), 109 responses indicated that the authentication ceremony was a primary reason for successful
identification. This is encouraging, but also expected given the focus that the study placed on its
significance, which may have biased participants. For example, in response to the first prompt,
R13B stated “...I asked him a person[al question] that he responded [to] in the right manner, but
also because our messages were encrypted and our personal keys matched.” The use of questions
that rely on shared knowledge was a common response to this prompt, and it was often coupled
with a reference to verifying the key.
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Where verification of personal inquiries are mentioned in tandem with key verification as
a reason for verified identities, it is unclear whether participants believe the inquiry can be used
as a substitute for key verification or if they are expressing the more secure notion that proper key
verification includes explicit identity matching. To mitigate any mislabeling due to this lack of
clarity, we focus on the responses that did not mention key verification as the reason for identity
verification, which occurred 32 times. These responses focused on verifying features of their partner
and considered impersonation or physical duress attack vectors. For example, R24A asserted he
had verified the identity of his partner because he had “asked personal questions that are difficult
to know from online material/searches and R36B confided that his partner “was able to tell [him]
something that no one else would know. Unless he was being held at gunpoint.” Of these 32
responses, 28 (88%) of them mention using features of their partner as the method of verifying
identity (e.g. physical appearance in video, shared private knowledge, familiar voice). Two others
mentioned trust in the application itself, one admitted no attempt to verify, and one trusted that their
partner verified on their behalf.
The second prompt listed above provided some insight into the set of possible attackers
considered by participants. This question was issued 141 times as well, immediately following the
prompt mentioned earlier. Though 109 responses indicated that the identity of their partner had
been verified, only 76 (70%) responses indicated that no other party could read messages exchanged
between the two partners. The responses of those who indicated that other parties may be privy
to the information were coded to determine the nature of the suspect parties. Five distinct entities
were found to be mentioned in those responses: government, cellular service providers, physical
accessors (e.g., shoulder surfers, thieves), the application developer, and remote “hackers”. The
number of times each of these entities was mentioned in a response are recorded in Table 3.6.
Thirty-three of these labels come from persons who identified the importance of the key in verifying
their partner’s identity but obviously remained skeptical as to the full security of the application.
It is interesting to note that man-in-the-middle attacks were not explicitly mentioned as a
possible attack vector in the responses to either of the prompts evaluated here. Impersonation was
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Type

Times Mentioned

Service Provider
Government
Hackers
Physical Accessors
Application Developer

4
8
17
18
19

Table 3.6: Attacker types suspected by participants.
mentioned frequently in responses to the first prompt, and various tampering by governments and
those with physical access to phones and their software were mentioned in responses to the second
prompt. The apparent lack of awareness of man-in-the-middle attacks seemed to influence the trust
users had in each other’s identity, based on the frequent mentions of things like shared knowledge
and videos used when identifying users. Many respondents further demonstrated this unknown
attack surface through additional commentary. For example, R24A said he “just did not consider
verifying her identity. Thought [it] would [be] hard to replicate it within this short time.”
Many users did seem to grasp that there were other attacks possible, but used the term
“hacker” as a generic catchall for these. For example, R27B mentioned that no one could read
the messages sent between her and her partner “unless people read over our shoulder or people
hack into our Facebook accounts and read them before we delete them.” Similarly, R36A and
R28A stated that the only people who could read the encrypted messages were “just the two of us
unless there were hackers” and “not WhatsApp or third parties! But probably people with skills,”
respectively.
In addition to being a catchall, use of the “hacker” response may also be providing insight
into belief in a theoretical ceiling of network security by users. Since most users are unfamiliar with
the mathematical foundations of cryptography and the details of security protocols, many struggle
to adopt secure practices and understand the nature of various threats. On the other hand, users
are often aware of their own ignorance in such matters, and these responses might indicate that
users account for this in mental models by incorporating a “hacker” entity that is always capable
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of subverting any piece of the system. In this sense, lack of security knowledge affects both users’
ability to make secure decisions and lowers their confidence in security itself.
Some users also expressed some suspicion of the applications themselves for government
and/or developer eavesdropping. R24B was suspicious of both: “Viber (if they want to) & government investigation agencies”. Others respondents explicitly mentioned “backdoors” built into the
applications or general suspicions like R29B: “I still feel like WhatsApp can read the messages even
though they say they can’t.” Finally, some users were wary of logging, as exemplified by R15A:
“The company I’m sure has records of the texts but [security] depends on if they go through them or
not.”
Overall, the responses indicate that users have a healthy wariness and high-level understanding of impersonation attacks, government and developer backdoors, and physical theft, but that
the same cannot be said for man-in-the-middle attacks, both passive and active. It is assumed that
some of the mentions of “hackers” refer to this, but these responses were far less specific than for
other attacks. In other words, it appears that users’ threat models do not include the ability for
attackers to be positioned in between the two endpoints of a conversation. If this was understood, we
hypothesize that far less respondents would have relied on physical appearance or shared knowledge
as an identity verification mechanism. Since one of the primary goals of the secure exchange of
keys is to thwart man-in-the-middle attacks, work may be needed to help users understand this
attack vector.

3.10

Conclusion

We used a two-phase study to examine whether users are able to locate and complete the authentication ceremony in secure messaging applications. In the first phase, users were aware only of the
need to authenticate and ensure confidentiality, and only two of twelve users were able to locate the
authentication ceremony, with an overall success rate of 14%. Participants instead primarily used
personal characteristics, such as a person’s voice, face, or shared knowledge. In the second phase,
users were instructed about the importance of comparing encryption keys in order to authenticate a
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partner, leading to an overall success rate of 78%. Users were significantly more successful using
Viber. However, the time required to find and use the authentication ceremony was 11 minutes,
combined, on average across all applications, which may be so long that it would discourage users
from authenticating each other.
Based on our findings, we believe that many users can locate and complete the authentication
ceremony in secure messaging applications if they know they are supposed to compare keys.
However most people do not understand the threat model, so it is not clear that they will know how
important it is to compare keys.
An open question is how secure messaging applications can prompt the correct behavior,
even without user understanding. It may be possible to leverage the tendency users have to rely on
personal characteristics for authentication. We are exploring the use of social authentication [72] as
a way of translating authentication of encryption keys into a method that is more understandable to
users.
Another area for future work is improving the authentication ceremony so that it does
not take so long to complete. A system like CONIKS [46] may help to automate the process of
discovering another person’s key without relying on a single trusted party, while also providing
non-equivocation so that key servers cannot deceive users.
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Chapter 4
Action Needed! Helping Users Find and Complete the Authentication Ceremony in Signal1

Abstract
The security guarantees of secure messaging applications are contingent upon users performing
an authentication ceremony, which typically involves verifying the fingerprints of encryption keys.
However, recent lab studies have shown that users are unable to do this without being told in advance
about the ceremony and its importance. A recent study showed that even with this instruction, the
time it takes users to find and complete the ceremony is excessively long—about 11 minutes. To
remedy these problems, we modified Signal to include prompts for the ceremony and also simplified
the ceremony itself. To gauge the effect of these changes, we conducted a between-subjects user
study involving 30 pairs of participants. Our study methodology includes no user training and only
a small performance bonus to encourage the secure behavior. Our results show that users are able
to both find and complete the ceremony more quickly in our new version of Signal. Despite these
improvements, many users are still unsure or confused about the purpose of the authentication
ceremony. We discuss the need for better risk communication and methods to promote trust.

1

Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Mark O’Neill, Dan Metro, Josh Cockrell, Timothy Moffett, Jordan Whitehead, Nick
Bonner, Kent Seamons, and Daniel Zappala, Action Needed! Helping Users Find and Complete the Authentication
Ceremony in Signal, Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS), August 2018.
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4.1

Introduction

Numerous secure messaging applications [71] have been developed to provide end-to-end encryption
for personal communication. These applications typically automate the encryption process as much
as possible, in order to provide a simpler experience for their users. However, the confidentiality
provided by these applications relies on the integrity of its central servers, which exchange users’
public keys automatically. To protect against a man-in-the-middle attack, either through compromise
of the server or other means, users need to verify the exchanged keys with their conversation partners.
This is typically done by comparing a fingerprint of the public keys. We refer to this verification
process as the authentication ceremony, and variations of it have been adopted widely in secure
messaging applications.
Research using lab studies has reported that users have difficulty performing the authentication ceremony within secure messaging applications [8], and this makes them susceptible
to attack [58]. Two recent papers demonstrated that with some instruction about the ceremony
itself [33] or the importance of comparing keys [73], users can successfully find and use the authentication ceremony. However, users still took an inordinate amount of time—over 11 minutes on
average—to find and complete the ceremony [73].
In this paper we examine whether opinionated design can make it easier for users to find and
perform the authentication ceremony, without relying on instruction about the importance of the
ceremony or providing any details about how the ceremony works. Our use of opinionated design
is inspired by work on the security indicators for the Chrome browser [25], which led to greater
adherence to SSL warnings, but not necessarily greater comprehension. We apply opinionated
design to the Signal messaging application, seeking to make the minimal set of changes needed to
encourage users to find and perform the ceremony. Our design principles follow recommendations
from Schröder et al. [58] in their study of the Signal application. We seek to improve both adherence
and performance with respect to finding and using the authentication ceremony, with comprehension
a secondary goal. We use Signal because it is open source and because it has been at the forefront of
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this space, having pioneered the Signal protocol that is also used in WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger,
Allo, and Skype.
To test the effectiveness of our design, we created two modifications of Signal, which
we label Modification 1 and Modification 2. Modification 1 focuses only on helping users find
the authentication ceremony, and the ceremony itself is unchanged. Comparing this version to
the original version of Signal enables us to test whether it leads to greater adherence, while also
providing a baseline for performance with the original ceremony. Modification 2 incorporates all
the changes from the first, and also updates the authentication ceremony to make it easier to use.
Comparing Modification 2 to Modification 1 enables us to test for differences in performance among
the two authentication ceremonies. We used a between-subject lab study to evaluate the impact
of these modifications. We encouraged participants to be security minded by promising them a
small monetary bonus. We then observed participant actions, measured their accuracy and time to
complete the task, and conducted interviews to understand their comprehension of the ceremony
and their opinions regarding the ceremony.
Our findings include:
• Our modifications of the Signal use interface led to 90% of participants finding the authentication ceremony on their own, combining results for Modification 1 and 2. These modifications
included visual cues in the Signal conversation screens to indicate the authentication status
of users’ contacts, with accompanying actions to initiate the authentication ceremony. Most
participants found the authentication ceremony in less than a minute, often within a few
seconds. This is compared to a 25% discovery rate for the authentication ceremony among
those who used the original version of Signal.
• Our redesigned authentication ceremony was successfully completed by 90% of participants
who used Modification 2, as compared to 30% for the original ceremony in Modification 1.
The new ceremony clearly separates a QR-code method (for in-person authentication) from
a phone call method (when contacts are not in the same location), and uses an in-app phone
call modeled after Viber’s ceremony. The median time to complete the new authentication
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ceremony was 2 minutes, as compared to 7 minutes for the few who actually completed the
original authentication ceremony.
• Our use of opinionated design, combined with an incentive to be security-minded, resulted
in equal or better results than the study by Vaziripour et. al [73], which relied on directly
instructing users about the importance of comparing keys. The success rate of 90% is better
than the 78% who were successful across all participants and applications in their work, and
comparable to the 96% success rate they saw with Viber. Moreover, the time to find the
ceremony and complete the ceremony in our modifications (less than a minute, median of 2
minutes) is much lower than in their work (3.5 minutes and 7.8 minutes, respectively).
• Comprehension of the purpose of the ceremony is mixed. Many users associate the ceremony
with authentication and confidentiality, but express doubts about their answers. Others clearly
do not know what the purpose of the ceremony is. Likewise, while many users express trust
in Signal, with further probing many indicate a lack of knowledge or experience to really
know if they should trust it. When the purpose of the authentication ceremony is explained
to participants, they mostly express a desire to use it, though one third would only use it for
some content or with some contacts. This leaves room for future work to further improve the
authentication ceremony.
Artifacts: We have created a companion website at https://action.internet.byu.edu that
provides the source code, study materials, and data.

4.2

Related Work

The usability of the authentication ceremony for secure messaging applications is a relatively new
topic in the field usable security. To the best of our knowledge, there are currently only five papers
focused on this topic [1, 8, 33, 58, 73]. The common conclusion of these works is that users are
vulnerable to attacks and cannot locate or perform the authentication ceremony without sufficient
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Design Principle

Modification 1

Modification 2

Awareness of security status
of conversations

Added verification status in Same as Modification 1
conversation list and view
(Figures 4.2a, 4.2b)

Comprehensible instructions
for recommended actions

Added instruction to visit veri- Same as Modification 1 +
fication screen via button (Fig- Separate in-person and remote
ure 4.2b)
authentication walkthroughs (Figures 4.3, 4.4)

Clear risk communication

None

Inform users of additional actions
needed to secure conversations (Figures 4.3a, 4.4d)

Easily accessible verification

Clickable action bar in
conversations (Figure 4.2b)

Same as Modification 1 +
Clickable action bar in conversations
(Figure 4.3a) and walkthrough (Figures 4.3, 4.4)

Table 4.1: Description of our application of Schröder’s design principle recommendations
instruction. This is largely due to users’ incomplete mental model of threats and usability problems
within secure messaging applications.
Our work has been inspired by one of the most recent studies on the usability of the
authentication ceremony in secure messaging applications by Vaziripour et al. [73]. In this work,
the authors studied users’ ability to locate and perform the authentication ceremony in WhatsApp,
Facebook Messenger, and Viber. The first phase of this work instructed participants about potential
threats, while the second phase added instruction concerning the necessity of the authentication
ceremony. From the first to the second phase, the average ceremony success rate increased from
14% to 79%. It took users, on average, over 3 minutes to find the authentication ceremony and
over 7.5 minutes to complete it when they succeeded in the second phase. We borrow some of the
methodology from this work.
Our Signal modifications are informed by recommendations from a paper by Schröder et al.
that studied the usability of Signal under attack conditions. This study revealed that security experts
also are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks due to usability problems and incomplete mental

80

models of security. Only seven out of 28 (25%) expert participants successfully authenticated their
conversation partners [58]. Asal et al. asked 20 participants to complete authentication by available
methods (fingerprint, shared secret, and QR code) in ChatSecure. Herzberg and Leibowitz showed
in their study that the majority of users fail perform the authentication ceremony, and that successes
were difficult and time consuming, even when participants were taught how to authenticate [33].
Abu-Salma et al. conducted a usability study on Telegram to show that the UI was a source of
confusion when performing the authentication ceremony [1].
There are serveral works on the usability of the verification mechanism itself. Shirvanian et
al. studied key verification performance by users performing authentication on remote and local
conversation partners. They showed that users perform poorly under most key verification methods,
especially in the remote case [61]. Independent of a particular application, Tan et al. compared
eight representations of authentication material, including textual and graphical representations,
with varying degrees of structure, in a simulated attack scenario [66]. They showed that graphical
representations were relatively more susceptible to attack but were easy to use, and comparison of
graphical forms was quick. Dechand et al. studied textual key verification methods, finding that
users are more resistant to attacks when using sentence-based encoding as compared to hexadecimal,
alphanumeric, or numeric representations [18]. Sentence-based encoding rated high on usability but
low on trustworthiness on a post-study Likert scale.
Another important aspect of our work is the qualitative analysis of users’ comments and
thinking process to inspect their decision-making processes. A study by Google shows that redesign
of Chrome’s SSL warnings to promote safe decisions resulted in 30% more users making correct
decisions, but found that user comprehension of threats remained low. The authors hypothesized
that if users understood the risks better, they would not ignore warnings. [25]. Cormac Herley
calculated that the economic cost of time users spend on standard security is substantially higher
than the benefits they incur. He argues that users’ rejection of security advice is therefore rational
economically [32]. Implications for nudging users toward more beneficial and secure choices
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have been considered recently [4]. Angela Sasse argues that security mechanisms with a high
false-positive rate undermine the credibility of security and train users to ignore them [55].

4.3

Modifying Signal

Schröder et al. found several problems with the usability of Signal under attack conditions [58].
They recommend four design principles to overcome these obstacles: awareness of conversation
security status, comprehensible instructions for recommended actions, clear risk communication,
and easily accessible verification. We applied these principles to redesigning the Signal application
and and evaluated their effect with a user study. Table 4.1 outlines our modifications and how they
correspond to Schröder’s recommendations. We created custom implementations of both the iOS
and Android versions of Signal with these changes
We began by creating visual mockups of our modifications to Signal’s interface that would
employ three of our target design principles. In particular, we provided visual cues to the Signal
conversation screens to indicate the verification status of users’ contacts, with accompanying
actions to initiate the authentication ceremony. Signal already employs a rudimentary indication
of verification status in the form of a (hardly noticeable) checkmark under the names of verified
contacts, but this is not easily associated with verification status and nothing is shown in the case
where a user has not yet verified a contact. We were also careful not to overstate vulnerabilities
in our visual cues, in line with recommendations from Sasse [55]. We showed these mockups to
40 university students to gather feedback for various designs, which varied in their use of icons,
colors, phrasing, and position of verification status cues and options. We settled on the design as
shown because it performed best in our mock ups and provided clear warnings. We also used the
Signal color scheme and terminology (e.g., safety number) for consistency with the original version.
Next, we performed a cognitive walkthrough on the modified application to make sure the language
used in the interface was clear. Once we were confident in our design, we made the necessary
modifications to Signal to implement it. These changes comprise our first modification of Signal
(Modification 1).
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.1: Authentication ceremony within the current Signal application

Our second modification of Signal (Modification 2) incorporated all of the changes of
the first, but added a set of instructions for users to follow that streamline the authentication
ceremony process. In a study by Vaziripour et al. [73], users were more successful performing the
authentication ceremony in Viber, and did so in less time compared to other apps. We hypothesize
that this was due to Viber providing an in-app phone call that presented encryption keys to users for
verification on the same screen. Accordingly, we separate the QR code and phone call verification
options in Signal, provide in-app functionality for verification phone calls, and incorporate guiding
dialogue to successfully perform verification in each scenario. To develop this second variant of
Signal, we conducted a set of pilot studies. We learned that users expect to be able to scan the QR
code on each other’s phone simultaneously, which could not be done using the original version of
Signal. As a result, we modified the application to use a new dual camera/QR code screen.

4.3.1

Original Signal

Signal [64] uses a Double Ratchet algorithm [49] to update session keys with each exchanged
message, which provides forward secrecy for the conversation. Before initiating the ratchet, it uses
a triple Diffie-Hellman (3-DH) handshake to exchange public keys. This exchange is automated
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(a)

(c)

(b)

(d)

Figure 4.2: User interface for finding the authentication ceremony and showing successful verification (Modification 1)
using a central server. To avoid a man-in-the-middle attack, users must verify the authenticity of
the public keys that have been exchanged by the central server. Under Signal, the authentication
ceremony is performed using fingerprints from a combination of a user’s public key and his/her
contact’s public key. This fingerprint is called a safety number.
Figure 5.1 shows the workflow for the authentication ceremony in the current version of
Signal. In the conversation screen, after a conversation is initiated with any contact, users can
tap on a contact’s name in the conversation screen shown in Figure 4.1a. At this point an option
labeled Show Safety Number is found, shown in Figure 4.1b. By selecting this option, users will
be transferred to the screen shown in Figure 4.1c, wherein two options are given to perform the
authentication.
Users can either compare their safety numbers directly using their numeric representations,
or by scanning an equivalent QR code displayed on their contact’s device. After users verify that
their safety numbers are equivalent, they are expected to toggle a UI switch captioned verified, also
shown in Figure 4.1c, to indicate that they manually verified the numbers to be identical. If users
choose to scan the QR code and the result is a successful match, the verified switch is changed
automatically. Next to the name of verified contacts, the interface places a check mark, shown in
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Figure 4.1d, which confirms that the contact has been verified and can be trusted to have a secure
conversation with, through the Signal application.
If the encryption keys change for this contact, due to reinstalling the application or a
man-in-the-middle attack, users will be prompted to redo the verification process.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.3: Authentication ceremony for scanning the QR code (Modification 2)

(a)

(c)

(b)

(d)

Figure 4.4: Authentication ceremony for comparing safety numbers using a phone call (Modification
2)
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4.3.2

Modification 1

Modification 1 was designed to facilitate the process of finding the authentication ceremony. Users
are prompted to perform the authentication ceremony in two locations, as shown in Figure 4.2. First,
in the list of contacts, shown in Figure 4.2a, any unverified contact has a warning tag indicating
Action Needed. We also replaced the profile image of unverified contacts with a warning icon until
they are verified. Second, in the conversation view depicted in Figure 4.2b, if the contact is not
verified, the bottom of the screen contains a red warning banner with the text Action needed! Click
to verify your safety numbers. If users notice the red warnings and press either of them, they are
directed to the original authentication ceremony screen, shown in Figure 4.2c. After successful
verification, a check mark appears next to the contact name, the red warning band disappears, and
each are replaced by a blue message which indicates that the contact has been verified. This text for
a conversation window is shown in Figure 4.2d. The profile image of this contact also shown in
favor of the alert icon. Note that in this version users still use the original authentication ceremony.

4.3.3

Modification 2

Our second variant of Signal, Modification 2, was designed to reduce the time required to perform
the authentication ceremony. We also attempted to enhance participant understanding of the purpose
of the ceremony, without intimate detail of its inner workings.
We separated the two options of scanning the QR code and verifying the safety numbers.
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show these modifications. When users press the red warning within the
conversation windows, a small dialog appears, shown in Figure 4.3a, informing users that the
verification is necessary for the security of their conversation. They are given two choices of
performing the authentication: over a free phone call (via Signal) or in person (QR code scan).
If users choose to verify the safety number in person, as shown in Figure 4.3, they will be
directed to the screen shown in Figure 4.3b, with the camera activated. In this screen, the local QR
code is also shown, allowing the user and his/her contact to scan and verify the safety numbers

86

simultaneously. If the authentication fails, users are given another chance to scan the correct QR
code, shown in Figure 4.3c.
If users instead choose to verify the safety number over a phone call, they will be informed
that the call will be free, shown in Figure 4.4b. We modified the call screen such that immediately
after initiating the phone call, users see their safety number with a very brief instruction, shown
in Figure 4.4c. Users are expected to read their safety numbers and ensure they have an identical
sequence of numbers. We use a phone call from within Signal because this allows users to see the
safety numbers while making a call. Afterward, users press the Mark as verified button (iOS) or flip
the toggle (Android).
We noticed during pilot studies that users lacked feedback after a successful verification.
As a result, contacts who have been verified by the user have a Verified tag next to their names
in the conversation list, instead of an Action needed tag. In addition, the profile image is loaded.
During the pilot studies we noticed that users also need feedback to make sure they completed the
ceremony correctly, so we created a short congratulation message, shown in Figures 4.3d and 4.4d.

4.4

Methodology

We conducted an IRB-approved, between-subject user study, examining how participant pairs locate
and complete the authentication ceremony across three versions of the Signal secure messaging
application. These three versions are the current version of Signal, Modification 1 (with changes
to prompt the user to find the authentication ceremony), and Modification 2 (with additional
changes to improve the usability of the authentication ceremony). Our study materials are shown in
Appendix D.1.1.
In the study, we asked participants to complete a scenario wherein one participant needed to
send a credit card number to the other participant. The base pay for the study was $7 per participant,
with a a $3 bonus if they performed the task safely. To avoid any hurt feelings, all participants were
given the bonus, but in our observations the bonus served to sufficiently motivate participants to act
securely.
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We also wanted to test whether we followed Krug’s first law of usability—Don’t make
me think! [39]. Thus, we did not provide participants with any instructions on the necessity of
performing the authentication (in contrast to [73]), nor did we give them instructions on how to find
or complete the authentication ceremony. We gave each participant a time limit of 10 minutes to
complete the task, though they were not aware of this limit in advance.
To test each version of Signal equally, we assigned each pair of participants to one of the
versions in a round robin manner. Prior to conducting the study a power analysis (described in
Appendix C.1) indicated we needed 10 pairs of participants for each version. During the study
subjects installed and used the Signal version to be evaluated on their own mobile devices. The
original version of Signal was retrieved from the relevant official app stores for iOS and Android.
We uploaded the Android versions of Modification 1 and Modification 2 to Google Play, and we
used TestFlight for evaluating our Signal modifications on iOS.

4.4.1

Task design

In each experiment, the task provided to participants was as follows:
You left your credit card at home! You are going to be using the Signal app to
ask your friend to send you the credit card number.
This is the message you should send to your friend:
“Hi! Can you send me my credit card number? I left my card on my desk at
home.”
You can both earn a bonus of $3 for this study if you make sure that nobody can
steal this information while your friend is sending it.
Participant B was instructed similarly:
Your friend is going to use the Signal app to ask you for their credit card number.
Use the credit card given to you by the study coordinator.
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You can both earn a bonus of $3 for this study if you make sure that nobody can
steal this information while you’re sending it.
Despite a difference in roles, our intention was for both participants to complete the authentication ceremony. Participants were instructed to “talk aloud” as they performed the task, explaining
their observations, actions, and reasoning.
Participants failed the task if they sent the credit card number before performing the authentication ceremony correctly, or ten minutes elapsed before completion of the task. In failure cases,
participants still performed post-task duties such as responding to questionnaires and interview
questions.
During the study, the coordinators checked whether participants had performed the authentication ceremony correctly. If the participants were successful, the coordinators recorded the method
used (QR code or comparing the fingerprints verbally in a phone call). If the participants were not
successful, the coordinators recorded the reason why.

4.4.2

Study questionnaire

Participants used a web-based Qualtrics survey on a laptop during the study. This survey both
recorded participant answers to various questions both before and after the task, and also briefed
them on the task itself. The survey contained:
• A standard set of demographic questions.
• A description of the primary study task, involving the exchange of a credit card number.
• A question asking if the participant believed they had exchanged the credit card number safely,
followed by a free-response question to explain the answer.
• A question asking if the participant had seen the authentication ceremony screen (depicted
by a screenshot in the survey) during the task. If so, the survey asked the participant several
followup questions.
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• A question asking if the participant had previously used secure messaging applications to send
sensitive information, and the nature of that information.
• A question asking if the participant trusted Signal to be secure, followed by an open-response
question to explain the answer.
• A question to rank participant knowledge of computer security.

4.4.3

Post-study interview

At the conclusion of each study, the coordinators verbally asked each individual participant the
following questions:
• We asked participants what features they were looking for to aid in accomplishing the task.
This provided us with insight into reasons for success and failure.
• We showed participants how to find the authentication ceremony and asked them to explain
how they thought this ceremony helped them (or would have helped them) accomplish the
task.
• We asked participants whether they were willing to perform the authentication ceremony
before exchanging information with their friends in the future.
We recorded the audio of each study and transcribed the post-study interviews. To analyze
the data for open-response questions in the survey and interviews, two authors coded the data
together using conventional content analysis. Any disagreements were resolved via discussion.
First, we reviewed qualitative comments phrase-by-phrase and word-by-word to assign codes
that classified users’ comments with regards to a particular topic. Then, we used the constant
comparative method to group codes into concepts and organized related categories by merging
related codes.
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4.4.4

Study recruitment and design

We recruited pairs of participants on our campus, telling them that each person needed to bring
a friend, and that both participants needed to have smartphones. Recruitment proceeded from
November 14, 2017, to January 28, 2018, with 41 unique participant pairs recruited in total: 10
pairs for testing each version, eight pairs for pilot studies, and three pairs for replacement. We had
to replace the data for three studies, two because the participants had participated in similar studies
recently and one because a participant’s device had security software that warned them against
using our modified version of Signal.
When participants arrived for their scheduled appointment, we presented them with the
requisite forms for consent and compensation. We instructed them to download and install the Signal
application being tested. We then read them a brief introduction describing the study conditions and
their rights as study participants. We informed them that they would be placed in separate rooms.
We also informed participants that a study coordinator would be with them at all times and would
answer any questions they might have. We let participants choose the study coordinator they would
be comfortable working with.
We led the participants to their respective rooms, initiated audio recording, and instructed
them to begin the survey. Throughout the study, coordinators were available to answer general
questions but were careful not to provide any instructions that would aid in the use of the applications.
Sometimes, participants asked if they could meet, and we told them they could. The nature of the
scenario led most participants to assume they would not meet.

4.4.5

Limitations

The scenario we gave participants to exchange a credit card number included telling participants to
make sure that no one could steal their information. This caused confusion in one case, when the
participants made a phone call through the app in order to perform the authentication ceremony,
when they noticed that they could use the same phone call to exchange the credit card number. It
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may be better to create a scenario where users first validate the safety numbers, then are given a task
to exchange the credit card number.
The iOS and Android versions are slightly different. The Android version in Modifications 1
and 2 tells the user that they need to send a message in Signal before they can verify safety numbers.
This message appears because the safety number is generated from a combination of local identities
and remote identity public keys, and on Android the remote identity key is only received after
exchanging the first message. For iOS, this is not the case, and safety number is available before
any message exchange.
Due to our method of recruitment, our participants were largely students and their acquaintances, and subsequently exhibited some degree of homogeneity. All participants were between 18
and 34 years of age and had received at least some college education. This could cause absolute
success rates or usability scores to be higher than in a broader population, though it should not
affect comparisons among different versions of the application.

4.4.6

Demographics

Our participants were not balanced with respect to gender—50.0% (10) of our participants for the
original Signal, 70.0% (14) of participants for Modification 1, and 35.0% (7) of participants for
Modification 2 were male.
Since we distributed recruitment flyers on the university campus, most of our participants
were undergrads, between 18 and 24—90.0% (18), 100.0% (20), and 90.0% (18) for each of the
three versions. Most participants had some college but not yet earned a diploma—90.0% (18),
75.0% (15), and 65.0% (13) for the three versions.
Participants had a variety of backgrounds, skewed toward fields with non-technical backgrounds and less explicitly IT-related. Participants were asked to place themselves into categories
of “beginner,” “intermediate,” and “advanced” regarding their security expertise. Most participants
regarded themselves as beginners—85.0%(17), 85.0%(17), and 70.0% (14) for the three versions.
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Participant self-report

Study coordinator report

Application

Yes

No

Not sure

QR code

Original
Modification 1
Modification 2

10
18
12

3
0
1

7
2
7

0
4
0

Yes
Phone call
0
2
18

Not found

No
Ignored

Toggled

15
0
1

4
2
1

1
12
0

Table 4.2: Did the participants safely exchange the credit card number?

Application

Time to locate
authentication ceremony

Time to complete
authentication

Time to complete
the task

3.5
<1
<1

N/A
7
2

5
8
4

Original
Modification 1
Modification 2

Table 4.3: Median time, in minutes, for finding and using the authentication ceremony.

None of our participants classified themselves as advanced, including the four participants from
computer science or computer engineering.

4.5

Results

In this section, we discuss the quantitative and qualitative results regarding the use of the authentication ceremony by participants. Details of our statistical methods are given in Appendix C.1.

Application
Original
Modification 1
Modification 2

Extremely
easy

Somewhat
easy

Neither easy
nor difficult

Somewhat
difficult

Extremely
difficult

1
9
7

0
5
10

2
5
1

1
1
1

0
0
0

Table 4.4: Responses to: “How difficult or easy was it to use this screen to verify the safety number?”
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4.5.1

Adherence and Completion

Participants who completed the ceremony compared their safety numbers by either scanning the
QR code or by comparing the numbers over a phone call. We recorded a failure when participants
transmitted sensitive data before verifying safety numbers, or if they failed to locate and validate
safety numbers within ten minutes of launching the application. We also asked participants whether
they felt they had safely exchanged the credit card number. Success and failure reports from both
participants and the study coordinators are shown in Table 4.2.
Half of the participants who used the original Signal, and the majority of participants
who used the modified versions, believed that they completed the task safely. However, none of
the participants who used the original Signal version successfully performed the authentication
ceremony. Only five participants even located the screen where safety numbers were displayed. In
one of these cases, the participant ignored the instructions on the screen and simply pressed the
Mark as verified button. In the other cases, participants ignored the screen entirely and immediately
dismissed it. Participants tried several methods to deliver the message securely, including using
various forms of primitive coding (e.g. developing their own substitution cipher), or enabling
Signal’s message impermanence feature.
All of the participants who used Modification 1 located the authentication ceremony screen,
a large increase over the original Signal. However, while six participants correctly verified their
safety numbers, the remaining 14 did not. Two of these latter participants ignored the screen
and dismissed it, and the other 12 simply toggled the Mark as verified switch without comparing
numbers. In successful cases, participants met to scan the QR code on each other’s phone and in
one case they wrote the safety numbers on paper and then made a phone call to verify them. We
also notice that under this version of Signal, nearly all of the participants (18) believed they had
safely performed the task. Only one of the participants who toggled the switch claimed to be unsure
about the safety of the exchange.
Participant performance with Modification 2 was drastically better when compared to both
the original Signal and Modification 1. Under Modification 2, 18 (90%) participants successfully
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performed the authentication ceremony, all of whom elected to do it over a phone call. The two
failures were from the same pair of participants. In this case, Participant A erroneously informed
his partner that the information had been transmitted safely, which caused Participant B to abandon
his viewing of the authentication ceremony. However, Participant B did note that he was unsure the
information was transferred safely in the post-task survey.
To test whether there are any differences between the versions of Signal, we used Cochran’s
Q test. We found that the success rate was statistically different for the applications (χ2 (2) = 27.11,
p < .0005). We then ran Barnard’s exact test to find the significant differences among the pairs
of applications. This test shows the differences among all the pairs are significant (Signal vs.
Modification 1, p = 0.0165; Signal vs. Modification 2, p = 1.15E − 05; Modification 1 vs.
Modification 2, p = 0.0163).

4.5.2

Timing

The study coordinators timed each of participants and obtained three metrics, all with a granularity
of minutes. First, the time required to locate the authentication ceremony was measured from the
time that participants launch the application to the time where they first find the screen wherein
the safety numbers reside. Second, the time for authentication completion was measured from
the time users find the safety number screen to the time they verify their partner’s safety number
matches their own. Third, task completion time was measured from the time participants launch the
application to the time they send (or receive) the credit card number from their partner.
Table 4.3 shows median times for each of the discussed metrics. For studies involving
Modification 1, no one performed the authentication; thus we did not include this data in the
table. In all of the studies with Modification 1 and Modification 2, all participants except for two
discovered the authentication ceremony in less than 1 minute, with many taking just a few seconds.
For the original version, only 5 (25%) of the participants found the screen, with a median of 3.5
minutes. Note the average discovery time in [73] was 3.2 minutes.
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Participants correctly performed the authentication ceremony in 3 out of the 10 experiments
with Modification 1, taking a median of 7 minutes. Participants correctly performed the authentication ceremony in 9 out of the 10 experiments with Modification 2, finishing in a median of 2
minutes. Note that the average time to complete the ceremony in [73] was 7.8 minutes.
For finding the ceremony, a two-tailed, two-sample t-test with equal variance shows there
is no significant difference between Modification 1 and Modification 2 (p=0.484, 95% CI: [-0.37,
0.759] minutes). This is expected since the interfaces for finding the ceremony are identical in these
two versions. For completing the authentication ceremony, a two-tailed, two-sample t-test with
equal variance shows there is a significant difference between Modification 1 and Modification 2
(p=7.849E-05, 95% CI: [1.937, 6.16] minutes).

4.5.3

Usability

We asked participants who found the authentication ceremony to rank the usability of the ceremony
on a five-point Likert scale, from Extremely easy to Extremely difficult. Table 4.4 shows the
participant responses to this question. No one reported the task as extremely difficult and the
majority of participants found it easy or somewhat easy to work with the authentication ceremony.
Note that the one who ranked the ceremony in the original Signal as Extremely easy to use
simply toggled the Mark as verified switch. Of the nine participants using Modification 1 who
reported it was extremely easy for them to use the ceremony, 5 either ignored it or toggled the Mark
as verified switch, with the rest successfully completing the ceremony. All of the participants using
Modification 2 saw the authentication ceremony screen and the majority believed it was easy to use.
Because many of the participants either didn’t use the ceremony or didn’t complete it properly, we
didn’t run any statistical comparisons among the different versions.
We also asked these same participants what they liked or disliked about verifying their
safety number, in an open-response question. Interestingly, some users felt the length of the safety
numbers improved the security of the task, while others felt they were too long or hard to keep track
of. This is well illustrated by the comment from one participant who used Modification 2:
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“I liked that it came up on the middle of the phone call screen rather than being
sent through a text message that I would have to pull up during the conversation. There
were a lot of numbers, which could be hard to keep track of if you were reading them
over the phone, but the amount of numbers ensures greater safety.”
The confusion regarding the original authentication ceremony is well illustrated by this
comment from a participant who used Modification 1:
“I was a little confused at first and I wondered if we needed to be in the same
room to scan the QR code to make sure our conversation was secure. At the bottom it
just asked if I could switch the conversation to verified and so I did.”
Another participant who used Modification 2 stated: “I liked how the numbers were large
and visible but I didn’t like that the numbers had to be read on speaker phone so everyone could
have heard them. This indicated some confusion about the role that safety numbers play in securing
the conversation.
Note that we didn’t make any statistical comparisons for this or other qualitative data in the
paper. Our qualitative data is noisy, meaning some users may not have offered all their reasoning in
a particular answer, while other users gave multiple reasons and were coded into multiple categories.
In addition, because of a large number of categories, the values of many cells in the tables are small.
These factors make statistical comparisons problematic.

4.5.4

Comprehension

During the post-task survey we also asked participants who found the authentication ceremony
what they thought the screen did. Overall, 43 out of 60 participants answered this question. We
also showed the screen to participants during the interview portion of the study, asking them how
they thought the screen helped them with the task. We coded this data, with the results shown in
Table 4.5.
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Code

Original

M1

M2

3
2
0
0
0

4
2
6
2
7

6
3
7
1
5

7
3
2
2
5

7
6
1
0
7

6
7
2
0
5

(A) Survey
Authentication
Confidentiality
Security
Trust
Didn’t know
(B) Interview
Authentication
Confidentiality
Security
Trust
Didn’t know

Table 4.5: Coded responses to: (A) “What does this screen do?” (shown if they saw the ceremony
during the study), (B) “How does this screen help you to accomplish the task?”
Many participants believed the authentication ceremony was involved with either authentication or confidentiality. Typically when mentioning authentication they discussed making sure
they were talking to the right person and not an impostor. Some participants indicated a good level
of understanding. For example, one participant who used Modification 2 said:
“That made sure that you weren’t talking to someone pretending to be your friend
or someone who had hacked her number and was answering the phone for her. Because
there was not picture of her, no live stream video. So it could have been someone that
sounded like her really closely. So I think that’s what the numbers did...If numbers didn’t
match.It would mean that I would send him a message, and then his phone would try to
unencrypt it, and it would just get garbage information.”
A participant who scanned QR codes with Modification 1 said:
“I think it helps, that, there were so many of them that its hard to replicate so I
don’t think that it would be easy for someone to just steal them or come up with them
and so, cause there were enough of them that when I saw that (A) had all the same ones I
was like ‘Cool I am definitely talking to the person I think I am.’ ”
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When mentioning confidentiality, participants discussed making sure nobody else could
read their conversation. A participant who used Modification 2 said: “I was thinking for safety
reasons. To make sure that the information we’re telling to each other is just between the two of us.”
Participants also often mentioned security, generally, without any additional clarification
about what it meant to have a “secure connection”. There are also significant numbers who didn’t
know and, by their own admission, could not make a guess, or who were clearly making up an
answer on the fly.
Note that many participants, across all codings, expressed doubt about their answers, as is
typical in lab studies involving technical topics. The vast majority of participants were not entirely
sure about the role that safety numbers played.

4.5.5

Participant Report on Success or Failure

During the post-study survey, participants were asked: ‘‘Do you think you have safely exchanged
the credit card number with your friend? Explain your answer.” The available discrete responses
were Yes, No, and Not sure (reported previously in Table 4.2), and an adjacent free response field
required respondents to explain in their own words. We coded the free response portion of these
answers into two groups: positive impressions and negative impressions. Positive impressions were
used to support claims of success and negative impressions support claims of possible failure. Note
that these categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, a persons unsure of their success in
the task sometimes provided both positive and negative impressions. The number of responses in
each identified category across all variants of the Signal application tested are shown in Table 4.6.
The use of a primitive cipher, such as writing the credit card number backwards, sending a
screenshot instead of textual data, or mapping numbers to letters in the recipients name, was the
most popular positive impressions for tasks under the original Signal. This was followed by trust
in the application and the use of message impermanence settings. We see an increase in mentions
(from 0 to 7) of the authentication ceremony from study participants who used Modification 1,
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Code

Original

M1

M2

6
4
3
2

3
9
3
0

0
1
0
0

1

0

0

1

0

1

1
1

3
2

2
1

0

7

11

7

1

1

4
1
1
0

2
0
0
1

4
0
1
0

0
0

0
0

1
1

Positive impressions
Use of primitive cipher
Trust in the application
Message impermanence
Use of other security features
Successful message delivery
Contact list synchronization
Trust voice call
Absence of physical
threats
Authentication ceremony
Negative impressions
Lack trust in the application
Lack of knowledge
Time cutoff reached
Lack of transparency
Lack of trust in mobile
apps
Lack of trust in text
Possible physical threat

Table 4.6: Coded responses to: “Do you think you have safely exchanged the credit card number
with your friend? Explain your answer.”
which is then further increased by participants using Modification 2, with over half of participants
mentioning this in their response. However, we also note that lack of knowledge seemed relatively
unaffected by Modification 2 with respect to the original Signal.
In cases of failure to find the authentication ceremony or perform it correctly, participants
were asked: “What were you looking for to accomplish the task?” By this time we had already
showed them the authentication ceremony screen and its purpose, so this question allowed them to
provide us with insight to what information they lacked during the study that would have helped
them find and use the ceremony.
For users of the original Signal, this responses were largely aimed at explaining why they
did not locate the ceremony. These reasons varied wildly, which in itself became the overall theme:
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Application
Original
Modification 1
Modification 2

Strongly
agree

Somewhat
agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Strongly
disagree

4
5
6

9
13
12

6
2
2

1
0
0

0
0
0

Table 4.7: Responses to: “I trust that Signal is secure.”
participants lacked sufficient direction under the original Signal. One participant said “I had no
idea what I needed to do” and another said he was “just looking for any sort of security setting
or application.” Some explained their method for ad-hoc cipher use, implying that they didn’t
look for built-in functionality to provide safety and instead resorted to their own means. Others
explained that they got caught up experimenting with other security features of the application, such
as message destruction, or blamed their own laziness for not finding the ceremony.
Since modified Signal versions effectively led the participants to the ceremony screen,
responses provided insight into why the authentication ceremony may not have been performed
properly. The primary difficulty in using Modification 2 was that participants had difficulty knowing
what to do with the authentication ceremony screen and its “Mark as verified” button. For example,
one participant remarked,
“I hit [the button] and then I was like, ‘well that did nothing’ and so I hit it again
and nothing happened...I hit verify and then it says that I just unhit it immediately
afterwards...I was just like, ‘verify what? What am I verifying?’ It didn’t really tell
me...Honestly it meant nothing.”
Our second modification was designed to deal with these problems by guiding users through
the authentication ceremony. Only one pair was unsuccessful in properly performing the ceremony.
The response to this question from that pair explained that the participants felt comfortable once
they identified each other on the call and thus didn’t proceed.
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4.5.6

Trust

Participants were presented with the statement I trust that Signal is secure, and asked to rank their
agreement with the statement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly agree to Strongly
disagree. Table 4.7 shows responses to this question for the different versions of Signal. A one-way
ANOVA shows that there are no significant differences between the different versions (p=0.143).
We also asked participants to explain their answer in an open response question. We coded their
positive and negative impressions, and this data is shown in Table 4.8.
The majority of participants somewhat or strongly agreed with the statement, with more
users of Modification 1 and 2 expressing these sentiments as compared to the original version. Note
that many of the people expressing trust in the application had no specific reason other than that
the application seemed secure, or that it seemed more secure than other applications they had used.
A number of people pointed to the authentication ceremony as a reason to trust the application,
but this could be because they sensed this was the purpose of the study. One participant who used
Modification 2 stated: “I think this app is strongly agree because once you are verified with others
you can actually trust the person on the call and exchange your information.” Several participants
indicated they trusted the application because they assumed it had been made by developers at our
university.
The only person who chose Somewhat disagree, for the original version of Signal, couldn’t
find the authentication ceremony and referred to lack of transparency as the reason for this choice.
This participant said: “There is no proof of this at all. It says it is secure but does not give me
any information.” The main negative impressions expressed by participants were lack of lack of
knowledge about the application or experience using it, and lack of reputation.

4.5.7

Adoption

During the interview portion of the study, we read participants the following statement:
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Code

Original

M1

M2

6
1
2
1
2
0
2
0
0

3
2
4
1
0
3
0
0
1

7
0
6
0
2
0
0
1
0

9

7

8

1
1
1
0

1
1
1
2

4
0
0
0

Positive impressions
Seem secure
Relatively secure
Authentication ceremony
Security settings
No evidence to contrary
Trust university
Message impermanence
Few people using it so far
User interface
Negative impressions
Lack of knowledge/experience
Lack of reputation
Lack of transparency
Lack of trust
Confusing user interface

Table 4.8: Coded responses to: “Please explain your answer” (regarding whether they trust Signal
to be secure)
“It is possible for someone to intercept your messages. These screens we have
been showing you are called an authentication ceremony. Using the authentication
ceremony ensures that nobody, not Signal, not hackers, and not even the government, is
able to intercept your messages. You only need to do this once (or if your friend reinstalls
the app). Now that you know this, are you willing to use the authentication ceremony
before you exchange messages with a friend the first time?”
We then asked participants if they would be willing to use the authentication ceremony in
secure messaging applications in the future. Of the participants who answered this question, 32 said
yes, 4 said no, 14 said only if they were exchanging confidential information, and 6 said only with
certain contacts. We emphasize that participants were likely to say yes to this question, due to the
nature of the study.
As an example of how we rated someone who would use the ceremony only when sending
certain content, one participant who used Modification 1 said:
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“Am I willing? Yes. Will I? No. Because here is the thing, I don’t really care if
my messages get intercepted because most of the time I am not sending my credit card
number or social security numbers. Will I use it for things that are really important? For
sure.”

4.6

Discussion

In this section we discuss the significance and shortcomings of our results.

4.6.1

Adherence, Timing, and Comprehension

One of the primary contributions of this work is that the modifications that we made to Signal result
in a higher success rate and lower task completion time in comparison to the original version. With
Modification 1 and Modification 2 combined, 97.5% of participants found the ceremony, compared
to only 25% for the original version of Signal. In addition, the changes made to the authentication
ceremony in Modification 2 resulted in a success rate of 90% for completion of the ceremony, as
compared to 30% for Modification 1. Numerous participants were confused by the Mark as Verified
toggle in the ceremony for Modification 1 (the same as Signal’s current ceremony), and assumed
that flipping this switch would activate some kind of automatic verification.
Our results improve on prior work by Vaziripour et al. [73]. Participants found the authentication ceremony in an average of less than a minute (and often seconds), as compared to 3.5 minutes
for [73]. Likewise, the average time to complete the authentication ceremony was 2.11 minutes, as
compared to 7.8 minutes across the three applications [73] studied.
These advances were made using opinionated design to encourage participants to use
the authentication ceremony, combined with a small monetary incentive to be security-minded.
Our methodology included no instruction on finding or completing the ceremony, as in prior
work [33, 73]. This indicates that the interface changes were enough to lead to the desired behavior,
once participants had a security mindset.
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Despite these results, participants did not demonstrate a strong comprehension of the purpose
of the authentication ceremony. Although some participants believed the ceremony had something
to do with authentication or confidentiality, many expressed doubts about their opinions. Still others
either directly or indirectly admitted they didn’t know what it was for. As one participant who used
Modification 2 stated, “I don’t know. I’m not really sure, actually, how it helped.”
Overall, these results are similar to a recent Google study on SSL warnings [25]. This
study found that design of the warnings enhanced secure behavior from users and boosted threat
understanding, but did not necessarily improve user comprehension of the warnings. This indicates
that more work is needed to help users understand what they are doing in the authentication
ceremony, and why they are doing it.

4.6.2

Adoption, Risk Communication, and Trust

Our interviews with participants indicate more work is needed within secure messaging applications
to explain the purpose of the ceremony and to help users make choices about when it is necessary.
Once the purpose of the authentication ceremony was explained to users, they readily understood it.
However, a third of participants indicated that they would only want to use it certain in cases when
they were sending sensitive information, and their responses indicated that they viewed the risk as
acceptable when sending ordinary information. Others indicated they would never see the need, or
said they would have trouble convincing their contacts to adopt secure messaging apps or use the
ceremony.
A review of terminology used in Signal and in our modifications illustrates the difficulty.
Our warning message to users reads “Action needed! Click to verify your safety numbers.” There is
no indication of what comparing these numbers will do for users, nor what risks occur if they don’t.
Likewise, in the current Signal ceremony, it tells users that:
“If you wish to verify the security of your end-to-end encryption with Bob,
compare the numbers above with the numbers on their device.”
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Many users may not know what end-to-end encryption is, why comparing these numbers
helps, nor what risks occur if they do not do this. Similar criticisms are valid for our modified
ceremony.
In addition, users make rational tradeoffs between security and convenience [32]. Even if
the ceremony is highly usable, users may still not adopt it, since usability is not the primary obstacle
to adoption of secure messaging applications [2]. Rather, users may perceive the ceremony as
“geeky” [38], they may not be convinced there is a need for it, or they may not be able to convince
their contacts to use it.
Finally, many users readily admitted that they lacked the knowledge and experience necessary to know whether to trust Signal. The difficulty this poses for users was expressed well by one
participant who used Modification 2:
“I don’t know that there is anything that would make be sure that no one else is
listening in. I don’t know if whoever has developed Signal has someone set it up so that
they can listen in. I would assume that they don’t because it seems like their purpose is
security. But I guess it might be possible for someone to be listening in. I don’t know
how I would know that that isn’t happening.”
It’s not clear how to give users a sense of trust in secure applications, especially when there
are regular breaches of security that they hear about in the news.

4.6.3

Generality

Our results on finding and using the authentication ceremony should generalize to other secure
messaging applications. We examined several major messaging applications to identify how our
research would apply to them.
• Finding the Authentication Ceremony: WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook Messenger, and Viber
all require multiple clicks to find the authentication ceremony within the menu system, similar
to Signal. With both Telegram and Facebook Messenger, encrypted chats are optional, so
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additional steps are needed to initiate a secure chat. We expect our improvements for finding
the ceremony would be applicable to all of these applications.
• Using the Authentication Ceremony: The ceremonies in WhatsApp, Telegram, and Facebook
Messenger differ in varying degrees from Signal. WhatsApp is nearly identical, with options
for scanning a QR code or comparing an alphanumeric fingerprint, and no integrated phone
call. Telegram allows the user to compare either a graphical or alphanumeric fingerprint, with
no integrated QR scanning or phone call and few instructions. Facebook Messenger only offers
the option to compare an alphanumeric fingerprint, and there are separate keys for each device,
again with no integrated phone call. We expect our improvements for using the ceremony will
be applicable to all of these applications. Viber is unique in that it integrates a phone call into
their application to make the ceremony easier to use. Thus it is likely that Viber’s ceremony
would have similar success as our design. In prior work [73] Viber had the highest success
rate for the authentication ceremony once people were directed to find it.

4.7

Conclusion

Our study indicates that users can find and complete the authentication ceremony in secure messaging applications, provided they have a security mindset and the application is designed to help
them easily accomplish these tasks. This raises numerous open questions for further study. First,
comprehension is still somewhat low, and additional design is needed to help users understand why
they should perform the ceremony and when it is necessary. Second, it is not clear whether users
will be security-minded without encouragement, such as a small monetary reward in the case of our
study. More work is needed to determine if user interface changes alone can encourage use of the
ceremony. Third, work is needed to determine if these advances can be applied to helping users
cope with an attack scenario or when a contact re-installs Signal. Both of these situations will cause
the security numbers to change, alerting users to a possible attack, and evidence to date shows that
users do not cope well. Fourth, it may be possible to fully automate the authentication ceremony,
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using social authentication [72] or CONIKS [46]. Finally, work is needed to help users make good
choices about which secure messaging applications are safe to use.
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Chapter 5
I Don’t Even Have to Bother Them! Using Social Media to Automate the Authentication
Ceremony in Secure Messaging1

Abstract
The privacy guaranteed by secure messaging applications relies on users completing an authentication ceremony to verify they are using the proper encryption keys. We examine the feasibility
of social authentication, which partially automates the ceremony using social media accounts.
We implemented social authentication in Signal and conducted a within-subject user study with
42 participants to compare this with existing methods. To generalize our results, we conducted
a Mechanical Turk survey involving 421 respondents. Our results show that users found social
authentication to be convenient and fast. They particularly liked verifying keys asynchronously,
and viewing social media profiles naturally coincided with how participants thought of verification.
However, some participants reacted negatively to integrating social media with Signal, primarily
because they distrust social media services. Overall, automating the authentication ceremony and
distributing trust with additional service providers is promising, but this infrastructure needs to be
more trusted than social media companies.

1

Under submission to CHI 2019
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5.1

Introduction

Secure messaging applications provide end-to-end encryption conversations for users, which is
particularly important where people are vulnerable to government surveillance and lack free speech
protection. However, the security of these applications is dependent on users verifying the encryption
keys used by the application. Most secure messaging applications provide a user interface for users
to do this, using a method called the authentication ceremony. This typically involves users needing
to scan a QR code, if they are in the same location, or making a phone call and comparing the key
fingerprint verbally. Unfortunately, research has shown that users are not able to find or perform the
authentication ceremony in current secure messaging applications [8, 33, 58, 73, 74].
Two recent studies have sought to improve the usability of the authentication ceremony.
First, Vaziripour et al. showed that users could complete the authentication ceremony in several
applications – WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Viber – but only if they had instruction about
potential threats and about the importance of the authentication ceremony [73]. Second, in a followup paper, Vaziripour et al. redesigned the authentication ceremony in Signal using opinionated
design and nudges, and they showed that with this new design most users were able to find and use
the authentication ceremony [75]. However, this work paid users a small monetary incentive to
encourage them to have a security mindset, and it is not clear if this would carry over to situations
outside of a lab study. In addition, users still had to compare a long key fingerprint over a phone
call, something they considered annoying.
In this paper, we examine whether it is possible to simplify and partially automate the
authentication ceremony using a method we call social authentication. In this method, we use
social media to distribute the public keys used by Signal and automatically compare them once
users have verified that we have linked the correct social media accounts for them. Our goal is
to examine whether social authentication is a feasible authentication method – whether users can
perform it quickly, like using it, trust it, and understand it. We also want to determine how this
method compares against the current methods of scanning a QR code or using a phone call in terms
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of usability, trust, and user preference. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has explored
automating the authentication ceremony.
To evaluate the effectiveness and the feasibility of social authentication, we integrated it into
the Signal messaging application and conducted two studies. We first conducted a lab user study
with 21 pairs of participants (42 total), with each pair trying all three methods of authentication
and comparing them. We then conducted a survey of 421 participants on Mechanical Turk, to study
the feasibility of social authentication and whether our lab user study results generalize to a larger
population.
Overall, we find that social authentication is considered by participants to be usable, fast,
and convenient. However, participants did not understand how it helped protect the privacy of their
conversations, worried about account compromise, and did not trust that social media could be
used for this purpose. It is difficult for people to conceive of using a public social media account to
somehow improve their privacy, and social media companies do not have a strong reputation for
trustworthiness due to frequent hacking. Participants also identified trade-offs with the QR code
and phone call methods, leaving no clear winner. Using results from participant preferences, we
identify principles for an ideal authentication ceremony and make recommendations for future work.
Our work demonstrates that there is promise for automating the authentication ceremony, but that
additional work is needed to realize this goal.

5.2

Background and Related Work

The effective security provided by secure messaging applications depends heavily on users completing an authentication ceremony, the process of manually verifying the fingerprints of the encryption
keys being used. The authentication ceremony is essential because a hacker or the service provider
could replace the keys with substitutes they choose, enabling them to decrypt a conversation’s traffic
if they can also intercept it. To make sure their conversations are private, users need to compare the
fingerprint of their keys to ensure they match. This ensures that they have each received the correct
public key for the other party.
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Each application provides a different user interface to facilitate the authentication ceremony.
Users may verify the public key of their partner by comparing a key fingerprint that has been
encoded into Short Authentication String (SAS), a hexadecimal version of the fingerprint, or by
scanning a QR code that encodes the fingerprint. Recent research shows that word-based and
sentence-based encodings of a key fingerprint are more resistant to attacks and rated high on
usability as compared to hexadecimal, alphanumeric, or pure numeric representations [18]. Other
work shows that graphical representations are more susceptible to attack but are easy and quick to
use [66]. Related work has also been done with crypto phones, which require users to compare a
short checksum and verify the other user’s voice. Shirvanian et al. show that users are susceptible
to impersonation attacks in the checksum verification process. [60, 62]. Notably, they found that
security decreases when moving from a 2-word to a 4-word checksum.
The evidence to date suggests users are unable to perform the authentication ceremony
successfully in current messaging applications [8, 33, 58]. Most of the related work focuses on
showing that current designs are not usable enough. Assal et al. found that only 30% of participants
successfully completed the QR code verification with no errors, mainly due to the ambiguity of the
connection between the key and QR code [8]. Schröder et al. show a high failure rate due to usability
problems and incomplete mental models [58]. Herzberg and Leibowitz proposed that with some
instruction about the ceremony itself, users can successfully find and conduct the authentication [33].
Shirvanian et al. studied key verification performance by users performing authentication on remote
and local conversation partners, showing that users perform poorly under most key verification
methods, especially in the remote case [61]. Vaziripour et al. showed that the success rate increases
to as high as 90% by providing instruction on the necessity of the authentication ceremony in
addition to potential threats [73].
One recent paper focuses on improving the design of authentication ceremony within secure
messaging applications. Vaziripour et al. employed usability principles and opinionated design
to develop a redesigned authentication ceremony in Signal [75]. Their modifications led to a 90%
success rate in completing the authentication ceremony, as compared to 30% for the original design,
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and fast authentication times. This was done with a small monetary incentive that encouraged
participants to be security-minded, but no direct instruction on the ceremony. However, results
showed that users still did not understand the meaning or purpose of the ceremony.
Other work has explored the use of social authentication for secure email, using the Keybase
service. This service has users create an account at Keybase.io, then prove ownership of their
social media and other accounts (e.g. GitHub). Another user can then access Keybase, download
proofs of ownership, and link a public key to the user’s identity. Atwater et al. used a simulated
version of Keybase to implement effective key management for secure emails [9]. Lerner et al.
also implemented a more usable secure email by integrating Keybase with the Mailvelope browser
plugin [41]. To compromise a user of Keybase, an attacker would need to take control of all the
accounts a user has verified with Keybase and create new proofs.

5.3

Social Authentication Design

In Signal, safety numbers are derived from the public keys of the communicating parties, their phone
numbers, and the first message they exchange. In current versions of Signal, the authentication
ceremony requires users to either scan a QR code that encodes the safety number (meaning they
must be in the same location), or make a phone call outside of the Signal application to compare
their safety numbers and ensure they match.
In this section we describe social authentication and how we integrated it into Signal in
order to compare it with these existing methods used for the authentication ceremony.

5.3.1

Social Authentication

The idea behind social authentication is to post the public keys of users to their social media
accounts. This provides a secondary exchange method, not controlled by Signal, for verifying that
the keys (and thus the safety numbers) match. This also provides a possibility for automating the
comparison of safety numbers and instead places users in a more familiar situation of identifying
their contacts through social media accounts. Since users generally don’t know about public key
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cryptography [80], this method could provide an authentication process that is more intuitive and
rooted in their experiences with social media.
If we could reliably infer a user’s social media accounts from their phone number, then this
process could be entirely automated, but we must instead (a) have each person tell Signal which
social media accounts they own, and then, (b) have users verify that the social media accounts
shown by Signal are indeed the accounts for the person they are contacting.
Thus, our social authentication method comprises three steps. First, users register their
social media accounts with the Signal app when they first install the application or first turn on the
social authentication feature. The Signal app posts their public key to their social media accounts at
this time. Second, the app will periodically collect the public keys of all their friends. Third, when
two users start a conversation, the Signal app compares the public key of the other party to all of the
public keys downloaded from social media accounts. If there is a match, it is presented to the user
for confirmation that this is the right person.
We incorporated this method of social authentication into Signal to demonstrate that it is
feasible. However, creating an application that posts on multiple social media accounts requires
individual approval from social media companies, and they typically review and approve professional
applications, rather than research prototypes. It proved difficult and time-consuming to convince
many companies to approve our app. As a result, we made several simplifications in our application
that make a user study possible. We don’t publish any public keys on social media accounts. This
avoids the need for additional review and approval, and also avoids any potential harm that could
come to users during the study. Instead, we stored the public keys in a separate server that maps
each user’s social media account identifier to the public key they use, as if it had been posted,
and their phone number. The Signal app then queries the server for this data in order to show the
user matching social media profiles. We made sure that the user interface did not change from the
idealized version of social authentication to the centralized version we implemented.
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(a) Authentication ceremony options

(b) IN PERSON option

(c) PHONE CALL option

(d) SOCIAL MEDIA
option

Figure 5.1: User interface for the authentication ceremonies

5.3.2

Integration with Signal

We integrated social authentication into Signal by starting with the redesigned prompts and authentication ceremony from prior work from Vaziripour et al. [75]. As shown in Figure 5.1a, users
are encouraged to start the authentication ceremony by a red bar shown at the bottom of their
conversation. Once they tap this bar, the message and options shown appear. We modified this
dialog to add an option for SOCIAL MEDIA. When a user successfully completes any version of
the authentication ceremony, a check mark appears next to the contact name and the red bar at the
bottom of the conversation changes to blue, with a message indicating the contact has been verified.
We performed a cognitive walk-through on the modified application to make sure the language used
in the interface was clear.

In Person Authentication
If a user clicks the IN PERSON option, they are taken to the screen shown in Figure 5.1b, with the
camera, activated. This screen allows a user to scan the other person’s QR code, and also shows their
own QR code in case the other person is the one doing the scanning. If verification is completed
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(a) Start of social authentication registration

(b) Authorization to register a social media account

(c) Login with a social
media account

(d) Social media accounts verified

Figure 5.2: Registration phase for social authentication
successfully, the app shows a green check mark and a message indicating that conversation is private.
This ceremony is unchanged from Vaziripour et al.

Phone Call Authentication
If a user clicks on the PHONE CALL option, they are shown a message indicating that they will
make a free phone call using the Signal app. After initiating the phone call, users see their safety
number with a very brief instruction, shown in Figure 5.1c. Users are expected to read their safety
numbers and ensure they have an identical sequence of numbers. Users are expected to switch
the Verified toggle after they confirm that the safety numbers match. After they do this, a message
appears, showing that the authentication was successful. This ceremony is also unchanged from
Vaziripour et al.

Social Authentication
To use social media authentication, users first complete a registration phase when the application
is initially installed. In the registration phase, users are prompted to authorize the application to
access their social media accounts to verify the safety numbers automatically. If users choose to
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proceed with the instruction which is shown in Figure 5.2, they are taken to a screen showing four
different social networks – Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, and Instagram. If they click on an icon
for a network, they are taken to a screen where they can log in to that account (Figure 5.2b, 5.2c).
Users can skip any of the social networks, although the application recommends they authorize as
many as they can. For each of the social media accounts users authorize they will see their profile
pictures as shown in Figure 5.2d.
Later, if a user clicks on the SOCIAL MEDIA option in Figure 5.1a, they are shown the
screen in Figure 5.1d. Users are supposed to confirm that the social media profiles shown match the
user they are contacting. If they match, they should switch the Verified toggle. If the user indicates
the profiles match, then the app verifies the safety numbers posted to the social networks match the
safety number that the Signal server delivered for the user. If the numbers match, the app displays a
message indicating that the safety numbers match.

5.4

Methodology

We first conducted a lab user study to compare social authentication to in person and phone call
authentication methods, then conducted a Mechanical Turk survey to examine the feasibility of
social authentication and to generalize the user study results.

5.4.1

Lab User Study

We conducted an IRB-approved, within-subject user study, comparing different authentication
ceremonies in Signal. These three methods of authentication include (1) scanning a QR code, (2)
comparing a cryptographic fingerprint over a phone call, and (3) our new social authentication
method. We used the open source code of Signal to implement the three different methods of
authentication. Our study materials are provided in a supplement and online at [redacted].
We recruited 21 pairs of participants (42 total participants) on campus, from July 17, 2018
to September 12, 2018. Participants were required to come in pairs, own an Android smartphone,
and not have used Signal previously.
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Participants were each compensated with $15 cash. Unlike previous work [75], we avoided
giving monetary incentives to make the scenario more realistic. We did not provide participants
with any instructions on the necessity of performing the authentication (in contrast to [73]), nor did
we give them instructions on how to find or complete the authentication ceremony. We avoided
giving any time pressure on participants to complete the task.
When participants arrived for their scheduled appointment, we presented them with the
requisite forms for consent and compensation. We instructed them to download and install the
customized Signal application being tested. We then read them a brief introduction describing the
study conditions and their rights as study participants. We informed them that they would be placed
in separate rooms. We also informed participants that a study coordinator would be with them at all
times and would answer any questions they might have. We led the participants to their respective
rooms, initiated video (and audio) recording, and instructed them to begin the survey. Throughout
the study, coordinators were available to answer general questions but were careful not to provide
any instructions that would aid in the use of the applications.
In the study, participants are asked to play the role of a parent and an adult child having a
conversation. We asked participants to complete the scenario in two steps. In the first step, both
participants were asked to have a normal conversation over Signal. In the second step, we asked
one participant, in the role of the child, to ask for help filing tax forms, and to transmit a fake W-2
tax form to the other participant, who acted as the parent. We reminded the participants to treat the
tax information as if it was their own. Despite the difference in roles, our intention was for both
participants to complete the authentication ceremony. Participants were instructed to “talk aloud” as
they performed the task, explaining their observations, actions, and reasoning.
We observed whether the participants used the authentication ceremony either in the first
step or the second step, and which method the participants selected. We recorded statistics about
their interactions with the ceremony, such as the time required to find it and time to complete it.
During the task, participants could choose any of the three authentication methods. If participants
transmitted sensitive data without completing the authentication ceremony, we noted this failure,
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and the study coordinators helped them initiate the authentication ceremony, using a method chosen
by the participants. In all cases, once the task was completed, including using the authentication
ceremony, participants were then asked to fill out a questionnaire. Following this, we asked them to
repeat the process using each of the other two authentication methods. Before participants tried the
other authentication methods, the study coordinator reset the verification status of their contacts.
After using all three methods, participants answered additional questions on the questionnaire to
compare the three authentication methods.
We recorded video of participants’ phone screens during the study to ensure we could
accurately measure which methods participants used and the time taken for tasks.

5.4.2

Mechanical Turk Survey

We conducted an IRB-approved, web-based survey to ask a larger number of respondents about
their opinions on using social media for the authentication ceremony within secure messaging
applications. We distributed the survey using the Qualtrics platform and recruited participants via
Amazon Mechanical Turk.
To get reliable (non-spam) responses, we recruited participants on Mechanical Turk by
setting the qualification requirement to a 96% acceptance rate. We also limited participation to
people in the United States, so that we could have a sample that was representative of the U.S.
population. A calculation shows that with a population of 325 million, a 95% confidence interval,
and a 5% error margin, we need a sample size of 385. We initially collected 450 responses. We then
removed any responses that were completed in less than 200 seconds, leaving us with 421 responses.
The average response time for these participants was 10.70 minutes.
The questionnaire contained 42 questions, the majority of which were multiple-choice
and Likert-type questions, with a few open-response questions. At the start of the survey, we
provided an introduction about the purpose of the study and an implied consent form following the
guidance from our IRB. The survey was divided roughly into the following groups of questions: (a)
demographics, (b) privacy preferences, (c) usage of secure messaging applications, (d) usage of
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social media, and frequency of the interactions with phone contacts on social media (d) introduction
to the importance of authentication in secure messaging applications, (e) instruction on how each of
the authentication methods function, and (f) opinions regarding features that participants liked or
disliked and their concerns about authentication via social media in open response questions.

5.4.3

Coding Qualitative Data

To analyze the data for open-response questions in the survey and interviews, three of the authors
coded the data together using conventional content analysis. Any disagreements were resolved via
discussion. First, we reviewed qualitative comments phrase-by-phrase and word-by-word to assign
codes that classified users’ comments with regards to a particular topic. Then, we used the constant
comparative method to group codes into concepts and organized related categories by merging
related codes and extracted themes.

5.4.4

Limitations

Due to our method of recruitment for our lab user study, our participants were primarily students
and their acquaintances, and thus exhibited some degree of homogeneity.
For our app to work without approval from Instagram, we had to invite participants to our
developer sandbox prior to the study. This may have predisposed them to use Instagram, though
only a few did so.
Users needed to log into their social media accounts, even if already logged in with a
separate application. Many had forgotten their password and had to reset it. This may have led to
lower usability scores for social authentication.
Most of the time, the first phone call made with Signal did not go through properly, which
has been reported as a bug in the Signal app (not our code). This may have led to lower usability
scores for the phone call authentication method.
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5.5

Lab User Study Results

In this section, we report on the quantitative and qualitative results of the lab user study. Our
complete data set is at [redacted].

5.5.1

Demographics

We report on data collected from 42 participants who were recruited on campus. The participants
are primarily young, with most (85.7%, N=36) between the ages of 18–24 and the rest (14.2%,
N=6) between 25–34. They skew somewhat male (57.1% N=24) and the rest identify as female
(42.8%, N=18). We asked participants to report their highest level of education, and most reported
some college (66.6%, N=28), and the rest having a high school degree (16.6%, N=7), bachelor’s
degree (11.9%, N=5), or an associate’s degree (4.7%, N=2). The majority of the participants
(66.6%, N=28) self-reported their technical expertise as a beginner, with most of the rest rating
themselves as intermediate (26.1%, N=11). Two participants whose majors were computer science
and information technology rated themselves as experts.

5.5.2

Task Completion

We reviewed recordings of the study to determine which participants performed the authentication
ceremony before sending or receiving the tax information. Table 5.1 shows the order in which
participants tried the various methods. Two thirds of participants (66.6%, N=28) succeeded in
performing the authentication ceremony, with about a quarter (23.8%, N=10) who did not even
attempt it. Some participants (9.5% ,N=4) noticed the red bar that prompted participants to use the
ceremony, clicked on it, and chose the phone call method, but they simply clicked the toggle to
mark the conversation as verified without actually checking the safety number.
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Table 5.1: Order of trying each method of authentication
Method of Authentication
Social Media
In Person
Phone Call
5.5.3

First

Second

Third

12
10
20

21
12
9

9
20
13

Time to Authenticate

Prior work has demonstrated that both QR code and phone call authentication can be completed in
several minutes [75]. To test whether social authentication can be competitive with respect to time
spent, we measured both the time it took for participants to register their social media accounts with
Signal and the time to use the social authentication method in the authentication ceremony.
It took participants an average of 2:32 (minutes:seconds) to register their social media
accounts with Signal. Only 10 participants authorized two social media accounts while the rest
authorized just one account. Nearly all of the participants (N=39) authorized Facebook.
It took participants 00:34 (minutes:seconds) to use the method, as measured from the time
they started the authentication ceremony to the time they clicked the toggle to mark the conversation
as verified. Most of the participants (N=39) clicked on the profile picture of their conversation
partner, and they spent an average of 00:18 (minutes:seconds) exploring their accounts. Most
participants indicated that they recognized their friends just from their profile pictures. Those who
did not tap on profile pictures mentioned that they didn’t know this feature existed.

5.5.4

Comparison of Methods

Immediately after they tried each method, we asked participants to evaluate the usability of the
method using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Extremely easy to Extremely difficult. Figure 5.3
shows the scores for each method, with social media ranked as the most usable, followed by in
person and phone call. The mean score is 1.64 for in person, 2.38 for phone call, and 1.61 for social
media. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on these scores yielded significant variation among the
methods (F (2, 123) = 7.488, p = 0.001, η 2 = 0.109). A post hoc Tukey test showed a significant
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Figure 5.3: Single Ease Question (SEQ) scores for each authentication method (user study)

difference between the phone call and in person (p = 0.04) and between phone call and social media
(p = 0.03).
After participants had tried all of the authentication methods, we asked participants which
one was their favorite. Social media was chosen the most (39.0%, N=16), followed by In Person
(34.1%, N=14) and Phone call (26.8%, N=11). One participant did not chose any preferred method
because they believed that all of the methods have major flaws.
After they had tried all of the authentication methods, we also asked participants to evaluate
their agreement with the statement: I trust this method of verifying the safety numbers in Signal.
The scores for each method are shown in Figure 5.4. The average rating for in person was 4.82,
for phone call 4.64, and for social media 3.71. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on these scores
yielded significant variation among the methods (F (2, 249) = 40.0, p < 0.001, η 2 = 0.243). A post
hoc Tukey test showed a significant difference between social media and in person (p < 0.001) and
between social media and phone call (p < 0.001).
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Figure 5.4: Trust scores for each authentication method (user study)
5.5.5

Participant Perceptions

After each authentication method they tried, we asked participants what they liked and disliked
about that method in separate open-response questions. After coding, we identified the following
themes:

Social authentication
Many participants liked that this method was fast and easy. Some liked that it worked asynchronously, meaning they could complete the ceremony independently without needing the other
person to be simultaneously available. For example, P30 stated:
“I liked that I didn’t even have to bother the other person in order to verify the privacy
of the conversation.”
Other participants mentioned security, being automatic, working remotely (not having to be physically in the same location), and being able to use multiple social media accounts. P41 stated:
“ I feel like most people you talk to, you are familiar with their social media accounts.
So it would be effective enough in identifying fakes.”
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The primary negative impressions were a worry that social media accounts could be easily hacked
and that the method was not very intuitive. Some of these fears were misplaced, due to a misunderstanding of how social authentication worked. For example, one participant stated:
“If your social media account is compromised it could leak your key to someone else.”
Other concerns were that it was complicated, did not include mutual authentication, general distrust
of social media, didn’t work with people they didn’t know on social media, was not secure, and was
error prone (due to human judgment about authenticity of accounts). For example, P29 stated:
“It requires human judgment to make sure the profile pictures match, so that adds a little
bit of uncertainty.”
We separately asked whether participants had any concerns about using social media accounts to provide the social authentication feature. In addition to worries expressed above, some
participants did not trust the security associated with social media accounts and were concerned
about a domino effect where if one gets hacked, all others are compromised. Another major point
of concern was identifying contacts through pictures on their social media. Participants expressed
concern for impersonator accounts that fake their friends’ accounts. Other participants didn’t like
the idea of mixing security with social media, either because it was too public or because they didn’t
trust the platform. Many participants flat out stated that they found this method insecure.

QR code
Many participants liked that this method was easy, fast, and secure. Other positive themes mentioned
were that it provided mutual authentication, was easy to understand, was reliable, and automatic.
Participant 17 mentioned:
“It seems to be very reassuring because you know for a fact your dealing with your
friend as you’re face to face”
The QR code method is unique in that it includes strong positive reinforcement – a physical action
leads to a green check mark and a statement that the conversation is now secure, whereas other
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methods require the user to toggle a switch once they have verified the social media accounts or
safety numbers. This positive feedback seemed important. Participant P33 stated:
“The literal scanning of a QR code is oddly gratifying.”
Another participant, P41, liked the idea of using this for new contacts:
“It was super quick and easy. And I feel like it would be better when you meet up with
someone you don’t know, to verify that they are who they say they are. I feel like it would
make me feel a lot safer meeting someone new with this to verify.”
Ironically, the fact that you have to be in person was the leading cause of disliking this
method. Many people don’t want to meet up in person to verify a safety number. For some of these
participants, it’s nearly impossible because their friends live in other states or even outside of their
home country. Other negative impressions were that it lacked clear instructions, was slow, and had
a bug (didn’t work the first time).

Phone call
Participants liked that they could verify the other person by voice (meaning they could recognize
the voice of their friend), and that it was easy. Participant P5 stated:
“I liked that I could talk to him, so that I could be sure it was really him I was talking to.”
Other positive impressions were that it was fast, secure, had the safety numbers visible during the
phone call, could work when participants were in different locations, had clear instructions, and the
phone call was integrated. Three participants mistakenly thought the method was asynchronous
because they toggled the verified switch and thought this activated a security feature. The primary
negative impressions were the length of the safety numbers and a bug that prevented the first phone
call from being completed for many users. The tediousness of the process could lead to unsafe
assumptions. For example, P10 stated:
“I need to listen carefully if I really care about this. But I guess I can just assume that
the 2 numbers are the same”
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Other negative impressions were fears that it could be hacked (or someone could eavesdrop), that it
was complicated, was not asynchronous, lacked clear instructions, was slow, and was not secure.
One participant mentioned that if some one can impersonate his voice, then they can also modify
the safety numbers and fool him. While this is not an easy attack, significant progress has been
made recently [60].

5.5.6

Participant Understanding of Privacy

Immediately after completing the task, we asked participants whether they believed their conversation was private, and why or why not. Participants were split, with about half believing their
conversation was private (47.0%, N=20) and about half saying they were not sure (47.0%, N=20),
with just two participant believing their conversation was not private.
We coded the responses to this question and identified the following themes as reasons why
participants believed their conversation was private:
• Authentication: Participants mentioned verification using a phone call or the QR code
methods. When they mentioned the QR code method, they emphasized the fact that they
physically met their conversation partners, rather than verifying the safety numbers.
• Trusting the application: Users mentioned Signal’s professional UI, and others mentioned
the notification in the application that their conversation was private. This trust was independent
of whether users successfully completed the authentication ceremony or simply toggled the
verified switch.
• Low possibility of attack: Some considered the probability of attack to be low, based on
previous experiences.
• Self filtering: Some participants covered the (fake) social security number when they sent the
tax form, or set auto delete feature on the message.
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• Signal contact verification: A few participants considered the registration process, where
Signal verifies their phone number, as demonstrating the application provided private conversations.
We also identified the following themes as reasons why participants believed their conversation was not private:
• Unsure: Some users said they did not have enough information to judge or were not sure if
they were careful enough or had missed some steps. They were particularly unsure about the
privacy of the tax information they had sent.
• Lack of indicator: A couple of users were suspicious about the privacy of the conversation
because they didn’t see an indicator for it.
• Lack of transparency: Some others blamed the application for lack of transparency, since it
did not explain what it meant for a conversation to be private.
• Possibility of attack: Participants were concerned about possible attacks, especially impersonation and physical attacks on the recipients’ side. One person worried that the tax information
could be seen by anyone who had access to the recipient’s phone.

5.5.7

Participant Understanding of the Ceremony

After participants had tried all three authentication methods, we asked them: Why do you think
Signal asks you to verify safety numbers?. Participant responses had a high degree of variability,
including mentioning security generally, mentioning privacy generally, believing it had to do with
verifying the recipient’s identity, preventing a spoofing (man-in-the-middle) attack, or expressing
confusion. Most participants did not have a clear understanding of what the ceremony accomplished,
but they often perceived that the safety number would somehow help enhance the privacy of the
conversation, either by ensuring them that attacks are not happening or helping them verify they
were talking to the right person. They generally did not make a connection between the safety
numbers and encryption, nor did they have a complete picture of the threats they might face.
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5.6

Mechanical Turk Survey Results

In this section, we report the results of the Mechanical Turk survey. We discuss the feasibility of
social authentication and how well the results of the user study generalize to a larger population.
Our complete data set is at [redacted].

5.6.1

Demographics

All of our participants are over 18. About half (52.7%, N=22) of our participants are ages 25–34,
and about a quarter (25.8%, N=109) are ages 34–44. Participants skewed male (60%, N=252),
with fewer female (40%, N=168). Participants had a variety of education: less than 4 years of
college (46.7%, N=197), 4-year degree (37%, N=156), Master’s Degree (15.2%, N=64), Doctorate
(0.9%, N=4). Participants self-reported their technical expertise with a mix of beginner (4.7%,
N=20), between beginner and intermediate (9%, N=39), intermediate (42.2%, N=178), between
intermediate and expert (31.1%, N=131), and expert (12.5%, N=53).

5.6.2

Feasibility

To determine the feasibility of using social authentication, we asked participants: Now we want
you to think about all the people you normally communicate with using text messaging or instant
messaging. How many of these people are you also friends with on the following social networks?
We listed the same sites mentioned above. Figure 5.5 shows the results, demonstrating that social
authentication will be feasible for at least some contacts for a quarter of participants on most social
networks, with Facebook being the most widely used.

5.6.3

Comparison of Methods

We instructed participants about secure messaging applications, the purpose of the authentication
ceremony, and comparing safety numbers. We then showed participants screenshots of each of the
authentication methods and, after each method, asked them to rate how much they trust each method,
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Figure 5.5: How many of these people are you also friends with on the following social networks?

using a Likert scale to agree or disagree with the statement: I trust the following methods to enhance
the privacy of my conversations. Responses are shown in Figure 5.6. The average rating for in
person was 4.26, for phone call 3.82, and for social media 3.10. An analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on these scores yielded significant variation among the methods (F (2, 1259) = 103.768, p < 0.001).
A post hoc Tukey test showed a significant difference between all pairs (p < 0.001 for each pair).
Comparing the trust scores, two points stand out. First, social authentication is least trusted
and in person is most trusted, indicating that trust is much easier when mediated by physical
confirmation. Second, there is a some amount of distrust for all methods, indicating that trust is
difficult goal to attain for secure messaging applications.
Similar to the user study, we asked participants: Which one of the above methods of
authentication do you like? The most preferred method was Social Media (37.7%, N=159),
matching our user study, with Phone Call (34.4%, N=145) and QR Code (27.7%, N=117) ranking
equally.
Participants were also asked to explain what they liked and disliked about each method,
and their concerns about the Social Media method. After coding their responses, we found most
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Figure 5.6: Trust scores for each authentication method (MTurk survey)
of the themes from these open responses were similar to themes found from the user study. The
primary differences were themes found in the user study due to experience with our particular
implementation of social authentication. These included positive sentiment about not needing
to leave the app to check profiles, and negative sentiments about a lack of clear instruction, not
knowing what was being shared on their social media accounts, and the authentication not being
mutual. Participants in the survey shared positive sentiments about the modern design and liked that
they could verify multiple people in one sitting. They also noted concerns about the reliability of
profile pictures.

5.7
5.7.1

Discussion
Feasibility of Social Authentication

One of our primary purposes of this work was to test the feasibility of social authentication as a way
to partially automate the authentication ceremony. Our user study demonstrated that participants
find the method usable and fast, but they clearly did not spend much time verifying whether their
contact’s social media accounts had been faked or compromised. It would be even more difficult
for users to judge the authenticity of a user’s profile that they don’t interact with often. In addition,
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the security of this approach improves as a user approves more social media accounts, but users
authorized usually one and at most two accounts. This was a consequence of them not interacting
with their friend on many accounts at once. Thus, even though an attacker would need to impersonate
someone on all their social media accounts to compromise social authentication, it is not clear that
users would use more than a few and it is not clear they would spot a clever attack.
Even if we could design a social authentication system that overcomes these flaws, based on
participant feedback it would be very difficult to help users understand they are somehow improving
their privacy by allowing Signal to access their social media accounts. Posting something on social
media, even if users could understand it was just a public key, seems to them to be the opposite of
private.

5.7.2

Trade-offs Among Methods

Participants identified clear trade-offs with the methods we presented to them. They find the
in-person method trustworthy and understandable, but inconvenient due to needing to be in the same
location. They find the phone call method convenient when remotely located, but not very usable
due to the long safety numbers that must be compared. They find social authentication works well
remotely, automates the comparison, and can also work asynchronously, but they don’t trust the use
of social media accounts for this purpose. Ideally, users would like a method that is asynchronous,
automated, works remotely, is understandable, and trustworthy.
Part of designing an understandable method is providing clear feedback to users regarding
their actions and what they are accomplishing. For example, one thing users liked about the QR
code method is that once they scanned the code, they viewed a large green checkmark and a message
indicating their conversation was secure. While users could use more help understanding why
scanning the QR code protected them, this feedback was helpful. With the other methods, users
took some action (matching the safety numbers, checking social media profiles), but then had to
switch the Verified toggle themselves. There was no clear connection between what they did and
how this protected them.
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5.7.3

Recommendations

Social authentication meets many of the participants’ expectations for an authentication ceremony –
it is asynchronous, works remotely, and is partly automated. In addition, the architecture provides a
good method for checking public keys separately from the Signal server in order to detect attacks.
Thus, one potential approach to close the gap is to fully automate the ceremony using service
providers that are more trusted than social media companies. A Signal user could register with
additional providers, who each verify their phone number and publish their public key. The Signal
app could then retrieve keys from these providers and compare them with the key published by the
Signal server. Several additional points would need to be fleshed out with this architecture. For
example, if users can choose different service providers, then some method is needed for mapping
users to providers. Some method for auditing providers for equivocation, such as CONIKS [46]
would be helpful. Users would need help choosing providers and would still need help recovering
from an attack if one was detected. One potential advantage of this architecture is that it could lead
to interoperability among secure messaging apps, a weakness in existing applications.

5.8

Conclusion

We have integrated social authentication into Signal, as the first attempt to partially automate the
authentication ceremony and translate it into a task that users can better understand. Our results are
mixed. Participants find social authentication to be usable and fast, but they have significant doubts
about its trustworthiness. Participants also spent too little time examining social media profiles,
which would likely lead them to be susceptible to fraudulent profiles if an attack was occurring.
However, our comparison of social authentication with other common methods helped identify
principles for an improved authentication ceremony and clear trade-offs in how existing methods
meet some principles but fall short in others. Our work illustrates that there is promise in automating
the authentication ceremony and points the way for future work in this area.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

In this dissertation, we studied the security and the privacy features of secure messaging
applications in four steps, with a focus on the authentication ceremony. First, we explored whether
Telegram, a popular secure messaging application, meets the security and privacy needs of their
Iranian users. One outcome of this study showed that the design of Telegram did not help users
comprehend the essential need of performing the authentication ceremony to ensure the privacy of
their end-to-end encrypted conversations. Second, we explored whether the authentication ceremony
within WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook messaging applications is usable by novice users when
they are asked to send sensitive information. This study showed that it is difficult for users to find
and perform the authentication ceremony without instruction, and when we provided instructions
it took a long time for users to complete the task. Third, we used opinionated design and nudges
to modify the Signal app and its authentication ceremony. We also used a lab study to show that
this design helps users find and complete the authentication successfully without instruction, and
in a short amount of time. However, it doesn’t necessarily help users comprehend the importance
of the process. Finally, we examined whether it is possible to simplify and partially automate the
authentication ceremony using social media. We linked the social media accounts for users to
distribute the public keys used by Signal and automatically compare them once users have verified
their accounts. We found it promising to distribute trust among multiple service providers, but this
infrastructure needs to be more trusted than social media companies.
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In this chapter we discuss the contributions of our work. We then make recommendations
for improving the use of privacy and security features in secure messaging applications. We close
the chapter with a list of items for future work in this area.

6.1

Contributions

The research contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1. The security and privacy needs of Iranian users living within Iran are very different
from those living outside of Iran. In this dissertation, we studied the privacy and security
needs and practices of Iranian Telegram users. Our results indicate that those who are living
inside Iran are more concerned about their privacy, more likely to use security and privacy
features, but also more likely to share sensitive information. Because our sample population
was demographically homogeneous, except their country of residence, we can argue that
behavioral differences between those users most likely is a consequence of their current
environment and the differences in their perceived threats based on the country that they reside.
This is also observed in our subsequent study of WhatsApp, Viber and Facebook Messenger.
American participants in our studies were less interested in using the authentication ceremony
as compared to international participants who had expressed a clear need for this kind of
protection.
2. Trust in secure messaging applications can be misplaced by their users. Previous work
showed that users adopt these applications because their friends use them, rather than due to
particular security or privacy concerns [17]. In this work we asked participants questions about
the importance of privacy to them, and why they send sensitive information with Telegram. The
overwhelming majority of participants (93%) indicated it was either important or extremely
important that applications protect the privacy of their messages from viewing by other parties.
Yet, despite this strong concern, over half of participants said they used Telegram to send
sensitive information. A primary factor in choosing to share sensitive information is trust in
the security of Telegram, and nearly half (47%) have no strategy to protect their privacy when
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using Telegram. Because the majority of users in our study were not aware of the option to
encrypt their messages in Telegram, we can conclude that Telegram doesn’t meet their needs.
We made a similar observation about the use of optional encryption in Facebook messenger.
When the end-to-end encrypted conversation is not active by default in such messaging
applications, it is less likely that people know that this option exists and enable it for their
sensitive conversations.
3. There is a general lack of awareness about the purpose of authentication ceremony. Our
results from studies of five different secure messaging applications show that users are confused
about the purpose and necessity of the authentication ceremony. They generally reported only a
vague understanding of a connection between encryption and the ceremony. When participants
were asked to ensure that they are talking to the right person and no one else can access their
messages except them, they tried to meet these goals by asking their friend a question that
relied on shared knowledge or they assumed that if they heard the voice of their friend then
they had authenticated them. Even when we gave participants instruction, leading them to use
the authentication ceremony, they still pointed to these ad hoc authentication methods as a
reason for trusting that they had authenticated their partner. In addition, the primary threats
that participants were concerned about included surveillance by governments, physical access
to phones, and impersonation. They did not understand how man-in-the-middle attacks could
work, indicating a disconnection between the threats they are aware of and the purpose of the
authentication ceremony.
4. The authentication ceremony used in current secure messaging applications is not usable for the masses. Previous works show that users are unable to find and perform the
authentication ceremony without instruction [8, 58]. We found that, across three popular
secure messaging applications, participants failed to locate and complete the authentication
ceremony 86% of the time when they were given the brief instruction on potential threats.
This failure rate dropped to 21% when we included instructions about the importance of the
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authentication ceremony. However, even when we helped users find the ceremony, the time
required to find and compete it was excessively long from the usability standpoint.
5. Opinionated design helps users find and use the authentication ceremony, but doesn’t
necessarily help with understanding the purpose of the ceremony. We employed the
design principles, recommended by Schröder et al. to overcome usability problems they identified. We modified Signal to provide a direct link inside the conversations to the authentication
ceremony screens. We also provided more instructions and nudges to encourage users perform
the authentication ceremony. These modifications helped users easily accomplish the task and
resulted in a much shorter time to find and complete the ceremony. However, this required
that we encouraged participants to have a security mindset during the studies and still did not
lead to greater understanding of the purpose and need for using the ceremony.
6. Social authentication is fast and partially automated, but social networks are not trusted
enough to play a role in authentication ceremony. We have integrated social authentication
into Signal, as the first attempt to partially automate the authentication ceremony and translate
it into a task that users can better understand. Our results are mixed. Participants find social
authentication to be usable and fast, but they have significant doubts about its trustworthiness.
Participants also spent too little time examining social media profiles, which would likely
lead them to be susceptible to fraudulent profiles if an attack was occurring. However, our
comparison of social authentication with other common methods helped identify principles for
an improved authentication ceremony and clear trade-offs in how existing methods meet some
principles but fall short in others. It is especially encouraging that participants liked having a
ceremony that is asynchronous. Our work illustrates that there is promise in automating the
authentication ceremony and points the way for future work in this area.

6.2

Recommendations

In addition to the mentioned list of contributions, we also propose the following recommendations
for improving the use of privacy and security features in secure messaging applications.
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1. Use end-to-end encryption for all conversations
Some of the secure messaging applications, such as Telegram and Facebook Messanger,
encourage people to use plain text by setting this mode as default and integrating advanced
features including stickers, phone calls, and group chat into this mode. Thus, users tend to use
the default chat and send sensitive information over unencrypted exchanges, first due to lack
of knowledge about the existence of encrypted chat and what it can do to protect their privacy,
and second due to the limited functionality of the encrypted mode. Telegram justifies this use
of unencrypted chat by claiming that end-to-end encryption of chats does not allow users to
easily restore access to their chat history on a new device. However, Signal and WhatsApp
have demonstrated that there is no technical reason why end-to-end encryption cannot be
activated by default, why encrypted conversations cannot be portable, and cannot also be used
for phone and video calls.
2. Use nudges and opinionated design
Our research demonstrates that users can be security conscious and will use security features if
they perceive a need for them. Our study of Telegram indicates that all of the privacy features
are implicitly prompted to the user, while users are not prompted, even implicitly, to use the
security features. For instance, when users receive an unwanted message from an individual or
group for the first time, they are prompted to block the contact or leave the group. By contrast,
users are not prompted to change their default chat mode to the end-to-end encrypted version or
activate two-step authentication to protect their conversations from man-in-the-middle attacks.
This led to the higher usage of privacy features among its users. Other privacy features, like
the self-destruct timer, may be adopted due to the visibility of the functionality. Our work
with Signal demonstrates that users can be nudged to enable particular security features. By
providing clear notifications in the interface, and suggesting a need for authentication, we
were able to encourage users to use the encryption ceremony. Similar nudges and prompting
could be used to encourage use of other features.
3. Use simplified security settings
138

Not only is it inconvenient that these applications have numerous privacy settings with
multiple options, but also it is confusing for most of the non-expert users of secure messaging
applications. Changing the default settings requires becoming aware of these features and
finding them in extensive menu systems. Secure messaging applications could use profiles to
help users choose settings that match their privacy preferences. Based on how concerned users
are about privacy, the application could sort them into one of the groups identified by Lin et al.
– conservative, fence-sitter, and unconcerned. Once a user selects a particular group, a variety
of privacy settings and prompts could be tailored to their preferences all at once.
4. Automate the authentication ceremony
Our results indicate that users have a healthy wariness and a high-level understanding of
impersonation attacks– and government surveillance, unlike man-in-the-middle attacks. This
threat model could be the reason that participants self-filter, or during our experiments, attempt
to verify each other using common knowledge or features of their conversation.
This type of verification is not sufficient to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks, especially because
it has been shown that users are susceptible to impersonation when advanced text-to-voice
converters are employed to imitate their voices in the authentication process [60].
We showed that social authentication meets many of the participants expectations for an
authentication ceremony – it is asynchronous, works remotely, and is partly automated. In
addition, the architecture provides a good method for checking public keys separately from
the Signal server in order to detect attacks. It also pushed the authentication ceremony to a
more natural domain for users – identifying accounts rather than comparing obscure keys.
This transformation helps users understand the ceremony in a natural way. The main obstacle
for using social authentication is the general mistrust social media among users. Thus, one
potential approach to close the gap is to fully automate the ceremony using service providers
that are more trusted than social media companies – such as universities or multiple secure
messaging service providers that can monitor and inter-operate with each other. A Signal user
could register with additional providers, who each verify their phone number and publish their
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public keys and then ensure that all providers share the same key. Alternatively, users could
register with a single provider and then use a system such as CONIKS [46] to ensure that the
provider is not equivocating.

6.3

Future Work

After conducting several studies on secure messaging applications, we noted the need for further
work in some related areas.
• Study secure messaging applications under attack
The main focus of this dissertation was on improving the authentication within secure messaging applications in normal situations when the possibility of attack is low. More work can be
done on attack scenarios, focusing on communicating risk to users properly when their actions
are essential.
• Help users to become security minded
One of the hard open problems that we faced during our studies was how to help users be
security minded. In some of our studies, we incentivized our participants to be security
minded, but after the studies most of them mentioned that they wouldn’t normally use the
authentication ceremony or even secure messaging applications because they don’t perceive
the need and believe that the possibility of risk for them is so low, or they are not important,
and they are just college students and their data would not be worth the effort for hackers. All
the thoughts of this type prevent users from being security minded. The question is how can
we communicate risk to users within secure messaging applications. More studies are required
to understand better which situations users consider risky and help them know what they can
do in these situations. To study this topic cross-cultural studies are necessary because risks are
perceived differently by people living in different locations.
• Find service providers that users will trust

140

Studying the feasibility of using social media for authentication ceremony, we realized that
it is not easy to find trusted entities among users. Although users are not security minded,
they are wise and informed. They usually choose trusted sources by considering their peers’
reviews. Companies gain their reputations via users’ trust, while this reputation also is a source
of trust for users. It is like a chicken and egg problem.
Trusted sources could be used for exchanging public keys and auditing each other. These
same sources could also be used to help provide interoperability among secure messaging
applications. We need to conduct more surveys and user studies to get users’ feedback on
replacing social media with different service providers, like servers which could be located in
universities, companies, or governments.
• Help users to protect the privacy of data at rest
We focused on protecting data in transit in this dissertation, while we also noted that the
authentication ceremony is not the only privacy feature users need help with. They also
need to know how to protect the messages stored on their phones, e.g., with a passcode lock
or disappearing messages. Several participants expressed concerns about the possibility of
physical attacks on the recipients phone compromising their sensitive information. More work
in this regards is required either on the design of these features in the applications or educating
users about the features. One option is to use nudges to inform users about features that can
protect the privacy of stored data on their phones against possible physical threats. Another
option is to make it simpler for users to configure their privacy and security settings, perhaps
by using privacy profiles.
• Longitudinal study of using authentication ceremony All of the studies in this dissertation
and most of the related work were short-term, lab usability studies. It would be interesting to
study barriers to use the authentication ceremony in long-term, during daily use. It is not clear
whether users tend to conduct the authentication ceremony for each of their conversations in
their conversation lists over time, for example when their contacts reinstall the application.
Majority of participants in our studies stated that they are willing to adopt the authentication
141

ceremony when they are transferring sensitive information and when they are communicating
with specific people. In order to study users’ actions over the long-term and under normal
conditions, we can conduct an online survey and instruct people about this feature within
secure messaging applications, and after a slightly extended time interview them and study
when and why they used or decided to not use this feature with their conversations.
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Appendix A
Study materials for “A Survey of the Privacy Preferences and Practices of Iranian Users of
Telegram”
A.1
A.1.1

Study Questionnaire
Introduction

Please select the language you are most comfortable with.
Thank you for your participation!
In this study, we are interested in learning about your views on online data privacy and how
this affects your use of Telegram. This will help us to design better security and privacy tools for
Internet users by understanding of the privacy concerns of people around the world.
Participating in this study involves completing this survey which should take approximately
15 minutes of your time.
Your participation and information will be totally anonymous to us and you will only be
contacted again if you choose. You do not have to participate in this study if you do not want to.
You do not have to answer any question that you do not want to answer for any reason.
Due to preserve your participation in this study anonymous, you will not be paid for
participating in this study. But to compensate you for your time, upon concluding the survey, we
provide few guidelines on how to better safeguard your privacy when using Telegram. This survey
involves minimal risk to you.
The completion of this survey implies your consent to participate. Thank you!
A.1.2

Demographics

In this section we are interested in learning more about you. We will keep this information private
and will never share it with anyone.
1. What is your gender?
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ I prefer not to answer
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2. What is your age?
◦ Under 18
◦ 18-24
◦ 25-34
◦ 35-44
◦ 45-54
◦ 55 - 64
◦ 65 or older
3. What is the highest degree you have completed or level of school you are in now?
◦ Less than high school
◦ High school graduate
◦ Some college
◦ 2 year degree
◦ 4 year degree
◦ Master degree
◦ Doctorate
4. In which country do you currently reside?
(select from a list)
5. In which country were you born?
(select from a list)
6. How long have you been living outside Iran?
◦ Less than 1 year
◦ Less than 2 years
◦ Less than 3 years
◦ Less than 5 years
◦ Less than 10 years
◦ More than 10 years
◦ I have never lived outside Iran
A.1.3

Privacy Preferences

In this section we are interested in learning about your privacy preferences.
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7. How important is it to you that messaging applications protect the privacy of your messages
from viewing by other parties?
◦ Extremely important
◦ Important
◦ Neither important nor unimportant
◦ Unimportant
◦ Extremely unimportant
8. I am more likely to trust a secure messaging application to protect my privacy if I pay for it.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
A.1.4

Usage

In this section we are interested in learning about how you use Telegram.
9. How often do you use Telegram?
◦ Daily
◦ 4-6 times a week
◦ 2-3 times a week
◦ Once a week
◦ Rarely
10. Why do you use Telegram? Check all that apply.
 To stay in touch with my friends and family.
 It has security and privacy features that I use.
 I like to involve in group conversations.
 I like to follow some of the channels.
 I like to use its stickers.
 I use it for free international communications.
 I use it for sending others voice messages.
 Other
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11. Have you ever used Telegram to send private/sensitive information, such as a credit card
number?
◦ Yes
◦ No
12. If the answer to #11 is No
Why don’t you send private/sensitive information using Telegram?
(open response)
13. If the answer to #11 is Yes
How often do you have conversations on Telegram that include private information?
◦ Often
◦ Sometimes
◦ Rarely
◦ Never
14. If the answer to #11 is Yes
What type of private/sensitive information do you discuss on Telegram?
(open response)
15. If the answer to #11 is Yes
Why do you feel comfortable sending private/sensitive information using Telegram?
(open response)
16. What strategies do you use to protect your privacy on Telegram?
(open response)
17. Who do you think can read the messages you send on Telegram to your friend, except you and
your friend? Check all that apply.
 Telegram employees
 Other friends
 Hackers
 My government
 Other governments
 My Internet provider
A.1.5

Privacy Settings

In this section we are interested in how you use the privacy settings in Telegram.
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18. Telegram has settings that control how other people can find you. How did you set up your
account in Telegram?
◦ Other people can find me using my phone number.
◦ Other people can find me using my real name.
◦ Other people can find me using a nickname.
◦ I don’t remember.
19. How often do you change your privacy and security settings in Telegram? This is a picture of
what this looks like.

◦ Frequently
◦ Sometimes
◦ I have never changed these settings
20. Telegram lets you control who can see various information about you. How do you currently
control this information? Last seen:
◦ Everyone can see this
◦ My contacts can see this
◦ Nobody can see this
◦ I don’t use this feature
21. Have you ever blocked a person? You may choose multiple answers.
 Yes, because I didn’t know this person.
 Yes, I know this person, but I don’t want him/her to contact me using Telegram.
 Yes, I know this person, but I don’t want him/her to be able to see my profile photo and/or
my status.
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 Yes, because we are not friends anymore.
 No, I have never blocked a person in Telegram.
 I can not remember.
 Others
22. Do you let other people add you to groups?
◦ I have blocked anyone outside my contact list so that strangers can’t send me messages or
add me to a group.
◦ I let other people add me to groups or send me messages, but then I leave the group or
report them as spam if I don’t like it.
◦ I have never changed these settings.
23. Have you ever used the feature that lets you delete or edit messages you have already sent?
You may choose multiple answers.
 I usually use it for removing or editing messages I send by mistake.
 I usually use it to protect my privacy, after the other person reads my message I will delete
it.
 I have never used it but I like this feature.
 I have no reason to use this feature.
A.1.6

Security Features

In this section we are interested in how you use the security features of Telegram.
24. You can set a pass code lock in Telegram so that you need to enter this code to access your
conversations. This could prevent someone from reading your conversations if they find your
phone. Have you set up a pass code lock for your conversations?
◦ Yes
◦ No
25. If the answer to #24 is No
Why have you never set up a pass code for your conversations? You may choose multiple
answers.
 It is annoying to enter the password every time.
 I do not use Telegram for sensitive conversations.
 I think the password for my phone is enough to protect my conversations.
 I use Secret Chat instead.
157

 I have never noticed this feature existed.
 I have set the self destructive timer for my sensitive conversations instead.
 I would like to set a pass code but it is hard to figure it out how to do so in Telegram.
 It never occurred to me that I need a pass code.
 I didn’t know what this feature did.
 Others
26. Have you set up two-step verification for your Telegram account?
◦ Yes
◦ No
27. If the answer to #26 is No
Why have you never set up two-step verification for your conversations? You may choose
multiple answers.
 It is annoying to verify the code each time I want to log in.
 I do not use Telegram for sensitive conversations.
 I think the password for my phone is enough to protect my conversations.
 I use Secret Chat instead.
 I have never noticed this feature existed.
 I have set the self destructive timer for my sensitive conversations instead.
 I would like to set it up but it is hard to figure it out how to do so in Telegram.
 It never occurred to me that I need to set up this feature.
 I didn’t know what this feature did.
 Others
28. How often do you use the Secret Chat feature in Telegram? This is a picture of what it looks
like.

◦ Often
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◦ Sometimes
◦ Rarely
◦ Never
29. If the answer to #28 is Rarely or Never
Why have you not used Secret Chat more often? You may choose multiple answers.
 None of my friends use this feature.
 I don’t use Telegram for sensitive conversations.
 I think the password for my phone is enough to protect my conversations.
 I have never noticed this feature existed.
 I have set the self destructive timer for my sensitive conversations instead.
 It is hard to figure it out how to work with this feature in Telegram.
 It never occurred to me that I need to use Secret Chat.
 I didn’t know what this feature did.
 I don’t trust this feature function as it is described.
 Others
30. What do you think the Secret Chat feature does? How is it different from a regular conversation?
(open response)
31. Who do you think can read your Secret Chat messages with your friend, except you and your
friend? Check all that apply.
 Telegram employees
 Other friends
 Hackers
 My government
 Other governments
 My Internet provider
32. How much do you trust Telegram to keep your Secret Chat messages private so that only you
and your friend can read them?
◦ A great deal
◦ A lot
◦ A moderate amount
◦ A little
159

◦ None at all
33. If the answer to #28 is not Never
Telegram has a feature that lets you verify the encryption key for your Secret Chat. How often
do you use this feature? This is a picture of what this feature looks like.

◦ Often
◦ Sometimes
◦ A moderate amount
◦ Rarely
◦ Never
34. Have you ever made a phone call through Telegram?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ I don’t have this feature.
35. If the answer to #34 is Yes
How often do you compare emojis when you make a phone call using Telegram? This is a
picture of what this feature looks like.

◦ Often
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◦ Sometimes
◦ Rarely
◦ Never
A.2

Tables and analysis

Our data largely consists of Likert-type items, “mark all that apply”-type questions, and a handful
of ordered-category items. For each of these questions, we conduct a two-fold analysis. The first
level of analysis is simple: we calculate the ratio of respondents per group–the full population, those
living inside Iran, and those living outside–that gave a particular response out of the total from that
population that responded to that question. This approach is also used for analysis of “mark all that
apply”-type questions, and so percentages reported will not sum to 100%. Instead, each individual
response item should be interpreted independently, with the reported percentages characterizing the
proportion of the respective population that marked that particular item.
Next, we conduct either a Pearson’s chi-squared test of independence or, when appropriate,
Fisher’s exact test, to evaluate whether there are differences between the responses of those living
Iran and those living outside. More specifically, when the following assumptions are not met–i.e.,
if any of the cells have values below 1 or more than 20% of the cells have values 5 or below–we
instead perform Fisher’s exact test on the response data. Furthermore, because statistical significance
is partially a function of sample size, with large sample sizes, it is possible to have statistically
significant results that have little practical meaning. For this reason, we additionally provide
Cramer’s V values (Φc ) for each test that returned a statistically significant result. Cramer’s V is
a measure of effect size that is equivalent to Cramer’s phi (Φ) in 2x2 contingency tables, while
also extending to contingency tables with larger degrees of freedom. Generally speaking, a rule of
thumb used to interpret Cramer’s V is that values around 0.1 indicate a small effect, 0.3 indicates a
medium-sized effect, and 0.5 indicates a large effect.
Table A.1: How important is it to you that messaging applications protect the privacy of your
messages from viewing by other parties?
Answer
Extremely Important
Important
Neither
Unimportant
Extremely Unimportant

Total

Inside

Outside

64.8%
28.1%
5.4%
1.3%
0.5%

70.3%
22.3%
5.9%
1.6%
0%

54.4%
39%
4.4%
0.7%
1.5%
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Table A.2: I am more likely to trust a secure messaging application to protect my privacy if I pay
for it.
Answer
Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Total

Inside

Outside

14%
35.2%
30.6%
10.7%
9.2%

11.7%
37.1%
30.9%
11.7%
8.6%

18.4%
31.6%
30.1%
8.8%
10.3%

Table A.3: How often do you use Telegram?
Answer

Total

Inside

Outside

Daily
4–6 times/week
2–3 times/week
Rarely

90%
6.1%
0.8%
3.1%

93.4%
4.7%
0.4%
1.6%

83.7%
8.9%
1.5%
5.9%

Table A.4: Why do you use Telegram? Check all that apply.
Options
Stay in touch with friends/family
Group conversations
Follow channels
Free international communications
Voice messages
Stickers
Security/privacy features
Other

Total

Inside

Outside

80.9%
54.3%
52.6%
21.9%
17.9%
13.5%
11.7%
7.7%

81.2%
58.8%
64.3%
19.6%
16.5%
12.9%
12.2%
7.5%

82.7%
47.4%
31.6%
27.1%
21.1%
15.0%
11.3%
8.3%

Table A.5: Have you ever used Telegram to send private/sensitive information, such as a credit card
number?
Segment

Yes (send sensitive information)

Total
Inside Iran
Outside Iran

53.1%
59.8%
40.3%
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Table A.6: What type of private/sensitive information do you discuss on Telegram?
Sensitive information
Personal photos
Financial information
Personally identified (PII)
Credentials (e.g. password)
Socially sensitive (e.g. gossip)
Business (e.g. work related)
Politically sensitive
Sensitive document scans
Religiously sensitive

Percent

Count

31.5%
20.6%
17.3%
13.0%
8.6%
2.1%
1.08%
1.08%
1.08%

29
19
16
12
8
2
1
1
1

Table A.7: Why do you feel comfortable sending private/sensitive information using Telegram?
Reason
Trust
Convenience
Have nothing to hide
Lack of alternatives
Ignore the risks
Taking risk
Coping with perceived threats
Authentication features
Self filtering
Secret chat
Not caring about security
Application fragmentation
Message impermanence
Checking for hackers
(e.g. active sessions)

Percent

Count

51.2%
11.7%
6.5%
5.8%
5.2%
4.5%
3.9%
2.6%
2.6%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
0.6%

79
18
10
9
8
7
6
4
4
2
2
2
2
1

Table A.8: Why participants trust Telegram for sharing sensitive information.
Aspect of Trust
Trust Telegram security
Trust popularity of the app
Trust based on experience
Trust foreign country developers
Trust through learning
General Trust
Trust based on feeling
Trust due to message availability
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Percent

Count

51.8%
16.4%
15.2%
5%
3.7%
3.7%
2.5%
1.3%

41
13
12
4
3
3
2
1

Table A.9: Why don’t you send private/sensitive information using Telegram?
Reason

Percent

Count

40.0%
23.5%
21.0%
15.2%

63
37
33
24

Lack of trust
No need
Perceived threats
Prefers alternative

Table A.10: What strategies do you use to protect your privacy on Telegram?
Technical strategies
End-to-end encryption
Password authentication
Enable security features
Message impermanence
Two-factor authentication
Session management
Selective contacts
Limit the application permissions
Non-technical strategies
Self filtering
Preferred alternatives
Side channel
Have nothing to hide
Use secret phrases (coding)
Reliance on platform
Manual content encryption
Credential impermanence
Anonymity

Percent

Count

13.1%
7.8%
7.2%
6.5%
5.9%
4.6%
4.6%
0.6%

20
12
11
10
9
7
7
1

Percent

Count

32.2%
5.2%
2.6%
2.6%
2.6%
1.9%
0.6
0.6
0.6

49
8
4
4
4
3
1
1
1

Table A.11: Who do you think can read the messages you send on Telegram to your friend, except
you and your friend? Check all that apply.
Answer
Hackers
My government
Telegram employees
Other governments
My Internet provider
Other friends

Total

Inside

Outside

57.7%
54.1%
51%
36%
38%
9.7%

59%
57.4%
53.5%
37.5%
36.3%
9.4%

55.1%
47.8%
46.3%
33.1%
41.2%
10.3%
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Table A.12: How often do you change your privacy and security settings in Telegram?
Answer
Frequently
Sometimes
Never

Total

Inside

Outside

6.7%
64.7%
28.6%

7.8%
69.8%
22.4%

4.5%
54.9%
40.6%

Table A.13: How do you currently control this information? (Last seen status)
Segment
My contacts can see this
Everyone can see this
Nobody can see this
I don’t use this feature

Total

Inside

Outside

37.0%
27.2%
18.5%
17.2%

41.9%
29.8%
15.3%
12.9%

27.7%
22.3%
24.6%
25.4%

Table A.14: Have you ever blocked a person? You may choose multiple answers.
Reason
Yes, because I didn’t know this
person
Yes, I know this person, but I
don’t want him/her to contact me
using Telegram
No, I have never blocked a person on Telegram
Yes, I know this person, but I
don’t want him/her to be able to
see my profile photo and/or my
status
Yes, because we are not friends
any more
I can not remember
Other

Total

Inside

Outside

33.9%

33.1%

36.6%

31.1%

35.0%

24.6%

23.0%

21.7%

26.1%

18.1%

18.1%

18.7%

15.0%

17.7%

10.4%

9.9%
4.1%

8.3%
5.9%

13.4%
0.7%

Table A.15: Do you let other people add you to groups?
Segment

Total

Inside

Outside

Leave this option open
57.0%
Blocked anyone outside 25.1%
their contact list
Never changing their set- 17.9%
tings

61.3%
29.2%

48.9%
17.3%

9.7%

33.8%
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Table A.16: Have you ever used the feature that lets you delete or edit messages you have already
sent? You may choose multiple answers.
Reason
Delete or edit mistakes
Protect privacy
Never used

Total

Inside

Outside

66.1%
22.4%
22.7%

68.1%
22.7%
19.1%

62.4%
21.8%
27.8%

Table A.17: Why have you never set up a pass code for your conversations? You may choose
multiple answers.
Reason
I do not use Telegram for
sensitive conversations.
I think the password for
my phone is enough to protect my conversations.
I have never noticed this
feature existed.
I didn’t know what this
feature did.
It never occurred to me
that I need a pass code.
It is annoying to enter the
password every time.
I would like to set a pass
code but it is hard to figure it out how to do so in
Telegram.
I have set the self destructive timer for my sensitive
conversations instead.
Others
I use Secret Chat instead.

Total

Inside

Outside

29.8%

26.4%

34.2%

29.0%

27.0%

31.6%

27.5%

26.4%

28.9%

26.0%

29.1%

21.9%

25.6%

27.0%

23.7%

24.0%

23.0%

25.4%

6.1%

6.8%

5.3%

5.7%

8.1%

2.6%

3.8%
2.3%

4.7%
2.7%

2.6%
1.8%
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Table A.18: Why have you never set up two-factor verification for your conversations? You may
choose multiple answers.
Reason
I have never noticed this
feature existed.
I didn’t know what this
feature did.
It never occurred to me
that I need to set up this
feature.
I do not use Telegram for
sensitive conversations.
I think the password for
my phone is enough to protect my conversations.
It is annoying to verify the
code each time I want to
log in.
I have set the self destructive timer for my sensitive
conversations instead.
I would like to set it up but
it is hard to figure it out
how to do so in Telegram.
Others
I use Secret Chat instead.

Title

Inside

Outside

31.2%

28.7%

35.4%

28.9%

28.7%

29.3%

25.9%

26.2%

25.3%

22.8%

21.3%

25.3%

21.3%

19.5%

24.2%

17.9%

14.0%

24.2%

6.8%

7.9%

5.1%

5.7%

7.9%

2.0%

1.5%
1.1%

1.8%
1.2%

1.0%
1.0%
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Table A.19: Why have you not used Secret Chat more often? You may choose multiple answers.
Reason
It never occurred to me
that I need to use Secret
Chat.
I don’t use Telegram for
sensitive conversations.
I didn’t know what this
feature did.
I have never noticed this
feature existed.
I think the password for
my phone is enough to protect my conversations.
None of my friends use
this feature.
I don’t trust this feature
function as it is described.
I have set the self destructive timer for my sensitive
conversations instead.
It is hard to figure it out
how to work with this feature in Telegram.
Others

Percent

Inside

Outside

34.7%

39.2%

26.3%

30.0%

23.4%

42.1%

20.7%

24.4%

14.0%

19.8%

17.2%

24.6%

14.2%

15.8%

11.4%

12.7%

14.4%

9.6%

10.0%

8.6%

11.4%

7.4%

8.1%

6.1%

4.6%

6.2%

1.8%

4.6%

5.7%

2.6%

Table A.20: What do you think the Secret Chat feature does? How is it different from a regular
conversation?
Functionality
Don’t know
Message impermanence
Encryption
Protection
Government filtered
Restricted sharing
End-to-end encryption
Cost saving
Safe from third parties
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Percent

Count

40.8%
20.4%
9.6%
9.1%
6.9%
5.9%
5.3%
1.0%
0.5%

76
38
18
17
13
11
10
2
1

Table A.21: Who do you think can read your Secret Chat messages with your friend, except you
and your friend? Check all that apply.
Answer
Hackers
My government
Telegram employees
Other governments
My Internet provider
Other friends

Total

Inside

Outside

47.2%
43.1%
55.6%
32.4%
30.6%
5.1%

43.8%
43.8%
59%
30.9%
30.9%
4.3%

53.7%
41.9%
49.3%
35.3%
30.1%
6.6%

Table A.22: How much do you trust Telegram to keep your Secret Chat messages private so that
only you and your friend can read them?
Answer
A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

Total

Inside

Outside

5.3%
16.0%
41.7%
26.3%
10.6%

5.5%
18.3%
43.0%
25.1%
8.1%

4.9%
11.5%
39.3%
28.7%
15.6%

Table A.23: Telegram has a feature that lets you verify the encryption key for your Secret Chat.
How often do you use this feature? This is a picture of what this feature looks like.
Answer
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never

Total

Inside

Outside

4.9%
4.9%
19.7%
70.4%

4.2%
4.2%
18.8%
72.9%

6.5%
6.5%
21.7%
65.2%

Table A.24: Have you ever made a phone call through Telegram?
Answer
Yes
No
I don’t have this feature

Total

Inside

Outside

47.9%
33.3%
18.7%

40%
34.5%
25.5%

62.5%
31.2%
6.2%
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Table A.25: How often do you compare emojis when you make a phone call using Telegram? This
is a picture of what this feature looks like.
Answer
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never

Total

Inside

Outside

15.8%
16.4%
21.6%
46.2%

18.1%
14.9%
21.3%
45.7%

13%
18.2%
22.1%
46.8%

Table A.26: Reasons given for using Telegram to share sensitive information. + : original quote in
Farsi. ∗ : original quote in English
Code

Sample Quote

Trust Telegram security
Trust popularity of the app
Trust based experience
Trust foreign country developers
Trust through learning
General Trust
Trust based on feeling
Trust due to message availability
Convenience
Have nothing to hide
Lack of alternatives
Ignore the risk
Taking risk

Emphasis of Telegram on message encryption and providing security+
Never faced any news saying Telegram is not secure+
So far no one has issue with it+
Because it is a foreign program, it is less likely to be hacked or be abused+
As I heard it has good message encryption And maybe as other rely on that!∗
Just trusting the host servers+
I have a good feeling to it+
Information wouldn’t be removed after reinstallation and is easy to access+
It’s easier than reading them on phone, It is also available any time.∗
It isn’t about nuclear arsenal! Is it?+
Didn’t have other options∗
I have never paid attention to its safety and security of my data+
I share the pictures which are not that important and believe anything is
possible+
I wouldn’t do that as it is possible, and if I do I will delete it imediately
afterward+
Have high encryption[,] settings password
I would send the general parts and hide the more sensitive parts+
It is possible to use secret chat and Telegram also is encrypted+
My work related files are not important+
It is just because other people use it, and I have never heard any misuse of
telegram by other parties such as government or hackers∗
I wouldn’t do that as it is possible, and if I do I will delete it imediately
afterward+
Because I am aware of security settings of Telegram and check that I wouldn’t
be hacked [refers to session management setting]+

Coping with perceived threats
Authentication feature
Self filtering
Secret chat
Not caring about security
Application fragmentation
Message impermanence
Checking for hackers
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Table A.27: Reasons given for not using Telegram to share sensitive information. + : original quote
in Farsi. ∗ : original quote in English
Code

Sample Quote

Lack of trust

I am not sure if they share the key with anybody else or not for the right price
everything is possible∗
Never needed to send such information to the people I am in touch with on
Telegram∗
lack of trust to virtual networks+
I prefer to say it over the phone [call] to feel more comfortable and secure+

No need
Perceived threats
Prefers alternative

Table A.28: Quote samples corresponding to codes. + : original quote in Farsi. ∗ : original quote in
English
Code

Sample Quote
Technical Strategies

E2E encryption
Password authentication
Message impermanence
Enable security features
Two factor authetication
Session management
Selective contacts
Credential impermanence
Limit the app permissions

Sometimes I use secret chat+
Give a password to mey telegram∗
Sometimes I delete files I sent in the past from directory.∗
[Not] Showing last seen to strangers is one of them[,] Blocking Reporting[,]
Not Using personal picture for profile∗
Just I am depending on codes that were sent to my by telegram, after signing
out∗
Lock for the phone, if it needed [using] terminate session [option]+
Private groups only∗
I avoid sharing my information in Telegram, but if it is needed I have changed
the information afterward+
I limited access of Telegram to some of data on my phone, for example my
gallery+
Non-technical Strategies

Self filtering
Preferred alternatives
Side channel
Reliance on platform
Have nothing to hide
Use secret phrases (coding)
Manual content encryption
Anonymity

Not very sensitive information, for example [sending] bank account without
access code+
I send sensitive information via email as much as possible+
Sometimes I send half of the information via other messaging applications.∗
Use] features of the mobile phone+
I don’t have sensitive information that I need to be worried about their sevurity+
I try to write information in a way that only receiver can make sense of them+
I usually save the information in a file, encrypt the file then send it+
No profile picture, no full name etc∗
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Table A.29: User perception of what secret chat does. + : original quote in Farsi. ∗ : original quote in
English
Code

Sample Quote

Message impermanence

It deletes messages automatically after a specific
amount of time+
It is a strictly encoded channel, I think∗
It is more secure∗
It is not accessible in Iran+
It doesn’t let the files and photos to be saved, I consider it safer+
Probabely it encrypt the sent signal and it is only can
be decoded by the receiver phone+
It is cheap and has high quality+
It protect information from people who don’t have
access the main server
I don’t have specific information that would be useful
for such people.+

Encryption
Protection
Government filtered
Restricted sharing
E2E encryption
Cost saving
Safe from none-provider
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Appendix B
Study materials for “Is that you, Alice? A Usability Study of the Authentication Ceremony
of Secure Messaging Applications”
B.1

Statistical Tests

This section contains the details of the statistical tests we ran.
B.1.1

Success and Failure Rates

This data measures whether the participants were successful in using the authentication ceremony for
each application in the second phase of the study. We want to test whether there are any differences
between the applications.
Because the data is dichotomous we used Cochran’s Q Test and found that the success rate
was statistically different for the applications (χ2 (2) = 15.429, p < .0005).
We then ran McNemar’s test to find the significant differences among the pairs of applications. As shown in Table B.1, and after applying a manual Bonferroni correction for the three tests
(requiring p < 0.0167), there is a significant difference between WhatsApp and Viber (p=0.008) as
well as between Facebook Messenger and Viber (p < 0.0005).
Fail Success

N

Exact Sig.

8
48
38

0.008

12
42
30

0.000

Viber
WhatsApp

Fail
Success

2
0
Viber

Messenger

WhatsApp

Fail
Success
Fail
Success

0
0

Messenger
4
2
42
8
28

0.109

Table B.1: McNemar’s test for success and failure
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B.1.2

Task Completion Times

This data measures the time taken by participants to (a) find the authentication ceremony and (b)
complete the authentication ceremony, which was only measured in the second phase of the study.
We want to know if there is a significant difference in the time to complete these tasks among the
three different applications tested—WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook Messenger.
We first tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test. As Table B.2 shows, the data is
not normally distributed for any application (p < 0.05).

Task

Application

Statistic

df

Sig.

Finding Ceremony

WhatsApp
Viber
Messenger

0.856 38 0.000
0.835 46 0.000
0.841 30 0.000

WhatsApp
Completing Ceremony Viber
Messenger

0.902 38 0.003
0.878 46 0.000
0.886 30 0.004

Table B.2: Shapiro-Wilk test for task completion times
We next ran the Kruskal-Wallis test, which is a nonparametric test that can determine if
there are statistically significant differences between two or more groups. This test retains the
null hypothesis that the distribution of task times is the same across the applications for finding
the ceremony (p=0.278), but rejects the null hypothesis for completing the ceremony (p=0.043).
We next ran pairwise post-hoc tests to determine where the differences occur for completing the
ceremony.
As Table B.3 shows, we found a significant difference between Viber and WhatsApp for
completing the ceremony (p=0.045), with Viber being faster (mean time WhatsApp=8.5 minutes,
Viber 6.7 minutes). Note, the significance has been adjusted by the Bonferonni correction for
multiple tests.
Task
Completing Ceremony

Test
Statistic

Comparison
Messenger Viber
Viber - WhatsApp
Messenger - WhatsApp

-12.000
17.526
5.526

Std. Std. Test
Error Statistic
7.702
7.195
8.016

Adj.
Sig.

-1.558 0.358
2.436 0.045
0.689 1.000

Table B.3: Pairwise comparisons from Kruskal-Wallis post-hoc tests for task completion times
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B.1.3

Favorite Rankings

This data measures the system participants selected as their favorite, which was only collected in the
second phase of the study. We want to test whether there are any differences between the favorite
rankings for each application between the two phases.
We ran a Chi-Square test using the scores for the favorite application. As shown in Table B.4,
there are no statistically significant differences.
Phase

Favorite
WhatsApp

1
2

9
15

Favorite
Favorite
Pearson
Viber Messenger Chi-Square df
2
11

11
21

2.069

2

Asym.
Sig.
0.355

Table B.4: Chi-Square test for favorite application ranking

B.1.4

Trust Scores

We ran a mixed model ANOVA Test because we are interested in seeing the interaction between
two independent variables (application and phase). This data is not well suited to a Kruskal-Wallis
test because the use of the Likert scale provides too many ties when measuring trust. Mauchly’s
test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was met for the two-way interaction
(χ2 (2) = 3.385, p=.184).
We next examined the results for tests of within-subject effects and found that there is
a significant interaction between the application and the study phase (F(2,140)=5.023, p=0.008,
partial η 2 = 0.067).
To determine whether there was a simple main effect for the application, we ran a repeated
measures ANOVA on each phase. As shown in Table B.5, there was a statistically significant effect
of the application on trust for phase 1 (F(2,46)=4.173, p=0.022, partial η 2 = .154). Note that due to
a violation of the sphericity assumption in phase 2, we use the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.

Phase
1
2

Mean Mean
WhatsApp Viber
4.13
4.10

3.58
4.40

Mean
Messenger

df

3.79
4.17

2,46,
1.69,79.42

F

Sig.

4.173 0.022 0.154
1.843 0.171 0.038

Table B.5: Repeated measures ANOVA on each phase
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η2

Mean
Difference

Comparison
WhatsApp-Viber
WhatsApp-Messenger
Messenger-Viber

0.542
0.333
0.208

Std.
Error

Adj.
Sig

0.180 0.019
0.155 0.128
0.225
1.00

Lower Upper
Bound Bound
0.076
-0.068
-0.373

1.007
0.735
0.789

Table B.6: Pairwise comparisons from one-way ANOVA on each application, phase 1

By examining the pairwise comparisons, shown in Table B.6, we found that the trust score
was significantly lower for Viber as compared to WhatsApp in the first phase (M=0.542, SE=0.180,
p=0.19). Note, we use the Bonferroni correction for multiple tests.
To determine whether there was a simple main effect for the study phase, we ran a one-way
ANOVA on each application to compare the trust between the two phases. As shown in Table B.7,
there was a statistically significant difference in trust ratings between the two phases for Viber
(F (1, 70) = 14.994, p < 0.0005, partialη 2 = .176). The mean trust for Viber in the first phase was
3.58, and in the second phase it increased to 4.40.

Application
WhatsApp
Viber
Messenger

Mean
Phase 1 Phase 2
4.13
3.58
3.79

df

F

Sig.

η2

4.12 1,70 0.007 0.935 0.00
4.40 1,70 14.994 0.00 0.176
4.17 1,70 2.230 0.140 0.031

Table B.7: One-way ANOVA on each application

B.2

Study Materials

This section contains the study materials we used. The interview guide and interview form were
used by the study coordinators to ensure that each pair of participants experienced an identical study.
The questionnaire was followed by study participants to guide them through the study.
B.2.1

Interview Guide

Make sure to complete the following steps:
1. When the participants arrive, read them the following:
Welcome to our secure messaging application study. We are the study coordinators and are
here to assist you as needed.
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Before we start the study, we need you to install the following applications: WhatsApp,
Facebook Messenger, Viber.
In this study, the two of you will be in different rooms and will use the applications to
communicate with each other. You will each be asked to play the role of another person. I will
provide you with information about this person. During the study, please use the provided
information and not your own personal information.
Notice that even you are in separate rooms, you are welcome to ask for meeting, calling or
emailing your study partner during the study if you need to complete the study.
You will be asked to do the task while you are thinking loud and express your feelings or
thoughts about each single task that you are doing. During the course of this study we will be
recording what is happening in the study room including your any verbal communication with
the study coordinators. These recordings will not be seen by anyone beside the researchers and
will be destroyed once our research is complete. We will not collect any personally identifying
information. Any data, besides the previously mentioned recordings and answers to the study
survey, will be deleted automatically upon your completion of the study.
You will each receive $10 as compensation for your participation in this study. The expected
time commitment is approximately 60 minutes. If you have any questions or concerns, feel
free to ask us. You can end participation in this survey at any time and we will delete all data
collected at your request. A study coordinator will be with you at all times to observe the study
and also to answer any questions you may have.
2. Before going to the study rooms, make sure they sign the audio recording consent form.
3. Make sure their phone has enough space for installing the three apps (you can ask them to
install the apps before the study starts)
4. Choose one of the available codes for later usage in the study from the following link (a
spreadsheet for time slots)
5. Flip a coin and choose one participant to be Person A and one person to be Person B.
6. Take the user with whom you decided to work to the study room. Complete the following
setup steps:
(a) Ask the participant to sit down.
(b) Start the audio recording using the phones in the lab.
(c) Read the following instructions to your participant:
We are going to ask you to do a series of tasks. Once you are done with each step, let the
study coordinator know you have finished the task. You will then fill out a questionnaire
and go to the next step.
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We need you to think out loud while you are doing the tasks, meaning you are supposed to
talk about how you are accomplishing the task and express any feelings you have.
If you have any questions about the study ask the study coordinator. Remember you are
allowed to talk to or meet your friend during the study.
Please do not forget think loud.
7. On the chromebook, load the survey from Qualtrics
8. Give the code you already selected to the user.
9. Before using each system, the survey will instruct the participant to tell you they are ready to
begin the next task.
10. During the course of the task pay attention to what user is doing and fill out one of the attached
sheets.
(a) The user is supposed to think aloud while doing the tasks. If she forgets, gently remind
her.
(b) If the user complains that he is confused, suggest he can consult with his study partner
and do not help him to accomplish the task. Try not to instruct the user when they ask
questions. Answer them while giving as little information as you can away about the
study, but try to remind him that he has a partner who can help him.
(c) If it takes the pair too long to use one application (10 minutes), then record that as a
failure and guide the user to the next task. If you end the task, inform the other study
coordinator that you have done so, so that he catches up with you.
11. When the survey is finished, ask the participant about their experience.
(a) Use the situations you noted while they took the study or interesting things they said on
the survey.
(b) If they had any problems during the study, ask them to use their own words to describe
the problem. Ask them how they would like to see it resolved.
12. When the participant is finished, go to meet the other group in your room. Next, ask them the
following questions: (If it is applicable)
(a) You saw QR codes, strings of digits, and maybe NFC communication (touching your
phones) as methods for verifying keys. Which one did you prefer and why?
(b) If you were in a different city or state from your friend, how would you verify your
friend’s key? Would this be convenient?
(c) Some of these applications, like Facebook Messenger let you chat both securely and
insecurely. The rest of the applications only let you have secure conversations. Which
approach do you prefer and why?
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13. Thank the participants for their time. Help them fill out the compensation forms. Send them to
the CS office to be compensated.
14. Stop the audio recording. Save the record by time.
15. Fill in your name:
16. Return this form.
B.2.2

Interview Form

Study Coordinator’s Name:
Study Number:
System:
WhatsApp, Viber, FaceBook Messenger
Start Time:
End Time:
Key Verification:
 QR Code
 Manual verification via phone call
 Manual verification in person
 Manual verification other:
 NFC
 Verified successfully
 Notices conversation encrypted
Mistakes Made:
 The user sends the key or anything related to the key via the application itself
 The user sends sensitive data (the credit card number) unencrypted or before doing the identity
verification
 Does not use an encrypted conversation
 Other:
Other:
 The user calls, texts or meets his study partner Explain:
 The application crashes and needs to be restarted. Explain:
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 The user expresses any strong feelings toward the task (e.g. how boring or hard or easy it is)
Explain:
 Other Explain:
B.3

Study Questionnaire

Secure Messaging Application Study
1. Please enter the Type.
◦ A
◦ B
2. Please enter the code that study coordinator provides for you, here.
3. What is your gender?
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ I prefer not to answer
4. What is your age?
◦ 17 and under
◦ 18-24
◦ 25-34
◦ 35-45
◦ 46-64
◦ 65 and over
◦ I prefer not to answer
5. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
◦ None
◦ Primary/grade school (2)
◦ Some high school, no diploma
◦ High school graduate: diploma or equivalent (e.g., GED)
◦ Some college, no diploma
◦ Associate’s or technical degree
◦ Bachelor’s degree
◦ Graduate/professional degree
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◦ I prefer not to answer
6. What is your occupation or major?
7. Mark any of the following options which apply to you.
 Others often ask me for help with the computer.
 I often ask others for help with the computer.
 I have never designed a website.
 I have never installed software.
 I have never used SSH.
 Computer security is one of my job responsibilities.
 I have taken courses related to computer security, electronic engineering, security, or IT.
 I often use secure messaging applications such as WhatsApp.
 I have never sent an encrypted email.
 I am familiar with cryptography.
 I understand the difference between secure and non-secure messaging applications.
8. (Second phase only) How would you rate your knowledge of computer security?
◦ Beginner
◦ Intermediate
◦ Advanced
9. (Second phase only) If you are reading a website, such as CNN, using HTTP, who can see
what you are reading?
◦ Nobody, this is a private connection.
◦ Your ISP and CNN, but nobody else.
◦ Any router in between you and CNN.
◦ Your ISP and nobody else.
◦ I don’t know
10. (Second phase only) If you use a regular text messaging application, who can read your text
messages?
◦ Only the person you send the text message to.
◦ The person you send the text message to and the company providing the text messaging
service.
◦ Anybody who is nearby.
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◦ Google.
◦ I don’t know.
11. (Second phase only) How can you tell if it is safe to enter your username and password on a
website?
◦ The website has a good reputation.
◦ The website has a privacy statement.
◦ There is a lock icon in the URL bar and the URL shows the right host name.
◦ The web site is professionally designed.
◦ I don’t know.
12. (Second phase only) What is phishing?
◦ Making a fake website that looks legitimate to steal your private information.
◦ Hacking someone’s computer.
◦ Calling someone pretending to be a company to steal their information.
◦ Tracking your internet habits to send advertisements.
◦ I don’t know.
13. (Second phase only) What is a public key used for?
◦ I do not know what a public key is.
◦ To encrypt data for the person who owns the corresponding private key.
◦ To setup 2-factor authentication so your password can’t be stolen.
◦ To identify you to a bank.
◦ To protect an application so you know it is safe to use.
14. (Second phase only) If you receive a message encrypted with your friend’s private key, then
you know that
◦ Your friend has been hacked.
◦ Your friend was the one who sent the message.
◦ Everything you send your friend is private.
◦ You can’t trust what your friend is sending you.
◦ I do not know what a private key is.
15. Which of the following applications have you ever used? Select as many options that applies
to you.
 WhatsApp
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 ChatSecure
 Signal
 Telegram
 Zendo
 SafeSlinger
 Allo
 FB messenger
 iMessage
 imo
 Skype
 Viber
 Other
16. What is the main reason why you use these applications (list of applications from previous
question) ?
17. Have you ever tried to verify the identity of the person you are communicating with when you
are using (list of applications from previous question) ?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ Not Sure
18. Have you ever tried to send sensitive information when you use (list of applications from
previous question)?
◦ Yes
◦ No
19. Have you ever had an experience or heard any stories about any secure messaging applications
being compromised?
◦ Yes
◦ No
20. If yes, what story did you hear and what application was it about?
21. Second Phase Only:
Read aloud the following instructions:
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What Is Secure Messaging?

When you use regular text messaging, your
phone company can read your text messages.
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When you use secure messaging apps, you are
having a private conversation with your friend.
Not even the company running the service can
see your messages.

But you still need to be careful. A hacker could
intercept your traffic.
The bad guy
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To make sure your conversation is secure, these
applications assign a “key” to each person.
You need to make sure the key you see is the
same key your friend sees.
???
???

Secure messaging apps provide a way for you to
compare these keys.
We want to see how well the application helps
you do this.

22. Tell the study coordinator that you are ready for the next task to begin.
Repeat the following block for each of the three applications
23. You would like to send secure text messages to your friend. For example, you might want
to ask for a credit card number you left at home, or talk confidentially about a friend who is
depressed.
In this study we need you to do the following steps:
For Person A
You are going to be using (WhatsApp/Viber/Facebook Messenger) for secure texting with your
friend. This application is designed to help you have a private conversation with your friend.
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Your task is to make sure that you are really talking to your friend and that nobody else (such
as the service provider) can read your text messages. The application should have ways to
help you do this.
We want you to talk and think aloud as you figure this out.
Once you are sure the conversation is secure, ask the other person to send you your credit card
number with the following message.
“Hello! Can you send me my credit card number that I left on my desk at home?”
For Person B
You are going to be using (WhatsApp/Viber/Facebook Messenger) for secure texting with your
friend. This application is designed to help you have a private conversation with your friend.
Your task is to make sure that you are really talking to your friend and that nobody else (such
as the service provider) can read your text messages. The application should have ways to
help you do this.
We want you to talk and think aloud as you figure this out.
Say out loud why you believe you are texting to the right person and why nobody else can read
the text messages. Your preference is to figure this out without the other person in the same
room, but If you need to visit the other person to do this, you should go ahead and visit them.
Once you are sure the conversation is secure, he/she will ask you to send his/her credit card
number through the application. Use the following number in the study: “132542853779”=
24. You will now be asked several questions concerning your experience with (WhatsApp/Viber/Facebook Messenger).
25. (Second phase only) Please answer the following questions about (WhatsApp/Viber/Facebook
Messenger). Try to give your immediate reaction to each statement without pausing to think
for a long time. Mark the middle column if you don’t have a response to a particular statement.
• I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
• I found the system unnecessarily complex.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
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◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
• I thought the system was easy to use.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
• I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this system.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
• I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
• I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
• I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
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◦ Strongly disagree
• I found the system very cumbersome to use.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
• I felt very confident using the system.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
• I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
26. I trust this application to be secure.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
27. Have you managed to verify the identity of your friend correctly?
◦ No
◦ Yes
◦ Not sure
28. Please explain why do you think you have (or have not) verified the identity of your friend.
29. Who do you think can read your message except you and your friend?
End of the repeated block
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30. You have finished all the tasks for this study. Please answer the following questions about
your experience.
31. Which system was your favorite?
◦ WhatsApp
◦ Viber
◦ FaceBook Messenger
◦ I didn’t like any of the systems I used
32. Please explain why.
33. Which of the following applications have you ever used for secure communication? Select as
many options that applies to you.
 WhatsApp
 ChatSecure
 Signal
 Telegram
 Zendo
 SafeSlinger
 Allo
 FB messenger
 iMessage
 Skype
 imo
 Viber
 Other
34. Please answer the following question. Try to give your immediate reaction to each statement
without pausing to think for a long time. Mark the middle column if you don’t have a response
to a particular statement.
It is important to me to be able to have private conversations with my friends and family using
secure applications (like WhatsApp).
◦ Strongly disagree
◦ Disagree
◦ Neither Agree nor Disagree
◦ Agree
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◦ Strongly Agree
35. Did you know about encryption before attending this study?
36. Are you willing to participate in a follow up study? If so, please leave your name and phone
number with the study coordinator.
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Appendix C
Study materials for “Action Needed! Helping Users Find and Complete the Authentication
Ceremony in Signal”
C.1

Statistical Tests

This section contains the details of the statistical tests we ran.
C.1.1

Sample Size

We calculated the necessary sample size to compare two sample proportions (for comparing success
rates) and two sample means (for comparing task times). With a 95% confidence interval, 80% power,
and an expected success rate for the two samples (15% and 80%, based on our previous work [73]),
the required sample size is 6. With a 95% confidence interval and 80% power, the hypothesized
difference in timing completing the ceremony (4 minutes), and our previous measurements of
variance for the task (9 minutes), the required sample size is 9. We rounded up to 10.
C.1.2

Success and Failure Rates

This data measures whether the participants were successful in using the authentication ceremony for
the original Signal and each of the modifications. We want to test whether there are any differences
in the success rate between the three versions of the Signal application.
Because the data is dichotomous we used Cochran’s Q Test and found that the success rate
was statistically different for the applications (χ2 (2) = 27.11, p < .0005).
Since we used a between-subject study design, we performed Barnard’s exact test to find
the significant differences among the pairs of applications. This test shows the differences among
all the pairs are significant (Signal vs. Modification 1, p = 0.0165; Signal vs. Modification 2,
p = 1.15E − 05; Modification 1 vs. Modification 2, p = 0.0163).
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C.1.3

Task Completion Times

This data measures the time taken by participants to (a) find the authentication ceremony and (b)
complete the authentication ceremony. We want to test whether there are any differences between
the three versions of the Signal application, in finding and task completion time.
We did not perform a multiple samples comparison test because of the high failure rate with
the original version of Signal. Since the studies are between subject, we ran a two-tailed two-sample
t-test between Modification 1 and Modification 2.
For finding the authentication ceremony, a two-tailed, two-sample t-test with equal variance
shows there is no significant difference between Modification 1 and Modification 2 (p=0.484,
95% CI: [-0.37, 0.759] minutes). This is expected since the interfaces for finding the ceremony
are identical in these two versions. For completing the authentication ceremony, a two-tailed,
two-sample t-test with equal variance shows there is a significant difference between Modification
1 and Modification 2 (p=7.849E-05, 95% CI: [1.937, 6.16] minutes). For the total time to find
and complete the ceremony, a two-tailed, two-sample t-test with equal variance shows there is a
significant difference between Modification 1 and Modification 2 (p=1.05E-05, 95% CI: [2.982,
6.518] minutes).
C.1.4

Trust Scores

A one-way ANOVA shows that there are no significant differences between the different versions
(p=0.143).
C.2

Study Materials

This section contains the study materials we used. The interview guide and interview form were
used by the study coordinators to ensure that each pair of participants experienced an identical study.
The questionnaire was followed by study participants to guide them through the study.
C.2.1

Interview Guide

Make sure to complete the following steps:
• When the two users arrive, read them the following:
Welcome to our secure messaging application study. We are the study coordinators and are
here to assist you as needed.
Before we start the study, we need you to let us install an application called Signal on your
phone. You will use this application during the study, and then we will delete it for you when
we are done.
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• Install the Signal application on their phone.
• Now read the following:
In this study, the two of you will be in different rooms and will use the Signal app to
communicate with each other.
You will be asked to think aloud during the study. This means that you should explain
everything you are thinking and feeling during the study so we can understand how you
interact with the Signal application.
During the course of this study we will be making an audio recording of what you say. We will
transcribe these recordings and may publish them as part of our study, but we will not identify
you in any way. We will destroy the audio recordings and will publish only transcripts so that
you will be anonymous. We will not collect any personally identifying information about you.
You will also take a survey during the study, and we will publish your answers, but without
any information that can identify you.
You will each receive $7 cash as compensation for your participation in this study. You
will also have an opportunity during the study to earn a bonus of $3 cash, based on your
performance. The expected time commitment is approximately 30 minutes.
If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to ask us. You can end participation in this
survey at any time and we will delete all data collected at your request. A study coordinator
will be with you at all times to observe the study and also to answer any questions you may
have.
• Before going to the study rooms, make sure the participants sign the audio recording consent
form.
• Flip a coin and choose one participant to be Person A and one person to be Person B. Take the
participant with whom you will work to the study room. Ask the participant to sit down.
• Start the audio recording using the equipment in the study room.
• Read the following instructions to your participant:
We are going to ask you to do a series of tasks. Once you are done with each step, let the study
coordinator know you have finished the task. You will then fill out a questionnaire and go
to the next step. We need you to think out loud while you are doing the tasks in this study,
meaning you are supposed to talk about how you are accomplishing the task and express
any feelings you have. If you have any questions about the study ask the study coordinator.
Remember you are allowed to talk to or meet your friend during the study.
Please do not forget to think out loud.
• On the chromebook, load the survey from Qualtrics.
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• Before using Signal, the survey will instruct the participant to tell you they are ready to begin
the next task.
During the course of the task pay attention to what user is doing and fill out one of the attached
sheets.
The user is supposed to think aloud while doing the tasks. If she forgets, gently remind her.
Do not answer any questions from the participants.
The participants have 10 minutes to complete the primary task, which is using Signal to
exchange credit card information. If they do not finish the task on time, guide them to the next
part of the survey. If you end the task, inform the other study coordinator that you have done
so, so that he catches up with you.
If it takes the pair too long to complete authentication or if they sent a credit card number
before performing the authentication, then record that as a failure.
• When the survey is finished, ask the participant about their experience.
Use the situations you noted while they took the study or interesting things they said on the
survey. If they had any problems during the study, ask them to use their own words to describe
the problem. Ask them how they would like to see it resolved.
• When the participant is finished, ask his/her opinion on the following questions:
– Ask user if they trust the voice or text messaging for secure conversation?
– If they did not use the authentication ceremony:
∗ Ask them what they were looking for.
∗ Show them how to find the application ceremony. Why did they not find it?
∗ How do you think this screen would have helped you accomplish the task?
– If they did use the authentication ceremony, show them the screen(s).
∗ How do you think this screen helped you accomplish the task?
– Explain the following:
It is possible for someone to intercept your messages. These screens we have been
showing you are called an authentication ceremony. Using the authentication ceremony
ensures that nobody, not Signal, not hackers, and not even the government, is able to
intercept your messages. You only need to do this once (or if your friend reinstalls the
app).
Now that you know this, are you willing to use the authentication ceremony before you
exchange messages with a friend the first time?
• Stop the audio recording.
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• Return to the study room. Thank the participants for their time. Ask them not to invite their
friends to participate. Help them fill out the compensation forms and give them compensation.
C.2.2

Study Questionnaire

Signal study
1. Please enter whether you are Participant A or B.
◦ A
◦ B
2. What is your gender?
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ I prefer not to answer
3. What is your age?
◦ 18-24
◦ 25-34
◦ 35-45
◦ 46-64
◦ 65 and over
◦ I prefer not to answer
4. What is the highest degree or level of schooling you have completed?
◦ None
◦ Primary/grade school
◦ Some high school, no diploma
◦ High school graduate: diploma or equivalent (e.g., GED)
◦ Some college, no diploma
◦ Associate’s or technical degree
◦ Bachelor’s degree
◦ Graduate/professional degree
◦ I prefer not to answer
5. What is your major, or if employed, your occupation?
6. Tell the study coordinator that you are ready for the next task to begin.
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7. For Person A
You left your credit card at home! You are going to be using the Signal app to ask your friend
to send you the credit card number.
This is the message you should send to your friend:
“Hi! Can you send me my credit card number? I left my card on my desk at home.”
You can both earn a bonus of $3 for this study if you make sure that nobody can steal this
information while your friend is sending it.
Talk out loud as you do this task.
For Person B
Your friend is going to use the Signal app to ask you for their credit card number. Use the
credit card given to you by the study coordinator.
You can both earn a bonus of $3 for this study if you make sure that nobody can steal this
information while you’re sending it.
Talk out loud as you do this task.
8. You will now be asked several questions concerning your experience with Signal.
9. Do you think you have safely exchanged the credit card number with your friend?
◦ No
◦ Yes
◦ Not sure
10. Please explain your answer:
11. Did you see this screen during the study?
(showed Figure C.1)
◦ No
◦ Yes
If (Yes), ask the following three questions.
12. What do you think this screen does?
13. Overall, how difficult or easy was it to use this screen to verify the safety number?
(Extremely easy to extremely difficult)
14. When you used this screen during the study to verify the safety number, what did you like or
dislike about this? Please explain why.
(showed Figure C.1)
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(a) Original Signal

(b) Modification 1

(c) Modification 2

Figure C.1: Authentication ceremony screen
15. Before this study, have you ever tried to send sensitive information when you use a secure
messaging application like Signal?
◦ Yes
◦ No
16. (If Yes), Explain what kind of sensitive information you have sent.
17. I trust that Signal is secure.
◦ Strongly agree
◦ Somewhat agree
◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Somewhat disagree
◦ Strongly disagree
18. Please explain your answer to the above question.
19. How would you rate your knowledge of computer security?
◦ Beginner
◦ Intermediate
◦ Advanced
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20. Which of the following applications have you ever used? Select as many options that applies
to you.
 WhatsApp
 Signal
 Telegram
 Line
 Allo
 Facebook Messenger
 iMessage
 Skype
 Viber
 Other
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Appendix D
Study Materials for “I Don’t Even Have to Bother Them! Using Social Media to Automate
the Authentication Ceremony in Secure Messaging”
D.1

Study Materials

D.1.1

Lab User Study

This section contains the study materials we used. The interview guide and interview form were
used by the study coordinators to ensure that each pair of participants experienced an identical study.
The questionnaire was followed by study participants to guide them through the study.
D.1.2

Study Coordinator Guide

Study Coordinator’s Name:
Date:

Start Time:
End Time:

 Make sure the participants are qualified.
• 18 or older
• Have not participated in a previous user study with secure messaging applications
• Have Android smart phones
• Have each others’ phone numbers in their contact list
• Are friends in at least one of the Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or Pinterest
• Do not have Signal already installed on their phone
 Read the following:
Welcome to our study. We are the study coordinators and are here to assist you as needed.
Before we start the study, we need you to let us install an application called Signal on your
phone. You will use this application during the study, and then we will delete it for you when
we are done.
 Install the Signal application on their phones.
 Read the following:

200

In this study, the two of you will be in different rooms and will use Signal to communicate
with each other. You will each be asked to play the role of another person. We will provide
you with information about this person.
Even though you will be in separate rooms, you are welcome to call each other, text each other,
or ask to meet in person during the study if you feel you need to do this to complete the study.
You will be asked to think aloud during the study. This means that you should explain
everything you are thinking and feeling during the study so we can understand the choices you
make.
During the course of this study we will be using a video camera to record what is happening
on your phone and what you say. We will transcribe what you say and may publish this as part
of our study, we will not identify you in any way. We will destroy the video recordings at the
end of the study. We will not collect any personally identifying information about you.
You will also take a survey during the study, and we will publish your answers, but without
any information that can identify you.
You will each receive $15 cash each as compensation for your participation in this study.
The expected time commitment is approximately 50 minutes. If you have any questions or
concerns, feel free to ask us. You can end participation in this survey at any time and we will
delete all data collected at your request. A study coordinator will be with you at all times to
observe the study and also to answer any questions you may have.
We will now ask you to sign a consent for the video recording.
 Have the participants sign the video recording consent form.
 Flip a coin and choose one participant to be Person A and one person to be Person B.
 Take the participant with whom you will work to the study room. Ask the participant to sit
down.
 Start the video recording using the equipment in the study room.
 Load the survey from Qualtrics on the laptop.
 Read the following instructions to your participant:
We are going to ask you to fill out a survey. The survey will ask you questions and instruct you
to do a series of tasks. When you are asked for your opinion, please write a complete answer.
Your opinions are very important to us.
Please think out loud while you are doing the tasks in this study, meaning you are supposed to
talk about how you are accomplishing the task and express any feelings you have.
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Remember, even though you will be in separate rooms, you are welcome to call each other,
text each other, or ask to meet in person during the study if you feel you need to do this to
complete the study.
 The participant is supposed to think aloud while doing the tasks. If they forget, gently remind
them. If they ask for help, tell them to do the best they can, and do not help them with the task.
You may suggest that they can call, text, or visit their study partner.
 Verified safety numbers the first time?
 Yes
 No
 First authentication version

Start
Time:

End Time:

 QR Code
 Phone call
 Social authentication
 Help the participant reset the verified status in the application.
 Second authentication version

Start
Time:

End Time:

 QR Code
 Phone call
 Social authentication
 Help the participant reset the verified status in the application.
 Third authentication version

Start
Time:

End Time:

 QR Code
 Phone call
 Social authentication
 Be sure the participants read the slides explaining the authentication ceremony.
 Be sure the participant gives complete answers in open response questions.
 Mistakes made or problems with the study:
 Stop the video recording.
 Return to the study room. Thank the participants for their time. Help them fill out the
compensation forms and have them see the CS office for compensation.
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D.1.3

Study Questionnaire

1. The study coordinator will enter A or B for you.
◦ A
◦ B
2. What is your gender?
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ I prefer not to answer
3. What is your age?
◦ 18-24
◦ 25-34
◦ 35-45
◦ 46-64
◦ 65 and over
◦ I prefer not to answer
4. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
◦ None
◦ Primary/grade school
◦ Some high school, no diploma
◦ High school graduate: diploma or equivalent (e.g., GED)
◦ Some college, no diploma
◦ Associate’s or technical degree
◦ Bachelor’s degree
◦ Graduate/professional degree
◦ I prefer not to answer
5. What is your occupation or major?
6. Tell the study coordinator that you are ready for the next task to begin.
7. First task
You are going to be using the Signal application to send text messages to your friend. The
Signal application is designed to help you have private conversations. For this study, one of
you will be playing the role of an adult child, and the other will play the role of the mother or
father. Read the card that describes your role.
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◦ For Person A
You are going to be visiting your mother/father next week and want to arrange a dinner.
Use Signal to have a short conversation about what restaurant your mother/father would
like to go to for dinner.
◦ Person B
Your son/daughter is going to be sending you text messages via Signal. Please wait for
him/her to contact you and respond how you think a parent would.
◦ For Both
Please talk out loud as you perform this task.
When you are finished, tell the study coordinator that you are ready for the next task.
8. Second task
◦ For Person A
Send a message to your father/mother asking for if they can help you with your taxes.
When they ask for it, send a picture of your tax information and thank them. Use the tax
information we provide for this role play.
Even though you are role playing, treat the tax information as carefully as you would if it
was your own personal tax information.
◦ For Person B
Your son/daughter is going to ask you for help doing their taxes. Wait for them to contact
you and agree to help. Tell them you need their tax information and they will send you a
picture.
Even though you are role playing, treat the tax information as carefully as you would if it
was your own child’s personal tax information.
◦ For Both
Please talk out loud as you do this task.
Tell the study coordinator that you are ready for the next task to begin. when you are done
9. You will now be asked several questions concerning your experience with Signal.
10. Do you think your conversation was private?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ Not sure
11. Please explain your answer:
12. Did you click on the red warning in the conversation screen, as shown:
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and see the following screen and choose an option?

◦ Yes
◦ No
13. If (No) Why do you think you did not tap on the red warning message?
14. If (No) Go back to the red warning message, click on it, and follow the instructions.
15. Which choice did you make on this screen?
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◦ IN PERSON
◦ PHONE CALL
◦ SOCIAL MEDIA
16. You said you used [choice from above].
17. Overall, how difficult or easy was it to use this screen to verify the safety numbers?
[ show screen from their choice]
(Very difficult to Very easy)
18. When you used this screen what did you dislike about it, if anything? Please explain why.
19. When you used this screen what did you like about it, if anything? Please explain why.
20. If (social authentication is selected) Did you click on any of the profile pictures of your contact
and visit their profile?
◦ Yes
◦ No, because: .....
21. The study coordinator will now reset the safety numbers on your phone. Go back and try one
of the other methods to verify safety numbers.
[Repeat questions 15-21]
22. The study coordinator will now reset the safety numbers on your phone. Go back and try one
of the other methods to verify safety numbers.
[Repeat questions 15-21]
At this point in the survey, the participants should have tried all three versions.
23. Which one of the authentication methods you tried is your favorite?
206

◦ In person
◦ Phone call
◦ Social medias
24. Why did you choose this for your favorite method?
25. Is there anything you dislike about the other options?
26. Do you have any concerns about using social networks to compare your security numbers
automatically?
27. Why do you think Signal asks you to verify safety numbers?
28. What is Secure Messaging?
When you send a standard text message on your phone, your phone company can read the text
message.

When you use secure messaging applications, you are having a private conversation with your
friend. Not even the company running the service can see your messages. Common secure
messaging applications are Telegram, Signal, WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook Messenger.

But you still need to be careful. A hacker could intercept your traffic. To make sure your
conversation is private, Signal assigns a “safety number” to each conversation. This safety
number is used to encrypt your messages. You need to make sure the safety number you have
on your phone is the same as on your friend’s phone. If the safety number matches, your
conversation is private and only you and your friend can read the messages. Not even Signal
or the government can read your messages, unless they have one of your phones where the
messages are stored.
29. Make sure your conversation is private in Signal
In our version of Signal, you have three ways to verify the safety numbers.
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If you select the ”IN PERSON” option, you need to be in the same place as your friend to
compare safety numbers by scanning a QR code.

If you select the ”PHONE CALL” option, you can make a free phone call with Signal and
read the safety numbers out loud to make sure they match.
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If you select the ”SOCIAL MEDIA” option, you can authorize Signal to publish a special key
on your social networks. It can then use this key to automatically compare the safety numbers
you share with your friends. You first need to make sure the pictures shown for your friend in
their social media accounts is accurate, and if they match, then Signal will do this comparison
for you.

Now that you know what these methods are doing, we would like to ask you several questions
again.
30. Which one of the authentication methods you tried is your favorite?
◦ In person
◦ Phone call
◦ Social media
31. Why did you choose this for your favorite method? If your opinion is the same, you can leave
this blank.
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32. Is there anything you dislike about the other options? If your opinion is the same, you can
leave this blank.
33. Do you have any concerns about using social networks to compare your security numbers
automatically? If your opinion is the same, you can leave this blank.
34. Why do you think Signal asks you to verify safety numbers?
35. How much do you trust these methods? (Likert scale)
◦ In person
◦ Phone call
◦ Social media
36. Before this study, have you ever used Signal?
◦ Yes: ....
◦ No
◦ Not Sure
37. (if Yes), Have you ever verified your safety numbers on any secure messaging application
using any similar methods to those you’ve seen in this study?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ Not Sure
38. Before this study, have you ever tried to send sensitive information with a secure messaging
application like Signal?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ Not Sure
39. (If Yes), Explain what kind of sensitive information you have sent?
40. Do you think you would normally verify the safety numbers when using a secure messaging
application like Signal?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ Not Sure
41. Please explain why or why not.
42. Mark any of the following options which apply to you.
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 Others often ask me for help with the computer.
 I often ask for help with the computer.
 I have taken courses in computer science, electrical or computer engineering, or information technology.
 I have never sent an encrypted email
 I understand the difference between secure messaging applications and regular messaging
applications.
 I am familiar with cryptography.
43. How often do you use the following social networks? (Likert scale)
◦ Facebook
◦ Twitter
◦ Pinterest
◦ Instagram
◦ Secure messaging applications
◦ Text messaging
◦ Signal
44. How often do you interact with the friend you brought to this study on the following applications? (Likert scale)
◦ Facebook
◦ Twitter
◦ Pinterest
◦ Instagram
◦ Secure messaging applications
◦ Text messaging
◦ Signal
D.1.4

Mechanical Turk Survey

In this section we are interested in learning about how you use secure messaging applications. A
secure messaging application encrypts your messages so only you and the person you are messaging
can see them.
1. How often do you use the following secure messaging applications?
(Likert scale, Daily to Never)
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◦ Allo
◦ iMessage
◦ Line
◦ Signal
◦ Viber
◦ WhatsApp
2. Some non-secure messaging applications also include the ability to encrypt some of your chats.
They typically add this as an optional feature that you have to select.
How often do you use the secure chat feature in the following messaging applications?
(Likert scale, Daily to Never)
◦ Secret chat in Telegram
◦ Secret conversation in Facebook Messanger
3. Secure messaging applications encrypt your messages so that they are only readable by you
and the person you are messaging. How important is it to you that messaging applications
protect the privacy of your messages from viewing by anyone else, even the company that runs
the messaging service?
(Likert scale, Extremely unimportant to Extremely important)

In this section we are interested in learning about how you use social networks.
4. How often do you use the following social networks? (Likert scale, Daily to Never)
◦ Facebook
◦ Intagram
◦ Twitter
◦ YouTube
◦ Pinterest
◦ Linkedin
◦ Google+
◦ Tumblr
◦ Flickr
◦ Snapchat
◦ Reddit
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5. Now we want you to think about all the people you normally communicate with using text
messaging or instant messaging. How many of these people are you also friends with on the
following social networks?
(Likert scale, All to None)
◦ Facebook
◦ Intagram
◦ Twitter
◦ YouTube
◦ Pinterest
◦ Linkedin
◦ Google+
◦ Tumblr
◦ Flickr
◦ Snapchat
◦ Reddit
In this section we are interested in your opinions about the security methods used in secure
messaging applications.
6. When you use secure messaging applications, you are having a private conversation with your
friend. This picture shows how the messages you send with your friend are encrypted.

Not even the company running the service can see your messages. Common secure messaging
applications are Signal, WhatsApp, and iMessage.
7. But you still need to be careful. A hacker could intercept your traffic.

8. To make sure your conversation is private, Signal assigns “safety number” to each conversation.
WhatsApp calls this a “security code”. Other secure messaging applications may use other
terminology.

213

The safety number is used to encrypt your messages. You need to make sure the safety number
you have on your phone is the same as on your friend’s phone. This is what a safety number
looks like:

9. The following screen shows how you can compare safety numbers in Signal.
You can either scan a QR code from your friend’s phone (if you are in the same location), or
you can call your friend and read the security code to be sure they match on both phones.

If the safety number matches, your conversation is private and only you and your friend can
read the messages. If the safety number doesn’t match, then somehow a hacker or Signal is
listening in on your conversation.
10. In the current version of secure messaging application such as Signal, you can find the safety
number by clicking on the users’ name in the conversation screen.

11. Have you ever seen this screen, or one like it, for comparing safety numbers in secure
messaging applications? (Yes/No)

12. (If Yes), Have you ever compared the safety numbers, either by scanning a QR code or making
a phone call and reading the numbers? (Yes/No)

In this section, we are comparing three methods for verifying safety numbers or security
codes and we want your opinions on them.
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13. The first method is called “IN PERSON”:
You need to be in the same place as your friend to compare safety numbers by scanning a QR
code.

14. What do you like about this method?
15. What do you dislike about this method?
16. Overall, how difficult or easy do you think it would be to use this method to compare safety
numbers? (Likert 7-point scale, Very difficult to Very Easy)
17. How often would you use this method to verify the safety numbers of your contacts? (Likert
7-point scale, Never to Always)
18. The second method is called “PHONE CALL”:
You can make a free phone call with Signal and read the safety numbers out loud to make sure
they match.
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19. What do you like about this method?
20. What do you dislike about this method?
21. Overall, how difficult or easy do you think it would be to use this method to compare safety
numbers? (Likert 7-point scale, Very difficult to Very Easy)
22. How often would you use this method to verify the safety numbers of your contacts? (Likert
7-point scale, Never to Always)
23. The third method is called “SOCIAL MEDIA”:
You can authorize Signal to publish a special key on your social networks. It can then use this
key to automatically compare the safety numbers you share with your friends. You first need
to make sure the pictures shown for your friend in their social media accounts is accurate, and
if they match, then Signal will do this comparison for you.

24. What do you like about this method?
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25. What do you dislike about this method?
26. Overall, how difficult or easy do you think it would be to use this method to compare safety
numbers? (Likert 7-point scale, Very difficult to Very Easy)
27. How often would you use this method to verify the safety numbers of your contacts? (Likert
7-point scale, Never to Always)
28. Which one of the authentication methods are your favorite?
◦ IN PERSON
◦ PHONE CALL
◦ SOCIAL MEDIA
29. What do you like about your favorite method?
30. What do you dislike about the other options?
31. Do you have any concerns about verifying safety numbers using the SOCIAL MEDIA method?

Thank you for taking this survey. In the last section we are interested in learning more about
you. We will keep this information private and will never share it with anyone.
6. What is your gender?
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ I prefer not to answer
7. What is your age?
◦ 18-24
◦ 25-34
◦ 35-45
◦ 46-64
◦ 65 and over
◦ I prefer not to answer
8. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
◦ None
◦ Primary/grade school
◦ Some high school, no diploma
◦ High school graduate: diploma or equivalent (e.g., GED)
217

◦ Some college, no diploma
◦ Associate’s or technical degree
◦ Bachelor’s degree
◦ Graduate/professional degree
◦ I prefer not to answer
9. In which country do you live?
10. On a scale of 1 to 5, how would you rate your current technological expertise?
For the purposes of this survey, were primarily concerned with your computer and web-based
skills. Weve defined three points on the scale as follows. These tasks represent some of the
things a person at each level might do.
Beginner (characterized as 1 and 2 on the scale): Able to use a mouse and keyboard, create a
simple document, send and receive e-mail, and/or access web pages
Intermediate (characterized as 3 on the scale): Able to format documents using styles or
templates, use spreadsheets for custom calculations and charts, and/or use graphics/web
publishing
Expert (characterized as 4 and 5 on the scale): Able to use macros in programs to speed tasks,
configure operating system features, create a program using a programming language, and/or
develop a database.
(1) Beginner
(2)
(3) Intermediate
(4)
(5) Expert

11. Thank you for your participation in this survey! Please enter the following code into your
Mechanical Turk account to get paid: (Random code)
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